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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines the motif of idolatry in the work of two modernist 
authors, Oscar Wilde and Joseph Conrad, and one modernist filmmaker, Alfred 
Hitchcock. The idols in these texts serve a contradictory role, signifying both increasing 
commodification under capitalism and an attempt to formulate a new ethics of image-
making in response to this global transition.  
Chapter 1 analyzes Wilde’s play Salomé. Attending to the original French and to 
biblical allusion, I demonstrate that the text’s key generative trope is idolatry, which 
occupies a position both sacred and profane. The play superimposes two moments of 
historical rupture, positing Salomé as the embodiment of a new artistic potential of 
idolatry under monopoly capitalism. Chapter 2 analyzes Conrad’s early fiction, 
particularly The Nigger of the “Narcissus,” “The Return,” “Karain,” and Nostromo. I 
track a three-stage development in Conrad’s representations of idols, whereby the idol is 
associated with utopian fantasy, false ideals, and the artistic process. I also identify a new 
image-making technique, “retroactive modification,” which attempts to destabilize the 
image and thus counter problems of narrative representation, particularly reification and 
 
 viii 
historical inauthenticity. Chapter 3 analyzes Hitchcock’s Blackmail, Saboteur, and 
Shadow of a Doubt, and challenges the notion of Hitchcock as auteur. The first two films 
culminate in sequences featuring monumental and iconic statuary. In the earlier British 
film, this process signifies a reckoning with history; in the later American film, it 
signifies the threat of history’s erasure and the degradation of art. Shadow of a Doubt 
signals a shift to a post-modern global-capitalist paradigm and a focus on the celebrity 
idol. 
My methodology builds on the work of Fredric Jameson and Slavoj Žižek to 
elucidate cultural fantasies underlying the texts and the ways in which the texts perform 
the psychical maneuver of disavowal, whereby a proposition is simultaneously asserted 
and denied. This double movement in Wilde, Conrad, and Hitchcock’s texts bespeaks a 
striving, through the motif of idolatry, to represent the image in motion. Though this 
desire is finally realized in the technology of film, the authenticity of that realization is 
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My colleagues and I occasionally share a joke about dissertations and their 
writers, at least in the humanities: discover what the dissertation is really about and you 
will have discovered the essential trauma of the writer’s life. In my case, the truth in 
comedy holds. I was raised, as far back as I can remember, in a culture that encouraged 
me to see myself and the rest of the world in terms of sin. Sin was not a discrete act or 
acts, but rather a fundamental condition of human being because of which one is, on 
some level, always divided against oneself and in continuous rebellion against some 
fantasized “natural” order now lost, that Great Good Time before the Fall. Without 
realizing it, I had been introduced to Augustine’s notion of original sin: peccatum 
originale originatum, the inherited condition of original sin that afflicts all and is a 
consequence of peccatum originale originans, Adam and Eve’s original acts of sin.1 Sin is 
that in me that is not me, yet is nevertheless the inescapable condition of my existence. 
This dissertation focuses on a specific sin, that of idolatry, in the works of two 
authors, Oscar Wilde and Joseph Conrad, and one filmmaker, Alfred Hitchcock. I argue 
that, across this broad range of texts, idols function as sites of contradiction registering 
both the historical fact of increasingly rapid and all-encompassing commodification 
under capitalism and also an attempt by each artist to begin to devise a new ethics of 
image-making in response to this sweeping historical transition. Like every modernist 
artist, Wilde, Conrad, and Hitchcock had to confront the question of what it means to be 
                                                





an artist—that is, an image-maker—in an age that regards the work of art not as a sacred 
or exalted creation apart from the mundane things of the world, but rather as a good to be 
bought and sold like any other on the open market.2 Though idolatry is not (or, at least, is 
not necessarily) synonymous with original sin, the texts analyzed in this dissertation 
imply a significant connection between the two, and the chapters that follow are most 
productively read in light of this connection. 
Idolatry, Original Sin, and Catholicism 
Oscar Wilde 
The last chapter in The Picture of Dorian Gray includes a passage in which 
Dorian is figured as an idol. That in itself would not be remarkable, since Dorian is often 
presented as such in the novel, Wilde’s most extensive meditation on the relation of 
idolatry to art. In this passage, however, Dorian rejects his image as idol, and this 
repudiation of idolatry is likened to an overcoming of original sin.3 Lying in his library 
late one night, Dorian is reminded of “[t]he curiously carved mirror that Lord Henry had 
given to him” years before: 
He took it up, as he had done on that night of horror, when he had first 
noted the change in the fatal picture, and with wild tear-dimmed eyes 
looked into its polished shield. Once, some one who had terribly loved 
him, had written to him a mad letter, ending with these idolatrous words: 
“The world is changed because you are made of ivory and gold. The 
                                                
2 “Modernism also can only be adequately understood in terms of that commodity production whose all-
informing structural influence on mass culture I have described above: only for modernism, the commodity 
form signals the vocation not to be a commodity, to devise an aesthetic language incapable of offering 
commodity satisfaction, and resistant to instrumentalization.” Fredric Jameson, “Reification and Utopia in 
Mass Cutlure,” in Signatures of the Visible (New York: Routledge, 1992), 16. 
3 I do not mean to imply that Dorian actually successfully overcomes original sin or his penchant for 




curves of your lips rewrite history.” The phrases came back to his 
memory, and he repeated them over and over to himself. Then he loathed 
his own beauty, and flinging the mirror on the floor crushed it into silver 
splinters beneath his heel.4 
 
The final line includes an allusion to Genesis 3:15, which is one of several consecutive 
verses in which God enumerates the consequences of Adam and Eve’s act of original sin 
(peccatum originale originans). The allusion is partially veiled by the translation in the 
Authorized (King James) Version: “And I will put enmity between thee [the serpent] and 
the woman [Eve], and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou 
shalt bruise his heel.” Throughout the novel, however, Dorian’s obsession with the exotic 
and sensual manifests in part as an ongoing fascination with what was—according to 
English Protestants of the late nineteenth century, at least—the most idolatrous of 
institutions, the Catholic Church.5 The most popular Catholic English translation of the 
time renders Genesis 3:15 as follows: “I will put enmities between thee and the woman, 
and thy seed and her seed: she shall crush thy head, and thou shalt lie in wait for her 
heel.”6 Here, then, we find the scriptural referents of the key verb and noun from Wilde’s 
line, “crushed” and “heel.” Wilde’s sibilant “silver splinters” recall the subtle serpent of 
Genesis, leaving little doubt about the intended allusion. Thus, this striking passage from 
Dorian Gray, which implicitly identifies idolatry with original sin, casts its gaze back not 
only over much of the novel (to “that night of horror, when he had first noted the change 
                                                
4 Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray: Authoritative Texts, Backgrounds, Reviews and Reactions, 
Criticism, ed. Michael Patrick Gillespie, A Norton Critical Edition, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 
2007), 181. 
5 In his attraction to Catholicism, Dorian resembles Wilde, who, from his Oxford days forward, continually 
flirted with conversion to the Church of Rome, finally completing the deed on his death-bed in Paris. See 
Richard Ellmann, Oscar Wilde (New York: Vintage, 1988), esp. 583-84.  




in the fatal picture”), but also, via allusion, over the whole of human history, all the way 
back to the originating of original sin.  
The cluster of associations—original sin, idolatrous sensuality, Catholicism—
represented in the passage are brought together elsewhere in the novel as well. Dorian is 
particularly drawn to the “Roman ritual” of the Eucharist, which the novel depicts near 
the beginning of chapter 11 in highly sensual terms: the touch of “cold marble 
pavement,” the sight of “white hands moving aside the veil of the tabernacle,” the scent 
of “fuming censers” held aloft by “grave boys, in their lace and scarlet.”7 It is described as 
a “daily sacrifice, more awful really than all the sacrifices of the antique world,”8 a nod to 
the Catholic belief in transubstantiation, which was decried as a type of cannibalism and 
vampirism by hostile Protestant contingents in Victorian Britain and Ireland. Near the 
end of chapter 11, the idolatry and vampirism of Catholicism are more heavily 
emphasized as Dorian contemplates his ancestors both hereditary and literary. As he 
“look[s] at the various portraits of those whose blood flowed in his veins,” he wonders 
whether this hereditary transfer of blood also entails the transfer of “some strange 
poisonous germ,” “some inheritance of sin and shame”9 (such is the nature of original sin, 
a hereditary transfer from humankind’s first parents). Toward the end of this passage, the 
recurring image of blood begins to merge with the image of wine. Then, during Dorian’s 
musings on his “ancestors in literature,”10 who are almost all emphatically Catholic, we 
                                                
7 Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray, 110. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., 119-20. 




reach “Ezzelin, whose melancholy could be cured only by the spectacle of death, and 
who had a passion for red blood, as other men have for red wine”; “Giambattista Cibo, 
who [on becoming pope] in mockery took the name of Innocent, and into whose torpid 
veins the blood of three lads was infused by a Jewish doctor”; and, to drive home the 
particularly idolatrous inflections of Catholicism, “Sigismondo Malatesta, the lover of 
Isotta, and the lord of Rimini,” who “in honour of a shameful passion built a pagan 
church for Christian worship.”11 The church Sigismondo built, Tempio Malatestiano, was 
denounced by many of his contemporaries as a shrine to paganism.12 
 Though my chapter on Wilde analyzes Salomé, not The Picture of Dorian Gray, I 
elucidate in this introduction the interrelated themes of original sin, idolatry, and the 
vampirism of Catholic communion in the novel as a way of framing my analysis of 
Salomé, which Wilde wrote in 1891, the year Dorian Gray was published in book form.13 
In chapter 1 of this dissertation, I build on the work of Jarlath Killeen to show that 
Wilde’s play draws on anti-Catholic imagery of the period to portray Salomé’s desire to 
consume the body and blood of the prophet, Iokanaan. This desire is figured also as a 
kind of idolatry, a category which, in the context of the play, expands to encompass all 
manner of concupiscence. I also demonstrate, through careful attention to biblical 
allusion, that idolatry is the defining sin of the text, continually present yet continually 
                                                
11 Ibid., 123. 
12 A bitter enemy of Sigismondo Maletesta, Pope Pius II was particularly harsh in his condemnation of 
Sigismondo and the Tempio Malatestiano. See Emily O’Brien, The Commentaries of Pope Pius II (1458-
1464) and the Crisis of the Fifteenth-Century Papacy, Toronto Italian Studies (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2015), esp. 217. 
13 The Picture of Dorian Gray was first published in Lippincott’s Monthly Magazine in 1890. A significantly 




disavowed, and the text’s key generative trope. Thus, idolatry functions as the original sin 
of the text both insofar as idolatry is the inescapable condition of the text’s existence and 
also in idolatry’s status as the sin of fundamental generative potential. In this way, 
Salomé channels Voltaire, who conceived of original sin as the essential source of human 
creativity and progress14 and whose philosophy of sin coincides with many of Wilde’s 
own pronouncements on the subject.15 
Joseph Conrad 
Unlike Wilde, who was born into a Protestant family and was gradually drawn 
toward Catholicism over the course of his life, Joseph Conrad was born into Catholicism, 
which, according to many scholars, he utterly renounced in his adolescence, along with 
any belief in or fondness for Christianity in general. Advocates of this view almost 
inevitably refer to the 1902 letter Conrad wrote to his friend and fellow author Edward 
Garnett in which Conrad states that he “always, from the age of fourteen, disliked the 
                                                
14 “Voltaire argued that moral evil is inevitable to human nature. He turned Pascal’s contradictories into 
evidence of human nature’s strength, versatility, and creativity. [Ernst] Cassirer writes of Voltaire’s view 
that ‘were it not for our weaknesses, life would be condemned to stagnation, since the strongest impulses of 
life arise from our appetites and passions, that is, ethically considered, from our shortcomings.’ To allow 
for possibility of human creativity, God permits evil.” Wiley, Original Sin, 110. 
15 “What is termed Sin is an essential element of progress. Without it the world would stagnate, or grow old, 
or become colourless. By its curiosity, Sin increases the experience of the race. Through its intensified 
assertion of individualism, it saves us from monotony of type. In its rejection of the current notions about 
morality, it is one with the higher ethics.” Oscar Wilde, “The Critic as Artist,” in The Artist as Critic: 
Critical Writings of Oscar Wilde, ed. Richard Ellmann (New York: Random House, 1969; repr., Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982), 360. Citations refer to the 1982 edition. “And so, it is not our own life 
that we live, but the lives of the dead, and the soul that dwells within us is no single spiritual entity, making 
us personal and individual, created for our service, and entering into us for our joy. It is something that has 
dwelt in fearful places, and in ancient sepulchres has made its abode. It is sick with many maladies, and has 
memories of curious sins. It is wiser than we are, and its wisdom is bitter. It fills us with impossible desires, 
and makes us follow what we know we cannot gain. […]. It can teach us how to escape from our 
experience, and to realize the experiences of those who are greater than we are.” Wilde, “The Critic as 
Artist,” 383. For the purposes of this dissertation, when I discuss Wilde’s attitude toward sin, redemption, 
and related concepts, I am referring to Wilde as he was prior to his incarceration, a traumatic experience 




Christian religion, its doctrines, ceremonies and festivals. Presentiment that some day it 
will work my undoing, I suppose.”16 Perhaps significantly, the remark comes not amid a 
meditation on the history or philosophy of religion, but rather as a response to the 
suggestion that the Christmas season might stymy sales of Conrad’s recently published 
Youth and Two Other Stories. In any case, whatever Conrad may have felt for 
Christianity in his heart of hearts, Christian language and iconography play an important 
role in the way he frames his thoughts on writing as an art and profession.  
In another letter to Garnett, Conrad employs religious imagery, though not of a 
conclusively Christian type, to characterize the attitude of various publishers toward 
Garnett: 
It seems to me you do not realize this extraordinary prestige you possess—
the prestige of a quiescent bomb about whose deadly quality there is no 
doubt whatever. All these priests of imbecile idols seem to think that you 
may go off—if given a chance—and shatter their commodious temple to 
pieces. 
 May you do so! To me you are not a bomb—you are a righteous 
club which I imagine forever suspended over my head. And I don’t think 
you realize either how much this conception of E.G. influences the course 
of my existence.17 
 
The vision of Garnett as iconoclastic critic shattering the idols of unworthy publisher 
priests, and, more comically still, of Garnett as “righteous” Club of Damocles, 
complements the imagery of the next letter, sent about a week later, in which Conrad 
extols Garnett’s “amazing insight” into Lord Jim:  
                                                
16 Conrad to Garnett, December 22, 1902, in Letters from Joseph Conrad: 1895-1924, ed. Edward Garnett 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1928), 185. 




[Y]our analysis […] puts into words precisely and suggestively the dumb 
thoughts of every reader—and my own. 
 […] you have detected me falling back into my lump of clay I had 
been lugging up from the bottom of the pit, with the idea of breathing big 
life into it. And all I have done was to let it fall with a silly crash. 
 […]. I haven’t been strong enough to breathe the right sort of life 
into my clay—the revealing life.18 
 
In the first of these two letters, “idols” refer only to inferior authors and their work. In the 
second, however, in which Conrad imagines himself “breathing big life” into a “lump of 
clay” and, more subtly, Garnett breathing revelatory life into Conrad’s own “dumb 
thoughts,” Conrad seems to suggest that the lump of clay, whether the artist or artwork, 
could be molded into something worthy not of destruction, but of preservation and even 
veneration. 
Much like his letters at the turn of the century, Conrad’s fiction also uses the 
motif of idols and idolatry to reflect on the process of artistic creation. My analysis in 
chapter 2 tracks the growing frequency with which idols appear as a motif in select 
narratives from Almayer’s Folly, published in 1895, to Nostromo: A Tale of the 
Seaboard, published in 1904.19 Prior to Nostromo, Conrad’s work tends not to present 
idolatry in a specifically Roman Catholic context,20 though when those early stories do 
                                                
18 Conrad to Garnett, November 12, 1900, 171-72. Emphasis in the original. 
19 Aside from one brief reference, I do not discuss Heart of Darkness, published in 1899. Since there is 
already so much scholarship on the famous novella, I felt I could make a more significant contribution by 
focusing on other works. I have also chosen not to address Lord Jim for the simple reason that I enjoy it 
less than other narratives I do discuss. It may well have a place in a future expanded version of the current 
study. 
20 A notable exception is “Amy Foster,” published in 1901. For more on idolatry in “Amy Foster,” see the 




mention or imply Catholicism, it often signifies otherness and idolatry.21 In Nostromo, 
Conrad’s most extensive treatment of idolatry in relation to image-making, the “material 
interests” of Protestant proselytizer and San Francisco financier Holroyd, allied with the 
British Railway Company, are pitted against the political and familial interests of the 
Catholic Gould family, the de facto aristocracy of a thriving South American coastal 
town, as the two sides struggle for control of the San Tomé silver mine. Intimations and 
accusations of idolatry adhere to both Protestant and Catholic traditions in the novel, 
yielding a complex commentary on commodification, reification, and art, which I analyze 
at length. Unlike his depiction of Holroyd’s Protestantism, Conrad’s treatment of 
Catholicism in the novel, though not always wholly positive, is largely sympathetic. 
                                                
21 For example, in Almayer’s Folly, originally published in 1895, Kaspar Almayer, a Dutch trader living in 
Southeast Asia, is married to a native Malayan woman who, as part of her forced integration into the 
colonial European culture, was educated in a Catholic convent during her adolescence. As a result, she 
wears “always suspended round her neck” a “little brass cross,” which she regards “with superstitious awe” 
as a religious fetish: “That superstitious feeling connected with some vague talismanic properties of the 
little bit of metal, and the still more hazy but terrible notion of some bad Djinns and horrible torments 
invented, as she thought, for her especial punishment by the good Mother Superior in case of the loss of the 
above charm, were Mrs. Almayer’s only theological luggage for the stormy road of life” (33). Her 
experience with idolatrous Catholicism is immediately contrasted with her daughter’s protestant education, 
bereft of rosaries, crucifixes, and icons: “Mrs. Almayer had at least something tangible to cling to, but 
Nina, brought up under the Protestant wing of the proper Mrs. Vinck, had not even a little piece of brass to 
remind her of past teaching” (33). Joseph Conrad, Almayer’s Folly: A Story of an Eastern River (New 
York: Modern Library, 2002). “Amy Foster,” originally published in 1901, chronicles the journey of 
Yanko, a poor mountaineer from Central Europe who attempts to make his way to America, only to be 
shipwrecked and washed ashore in England, where the locals, who cannot understand his language, 
manner, or clothes, regard him as more animal than human. His Catholicism, a key aspect of his 
foreignness, is repeatedly presented as an idolatrous tradition. He is unable, for example, to comprehend the 
immensity of the Berlin train station, with its roof that “seemed made of glass, and was so high that the 
tallest mountain-pine he had ever seen would have had room to grow under it. Steam-machines rolled in at 
one end and out at the other. People swarmed more than you can see on a feast-day round the miraculous 
Holy Image in the yard of the Carmelite Convent down in the plains where, before he left his home, he 
drove his mother in a wooden cart:—a pious old woman who wanted to offer prayers and make a vow for 
his safety” (213). He is shocked that in England “there were no images of the Redeemer by the roadside” 
(227). The women of the town are disturbed by his habit of reciting the Lord’s Prayer every evening with 
the aid of a rosary and “in incomprehensible words and in a slow, fervent tone” (229), and once he is 
married, his wife, an English woman, is troubled when he tries to teach their infant son the same prayer 
(235). Joseph Conrad, “Amy Foster,” in “Typhoon” and Other Tales, ed. Cedric Watts (Oxford: Oxford 




As with Salomé, in Nostromo, idolatry is the defining sin of the text. Attending to 
previously unnoticed biblical allusions, I show that, from the opening scene, all work in 
the novel, including the work of art, is figured as a kind of idolatry. In terms of the grand 
action of the story, the chief idol is the silver of the San Tomé mine. In terms of the saga 
of the artist as image-maker, however, the chief idol is Mrs. Gould’s water-color sketch 
of the mine. Throughout Nostromo, the site of the mine is repeatedly presented as a 
formerly Edenic paradise. Charles and Emilia Goulds’ progressive fetishizing of the 
image of the mine as rendered in Mrs. Gould’s sketch engenders a recurring disavowal of 
the Fall, an attempt to identify a point before which it had not occurred. The text, in turn, 
continually reasserts the Fall, as though the Fall—the act, immediate consequences, and 
legacy of original sin—were happening again and again. In the novel’s critique of the 
artist as image-maker, the act of idolatry is tantamount to a relentless repetition of the 
Fall into original sin. 
Alfred Hitchcock 
 Like Conrad, Hitchcock was born into a Catholic family, and like Conrad, this 
made him an oddity in England in general, not to mention his hometown of Leytonstone, 
East London, in particular.22 “Just being a Catholic,” said Hitchcock, “meant you were 
eccentric.”23 When the director immigrated to the United States in 1939, his various 
                                                
22 Conrad was not born in England, of course, but in the city of Berdychiv, now in northern Ukraine. In 
1857, the year of Conrad’s birth, the region belonged to the Russian Empire and, prior to that, the Kingdom 
of Poland. By birth Polish, Conrad grew up speaking Polish and French. When he immigrated to Britain in 
his early 20’s, he spoke almost no English, and, unlike French and Polish, would continue to speak his third 
language with a noticeably foreign accent for the rest of his life. Conrad, Wilde, and Hitchcock were all 
perennial outsiders, in multiple overlapping ways. 
23 Quoted in Charlotte Chandler, It’s Only a Movie: Alfred Hitchcock, A Personal Biography (New York: 




eccentricities, including his Catholicism, were absorbed into the public persona of 
English gentleman he scrupulously cultivated (whether Catholicism really was a 
characteristic of the archetypal English gentleman didn’t matter much to Hitchcock’s 
American audience, most of whom would have been hard pressed to correctly identify, 
say, a Cockney accent versus a Brummie accent, or any of the other niceties Englishmen 
are likely to use to determine a compatriot’s origin and social standing). Hitchcock spoke 
often in interviews about his Catholic upbringing and education, encouraging the public 
to see his religious heritage as integral to his sense of ethics, aesthetics, and storytelling: 
“What did I learn in Jesuit school? A consciousness of good and evil, that both are 
always with me. They taught me control, organization, discipline.”24 The Jesuit masters 
also instilled in young Hitchcock a tenacious fear of “[t]he threat of corporal 
punishment.”25 According to Charlotte Chandler, “Hitchcock speculated that having this 
fear of punishment always hanging over him may have contributed to his ‘ticking bomb’ 
theory of suspense in cinema, that it wasn’t the explosion, but the threat of the explosion 
that created the suspense. He also learned that a sense of the forbidden and of sin makes 
everything more fascinating.”26 In short, Catholic sensibility was just as much a part of 
Hitchcock’s performance as the conspicuous and well-made boutonnière was of Wilde’s.27 
                                                
24 Quoted in Chandler, It’s Only a Movie, 35.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Chandler, It’s Only a Movie, 35. 
27 For a provocative consideration of Hitchcock’s “dandyism of sobriety,” in relation to Wilde and others, 
see Thomas Elsaesser, “The Dandy in Hitchcock,” in Alfred Hitchcock: Centenary Essays, ed. Richard 
Allen and S. Ishii-Gonzalès (London: BFI, 1999), 3-13. On Hitchcock as “practical joker” in Hollywood, 
Elsaesser remarks, “[T]he practical joker displays a particularly violent ambiguity: he attracts and holds an 
audience in order to distance himself the more definitely from any community with it. He recalls, in this 




 Despite Wilde and Hitchcock both adopting strong, distinctive public personae, as 
recently as 2005, Jarlath Killeen could write that, “except for those scholars who have 
made Wilde a subject of study, that he was interested in Catholicism is virtually 
unknown.”28 Not so for the Master of Cinematic Suspense. As my above commentary 
indicates, Catholicism is now and has long been part of Hitchcock’s public image, so 
much so that the first book-length academic study of Hitchcock’s oeuvre, Hitchcock: The 
First Forty-Four Films, by Eric Rohmer and Claude Chabrol, considers Hitchcock’s 
Catholicism to be the defining element of his art. Published in French in 1957, the book 
argues that the films express a specifically Jansenist worldview, i.e., one that emphasizes 
the ubiquity of original sin, the absence of free will, and the need for efficacious grace.29 
Though I think there is much merit in this interpretation of Hitchcock’s films, at this 
point, it has become so familiar to Hitchcock scholars that I am not compelled to produce 
yet another minor variation on the Rohmer and Chabrol thesis. For this reason, in my 
chapter on Hitchcock, I have not labored to place the films within a specifically Catholic 
context (though that context certainly exists, as Hitchcock scholarship has firmly 
established, and my own readings complement it). I have also shied away from films that 
                                                                                                                                            
painting—often a figure of pathos, as he stands apart from the crowd, yet bears the burden of their 
amusement. To the unconscious disloyalty of the audience corresponds the practical joker’s betrayal of his 
victim’s trust” (9). Several paragraphs later, Elsaesser continues, “That Hitchcock chose the dandy side of 
the British cultural character—a choice greatly facilitated by his move to Hollywood—shows another 
irony, for in Hollywood, the dandy turned into the saltimbanque: he chose a disguise that remarkably 
looked like it belonged to the other party—that of philistine Victorianism” (11). 
28 Jarlath Killeen, The Faiths of Oscar Wilde: Catholicism, Folklore and Ireland, Palgrave Studies in 
Nineteenth-Century Writing and Culture (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 1.  
29 A controversial movement within the Catholic Church, Jansenism originated in the seventeenth century 
with Flemish theologian Cornelius Jansen’s interpretation of the teachings of St. Augustine. The movement 
took hold in France, where it maintained a significant following into the eighteenth century. Encyclopaedia 





feature overtly Catholic iconography (e.g., I Confess, The Wrong Man). What does 
interest me, however, are the massive idols (or, if not literal idols, statues that verge on 
idol status) that appear at the end of multiple Hitchcock films (e.g., Blackmail, Saboteur, 
North by Northwest), as though the entire movie were somehow leading up to the idols’ 
appearance. I do accept, in accord with the Jansenist thesis, that these giant stone figures 
in some way embody the all-powerful auteur god gazing out at his creation (i.e., his film 
and his audience), but I am most interested in the ways that these idols, and the narratives 
that culminate in their appearances, trouble the notion of the omnipotent filmmaker god, 
particularly in relation to Hitchcock’s transition from Gaumont-British darling to pioneer 
of the American filmmaking landscape. This trans-Atlantic move, I argue, confronted 
Hitchcock with a new challenge, which I call “the terror of the audience,” a uniquely 
American manifestation of cultural debasement and historical erasure. 
Three Commercial Artists 
 Wilde, Conrad, and Hitchcock were all acutely aware of the way their art was 
received by the public. That is, all three were, in addition to whatever else they might 
have been, commercial artists. Hitchcock never hid the fact that he made movies to 
entertain people, and he insisted that popular appeal must be one of the primary 
objectives of the film director.30 Though Conrad was not quite as forthcoming about 
                                                
30 “We must not forget that our duty is always to provide entertainment for those who pay. […]. When you 
have to spend £50,000 or £100,000 on a film you must make it to please a lot of people in order to get your 
money back.” Alfred Hitchcock, “Films We Could Make,” in Hitchcock on Hitchcock: Selected Writings 
and Interviews, ed. Sidney Gottlieb, vol. 1, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 193. 
Originally published in London Evening News, November 16, 1927. Hitchcock’s conscientious 
commercialism is rarely overlooked by critics. Even Rohmer and Chabrol, in the first book-long study of 




commercial concerns, his letters evince continual hand-wringing over sales of his work. 
He never felt entirely secure in the profession of writing. Wilde developed an entire 
philosophy out of l’art pour l’art, which would logically suggest disinterest in public 
opinion. Nevertheless, as Regenia Gagnier has demonstrated in her groundbreaking Idylls 
of the Marketplace: Oscar Wilde and the Victorian Public, Wilde’s intentional 
commercialization of his own talent very much “supports the case for the concrete 
embeddedness of Aestheticism in a late-Victorian market economy.”31 “Wilde’s works,” 
writes Gagnier, “offer a site where the imagination—a romantic, indeed utopian, 
imagination—meets the marketplace that inevitably absorbs and transforms it” (15).32 
Gagnier may overestimate slightly the degree of transformation here, but the basic 
sentiment holds. 
I would position my own work in chapter 1, “Art and the Idolatry of Salomé,” as a 
complement to Gagnier’s project. “Wilde’s Salomé,” she writes, “posits the castration of 
the forces of law and order by the forces of illicit sexual desire.”33 In so doing, the play 
“confront[s] Victorian audiences with their own sexuality […] portray[ing] sex for sex’s 
sake, without purpose or production.”34 Though I agree with the majority of Gagnier’s 
claims, I argue that Salomé actually is concerned with “production,” and in my chapter 
on Wilde, I show how complex psychosexual dynamics operating within the text 
                                                                                                                                            
commercial considerations.” Eric Rohmer and Claude Chabrol, Hitchcock: The First Forty-Four Films, 
trans. Stanley Hochman (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1979), 9. 
31 Regenia Gagnier, Idylls of the Marketplace: Oscar Wilde and the Victorian Public (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1986), 11. 
32 Ibid., 15. 





contribute to significant commentary on the play’s historical moment of production in 
relation to the artist. As a text, Salomé registers that, by the end of the nineteenth century, 
it is neither possible nor desirable for art to inhabit a non-commodified, autonomous 
realm. A new way forward must be imagined. 
That is, in the broadest sense, the question I ask of every text examined 
throughout this dissertation: How does this narrative imagine a new way forward for the 
artist as image-maker in an increasingly commodified world? In the next section, I 
provide summaries of each of the three chapters, followed by a brief overview of my 
theoretical approach. 
Chapter Summaries 
In Chapter 1, “Salomé and the Art of Idolatry,” I argue that the formal and 
thematic attributes of Wilde’s play, which critics have tended to frame as aesthetic 
concerns, must instead be understood as the products of the particular politico-economic 
moment of the play’s own production. As a paradigmatic example of the aestheticizing 
tendency in Wilde criticism, I cite “Oscar Wilde’s Salome: Décor, Des Corps, Desire,” a 
brilliant post-structuralist reading in which Chad Bennett argues that Salomé constitutes 
“a vision of a world created and utterly disrupted by the powers of autonomous 
language.”35 Through careful attention to biblical allusion, as well as imagery and play 
with the signifier (much of which is evident only in the original French), I demonstrate 
that the key structural motif of the text is idolatry. This motif—previously unnoticed by 
                                                
35 Bennett borrows this summative line from, and builds on the argument of, Linda Dowling, Language and 
Decadence in the Victorian Fin de Siècle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 173, quoted in 




critics because thoroughly disavowed by the text—unlocks a libidinal economy of desire 
in the text that is doubled by an economy of physical goods exchanged between “idol-
buyers” and artisan “idol-sellers.” The motif of idolatry also constitutes a center around 
which aligns a whole nexus of structural binaries, including containment vs. rupture, 
purity vs. impurity, and the seen vs. the unseen, which manifest throughout the play in 
debates among various, often minor, characters representing diverse religious, ethnic, and 
national contingents within the Roman Empire. These dialectical oppositions and the 
debates they provoke may at first seem purely metaphysical. By explicating the historical 
context, however, I show that the philosophical disputes are also always political and that 
they bespeak a textual layering of two analogous moments of historical rupture and 
transition, one centered in first-century Judea, the other in nineteenth-century Britain. 
Invoking Jameson’s theory of the “political unconscious,” I argue that the historical 
rupture of the play threatens especially the role of the artist and, further, that the implied 
dissolution of the Veil of the Temple, which signifies both flagrant blasphemy and divine 
revelation, offers up eventual symbolic resolution in the form of Salomé herself, whose 
paradoxical status as pagan idol and perverse Christ-figure marks her as the locus of a 
new artistic potential of idolatry in an age of all-encompassing commodification under 
monopoly capitalism. 
In chapter 2, “Conrad and the Motion of Idolatry,” I track representations of idols 
in select fiction from the first decade of Conrad’s career as a published author, starting 
with Almayer’s Folly (1895) and culminating in Nostromo (1904). I show that, in his 




façade beneath which lies a hidden reality. Very soon, however, as early as An Outcast of 
the Islands (1896), one begins to see a three-stage development underway in Conrad’s 
representations of idols: first, the introduction into the narrative of a utopian fantasy of 
the future, which is actually a forward projection of an idealized past; second, an idol that 
embodies within the narrative the false ideal at the core of the fantasy; and third, a direct 
link between the idol and the artistic process. In my analysis of “The Return” (1897), I 
identify a new image-making technique, “retroactive modification,” centered on the 
image of a statue of a classical goddess. This technique is similar to, but not the same as, 
“delayed decoding.” Briefly put, the latter technique is ultimately a stabilizing maneuver, 
whereas the former keeps the image in flux as the narrative continually loops back on 
itself. The final and longest section of the chapter focuses on Conrad’s sprawling novel 
Nostromo, which, more overtly than any of the author’s previous fiction, manifests the 
contradictions inherent in imperial capitalism and its effects on authentic forms of social, 
cultural, and political life, and on Conrad’s treasured ideal of work. Mining as yet 
unnoticed biblical allusions within the text, I demonstrate that all work in the novel is 
framed as a type of idolatry. The key idol in the narrative of the artist as image-maker is 
Emily Gould’s sketch of the San Tomé silver mine. This image of the mine undergoes the 
process of retroactive modification, which, paradoxically, both enacts and counters the 
tendencies of reification and commodification endemic to capitalism. Emily Gould 
knows the brutal history of the mine, and recognizes the need to preserve a truthful record 
of the past, but at the same time, through her art, obscures that history with a utopian 




ultimately fails, that experiment still constitutes a significant step in Conrad’s endeavor to 
devise a new ethics of narrative representation. 
In chapter 3, “Hitchcock’s Idols of Entrapment,” I analyze three films from the 
first half of Alfred Hitchcock’s directorial career, Blackmail (1929), Saboteur (1942), and 
Shadow of a Doubt (1943). My analyses seek to complicate the popular critical 
conception of Hitchcock as auteur in absolute control of his own cinema. I argue that, 
though both Blackmail and Saboteur logically and deliberately culminate in sequences 
that prominently feature idols, the final idol in the earlier British film signifies a coming-
to-terms with the weight of history, whereas in the later American film, the idol instead 
suggests the unsettling prospect of history’s erasure. My analysis of Blackmail shows 
how Hitchcock culls cinematic techniques from German, Soviet, and American traditions 
in order to develop a “proxemics of guilt” and a firm foundation from which he will 
proceed to refine his signature style, according to which the objectification of the gaze is 
cognate with the production of guilt and suspense. My analysis of Saboteur shows how 
the romance plot attempts to cover over real historical conflict embedded both formally 
and thematically within the film. At the same time, the continual undermining of the 
romance plot indicates Hitchcock’s fundamental uneasiness about the potential for 
appealing to the audience in a predictable way. This uneasiness manifests in what I call 
“the terror of the audience,” which bespeaks a degradation of art and culture and is 
specific to Hitchcock’s new American context. In the final, shorter section of the chapter, 
I analyze Shadow of a Doubt as a major transitional film in Hitchcock’s oeuvre, after 




celebrity idol identified also as sculpted or crafted idol. I argue that Uncle Charlie’s 
pathology marks him as the embodiment of the dark side of the fantasy of capitalism, 
whereby productivity determines value. Uncle Charlie is also representative of 
Hitchcock’s ideal actor and, as such, signals a shift in Hitchcock’s work toward the star 
actor as idol and locus of commodification and reification. 
Appealing to the Masses, in Theory and Practice 
During her 1985 Oscar acceptance speech, Sally Field did not exclaim to an 
adoring crowd, “You like me, you really like me!” What she actually said was similar—
“I can’t deny the fact that you like me, right now, you like me!”—but somehow not quite 
as endearing. Nevertheless, millions of Americans, some of whom, like me, were too 
young to speak when the 57th Academy Awards Ceremony was originally televised, 
distinctly remember the Places in the Heart star uttering that slightly pithier affirmation 
of her own celebrity appeal. 
Though Field’s speech, and the fantasized version that has taken root in our 
collective consciousness, may never have been projected in a darkened room at twenty-
four frames per second, it still exemplifies a phenomenon of cinematic art that Jean-Luc 
Godard addressed during a 1968 panel discussion at UC Berkeley. A contingent of far-
left student activists, dissatisfied by Godard’s portrayal of would-be revolutionaries in La 
Chinoise (1967), pressed the director to clarify the authenticity of the film’s protagonists. 
In his response, Godard admonished the students: “You had a preconceived idea of what 
a political movie should be, and your difficulties stem from the false idea you have that 




you reproach these shadows for not being alive. What is alive is not what’s on the screen 
but what is between you and the screen.”36 Part of what appeals to me about film, 
literature, or any other narrative art is the nature of the fantasy or fantasies structuring the 
narrative as it is presented in words or images. What I’m after is Godard’s in-between. 
What is it that makes an audience, whether of viewers or readers, like a work—really like 
a work—of narrative art? Wherein lies the mass appeal? What are the narrative 
conventions that aid us, the readers and viewers, as we engage with the work of art to 
construct the story we will have seen? 
One of the most prolific theoretical apparatus available to literary and film critics 
for uncovering underlying narrative fantasies—whether the fantasy is asserted, denied, 
displaced, condensed, or otherwise—is Lacanian psychoanalysis, and in the chapters that 
follow, Lacanian theory and its Freudian antecedents are constantly in the background, 
and frequently the foreground, of my investigative efforts. The works I analyze most 
extensively, for example, all perform a crucial act of disavowal. This psychical maneuver 
differs from denial in that, whereas denial outright rejects a proposition, disavowal 
accepts and rejects it at the same time.37 Disavowal says, “I know X is not the case; 
nevertheless, I believe it to be true.” As mentioned above, in Wilde’s Salomé, the key 
generative trope of idolatry is disavowed by the text, and this act of disavowal is 
symptomatic of deep theological and philosophical conflicts for both the historical 
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moment of narrative action and the historical moment of the text’s production. In 
Conrad’s Nostromo, the chief artist, Emily Gould, knows that “for life to be large and 
full, it must contain the care of the past and of the future in every passing moment of the 
present. Our daily work must be done to the glory of the dead, and for the good of those 
who come after.”38 Yet, the act of disavowal entailed in her idolatrous rendering of the 
San Tomé mine directly contravenes the fidelity to history she seems to profess. In 
Hitchcock’s Saboteur, the disavowal of class and of the cultural import of significant art 
objects bespeaks a crisis of representation, “the terror of the audience.” In all these texts, 
intimations of historical rupture threaten the cohesion of form and the success of the 
artist.  
As is probably clear by now, in addition to Lacan, the other pillar of my 
theoretical approach is Marx. I also make use of the work of Fredric Jameson, 
particularly his theory of the “political unconscious,” which combines Lacanian and 
Marxian approaches to analyze narrative texts, both literary and cinematic. Jameson’s 
method, as elaborated in The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic 
Act, applies a Lacanian model of the individual unconscious to whole societies, and to 
the narratives produced within those societies, in order to understand how unconscious 
fantasies might also operate on a collective level; how those collective fantasies manifest 
through the formal attributes of received narrative genres and conventions; and finally, 
how the collective fantasies that structure narrative relate to the stages of History as 
determined by the dominant means and mode of production. I also build on the work of 
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Slavoj Žižek to varying degrees in all three chapters. Like Jameson, Žižek’s theoretical 
approach combines Lacanian and Marxian models, but whereas Žižek sees Lacanian 
theory as trans-historical, Jameson is always careful to note that the theoretical 
contributions of Freud and Lacan, while undeniably valuable, must themselves be 
understood as historically contingent. On this point, I agree with Jameson. 
Also lurking in the background throughout the dissertation, in ways I am sure I do 
not yet fully realize, is St. Augustine of Hippo, whose philosophy of original sin has been 
shaping my critical faculties since before I could read. This confession might seem to 
portend a gloomy road ahead, and at times, it is a bit gloomy. Yet it is also worth keeping 
in mind that Augustine’s primary reason for adopting a theory of original sin—and the 
Church Fathers’ primary reason for holding true to it for some sixteen centuries—was not 
to condemn humankind for its flawed nature, per se, but to provide a philosophical and 
theological rationale for the joyous possibility of redemption. That possibility resounds in 
various ways throughout the work of Wilde, Conrad, and Hitchcock, all three of whom 
knew how to indulge in the spirit of play (even Conrad—sometimes), and for the most 
part, my dissertation proceeds in that spirit. There is also something perversely 
comforting about the notion of original sin. The truly marvelous thing about sin, as has 







Chapter 1: Salomé  and the Art of Idolatry 
Here we touch upon the vital centre of Wilde’s art: sin. 
     —James Joyce, “Oscar Wilde: The Poet of ‘Salomé’” 
Introduction 
  In a dialogue published two years before Salomé was written,39 Wilde includes a 
joke that touches on attitudes toward idolatry. His speaker Vivian praises non-mimetic 
art: 
We are beginning to weave possible carpets in England, but only because 
we have returned to the method and spirit of the East. Our rugs and carpets 
of twenty years ago, with their solemn depressing truths, their inane 
worship of Nature, their sordid reproductions of visible objects, have 
become, even to the Philistine, a source of laughter. A cultured 
Mahomedan once remarked to us, “You Christians are so occupied in 
misinterpreting the fourth commandment that you have never thought of 
making an artistic application of the second.” He was perfectly right, and 
the whole truth of the matter is this: The proper school to learn art in is not 
Life but Art.40 
 
The second commandment is God’s injunction against idol-worship: “Thou shalt not 
make unto thee any graven image […]: Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor 
serve them: for I the LORD thy God am a jealous God.”41 It is characteristic of Wilde’s 
unique genius that he turns artistic prohibition into artistic production. In this case, he 
positions Vivian’s anecdote about Islamic art, famous for its non-figural mosaics, amid 
an argument against realism, which Vivian portrays as the petrification of artistic 
                                                
39 The dialogue, “The Decay of Lying: An Observation,” was originally published in January 1889. Wilde 
significantly revised the dialogue before republishing it in 1891 in the essay collection Intentions.  
40 Oscar Wilde, “The Decay of Lying: An Observation,” in The Artist as Critic: Critical Writings of Oscar 
Wilde, ed. Richard Ellmann (New York: Random House, 1969; repr., Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1982), 303-4. Citations refer to the 1982 edition. 





dynamism. The artist is the person who, seeing the world as it is not, embodies (in some 
medium) his new vision. This vision, initially rejected by society, gains gradual 
acceptance until eventually it becomes standard artistic practice. Art, a process of 
innovation, is mistaken for particular products, the dull artifacts of “unimaginative 
realism.”42 When this happens, the artistic ideal is reified as hollow idol. The artist’s task, 
as Vivian’s Mahomedan implies, is to challenge established convention by smashing 
those false idols. 
 At other times in Wilde’s oeuvre, idolatry serves the opposite function: rather 
than the “unimaginative realism” that stymies art, idolatry is identified with the process 
of artistic production itself. In Salomé in particular the role of idolatry as a key structural 
motif has escaped the attention of even Wilde’s most sensitive critics. This oversight 
points not to a lapse in critical rigor, however, but to the text’s own tendency to disavow 
its fascination with idolatry. Making use of the Freudian term disavow, I mean to direct 
attention to the operations of what Fredric Jameson has called the “political 
unconscious,” a type of textual agency through which sedimented formal conventions 
register the longing for collective utopian fantasies engendered by various social 
formations and by which narrative seeks symbolic resolutions to real historical conflicts. 
Building on this theoretical framework, in the following pages, I will demonstrate that the 
formal and thematic characteristics of Salomé, which have most often been explicated in 
primarily, if not purely, aesthetic terms, are most fruitfully understood as products of the 
                                                




dilemma of commodification in a particular politico-economic context of the late 
nineteenth century. 
The Wine of Herodias: The Figurative and the Literal,  Excess and 
Containment 
 In her first speech of the play, Salomé perfectly stages the Freudian process of 
disavowal:43 “It is strange that the husband of my mother looks at me like that. I know not 
what it means. Of a truth I know it too well.”44 (C’est étrange que le mari de ma mère me 
regarde comme cela. Je ne sais pas ce que cela veut dire … Au fait, si, je le sais.)45 
Confronted with the intolerable incestuous desire of Herod Antipas, her stepfather and 
biological uncle, Salomé reacts by disavowing that desire: I do not know it; nevertheless, 
in truth, I know it. As a play, Salomé’s symbolist aesthetic impels its audience into a 
similarly contradictory position. Though most staged drama poses a tension between the 
phenomenology of the theatrical space and the world that space represents, this tension is 
                                                
43 According to Freud, disavowal differs from simple denial in that, whereas the latter obviates an 
intolerable reality by denying it outright, the former posits that two mutually incompatible positions, 
attitudes, or beliefs are true at the same time. Sigmund Freud, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, trans. and 
ed. James Strachey (New York: Norton, 1949), 90-92. 
44 Oscar Wilde, Salome, trans. Alfred Douglas, in Oscar Wilde: The Major Works, ed. Isobel Murray, rev. 
ed. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 304. All subsequent English-language 
quotations are from this edition, unless otherwise noted. Citations will be marked parenthetically in text as 
(SE) to designate “Salome, English translation.” 
45 Oscar Wilde, Salomé, in The Works of Oscar Wilde, Ravenna ed., vol. 12, Salomé, La Sainte Courtisane 
(New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, [1915?]), 16. All subsequent French-language quotations are from this 
edition, unless otherwise noted. Citations will be marked parenthetically in text as (SF) to designate 
“Salomé, French original.” Note that the ellipsis in the original French line, rendered as a period in 
Douglas’s translation, is ambiguously suggestive. The final sentence, which Douglas translates, “Of a truth 
I know it too well,” is starker in the French. A better translation would be “In truth, yes, I know it.” 
According to Richard Ellmann, Wilde thought Douglas’s translation of the play “unacceptable” and 





much more pronounced for Salomé than for most of Wilde’s other plays, which conform 
to more realist conventions. In a production of An Ideal Husband, for example, the action 
performed in the theatre could conceivably be performed in real life by persons very 
much like the play’s actors in a space very much like the one on stage. The same cannot 
be said for Salomé. In a production of Salomé, the audience not only has to accept that 
the actress before them is the first-century Princess of Judea, but also that this princess is 
simultaneously herself and something greater than herself. In the symbolist theatre, the 
symbol necessarily exceeds the bounds of its embodiment in a particular person or thing. 
This excess is not an entertaining supplement to the play’s core aesthetic; it is that 
aesthetic’s defining quality. Without it the play fails. 
 The diegetic content of Salomé allegorizes the tension between the phenomenal 
and the noumenal inherent to the play’s symbolist form through several recurring 
dialectical oppositions, including the known vs. the unknown, the seen vs. the unseen, 
and the literal vs. the figurative. All three oppositions emerge early in the play during an 
exchange prompted by the First Soldier’s observation: “Herodias has filled the cup of the 
Tetrarch” (SE, 302). This is the first time Herodias is mentioned in the play. Later, when 
the prophet Iokanaan launches into his lengthy tirade against the sins of Rome and 
Herod’s client kingdom, Herodias and by extension her daughter, Salomé, become the 
key signifiers of sexual excess. Iokanaan’s denunciations draw heavily from the Bible, 
particularly Ezekiel 23, in which Ezekiel prophesies an angry God determined to punish 
Israel for its sexual iniquities. In the biblical source, Israel’s “cup” symbolizes both the 




divine wrath they will soon suffer for their transgressions.46 In Salomé the wine with 
which Herodias fills the Tetrarch’s cup spills over in an excess of figurative language, 
which ancillary characters un-self-consciously attempt to re-contain in rigid literal-
minded interpretation: 
SECOND SOLDIER. The Tetrarch is very fond of wine. He has wine of 
three sorts. One which is brought from the Island of Samothrace, and 
is purple like the cloak of Caesar. 
THE CAPPADOCIAN. I have never seen Caesar. 
SECOND SOLDIER. Another that comes from a town called Cyprus, and 
is as yellow as gold. 
THE CAPPADOCIAN. I love gold. (SE, 302) 
 
There is perhaps a warning implicit in this exchange against approaching Salomé—
whether in terms of what one sees or what one hears—too literally. I emphasize the too, 
since one way the text makes meaning is precisely the oscillation between the literal and 
the figurative.  
The oscillation between the figurative and literal, between rupture and re-
containment, points to a paradoxical self-negating, self-generating quality of language in 
Salomé. In the above excerpt, the figurative generates the literal in the shift from the 
Second Soldier’s speech to the Cappadocian’s speech, whereby the vehicle of each simile 
becomes a literal object unto itself: “like the cloak of Caesar” becomes simply “Caesar”; 
                                                
46 “I [the Lord] will do these things unto thee [Israel], because thou hast gone a whoring after the heathen, 
and because thou art polluted with their idols. Thou hast walked in the way of thy sister [Samaria]; 
therefore will I give her cup into thine hand. Thus saith the Lord GOD; Thou shalt drink of thy sister’s cup 
deep and large: thou shalt be laughed to scorn and had in derision; it containeth much. Thou shalt be filled 
with drunkenness and sorrow, with the cup of astonishment and desolation, with the cup of thy sister 
Samaria. Thou shalt even drink it and suck it out, and thou shalt break the sherds thereof, and pluck off 
thine own breasts: for I have spoken it, saith the Lord GOD. Therefore thus saith the Lord GOD; Because 
thou hast forgotten me, and cast me behind thy back, therefore bear thou also thy lewdness and thy 




“as gold” becomes simply “gold.” Thus, the literal re-contains the figurative excess that 
generated it. In the final shift from figurative to literal, however, the Nubian’s response 
erupts with all the violent excess Herodias has (figuratively) poured into Herod’s “cup of 
abominations” (SE, 307):47 
SECOND SOLDIER. And the third is a wine of Sicily. That wine is as red 
as blood. 
THE NUBIAN. The gods of my country are very fond of blood. Twice in 
the year we sacrifice to them young men and maidens: fifty young men 
and a hundred maidens. But I am afraid that we never give them quite 
enough, for they are very harsh to us. (SE, 302) 
 
In a brilliant deconstructive reading, “Oscar Wilde’s Salome: Décor, Des Corps, Desire,” 
Chad Bennett locates this simultaneously negating and generative quality of the play’s 
language within the French tradition of blazon and anti-blazon he sees at work 
throughout the play, particularly in Salomé’s address to Iokanaan. Drawing on Linda 
Dowling, Bennett describes Salomé as “a vision of a world created and utterly disrupted 
by the powers of autonomous language.”48  Without discounting Bennett’s observations, I 
                                                
47 The phrase “cup of abominations” alludes to John of Patmos’s apocalyptic vision of the Whore of 
Babylon: “and I saw a woman sit upon a scarlet coloured beast, full of names of blasphemy, having seven 
heads and ten horns. And the woman was arrayed in purple and scarlet colour, and decked with gold and 
precious stones and pearls, having a golden cup in her hand full of abominations and filthiness of her 
fornication: and upon her forehead was a name written, MYSTERY, BABYLON THE GREAT, THE MOTHER OF 
HARLOTS AND ABOMINATIONS OF THE EARTH” (Rev. 17:3-5). 
48 Linda Dowling, Language and Decadence in the Victorian Fin de Siècle (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1986), 173, quoted in Chad Bennett, “Oscar Wilde’s Salome: Décor, Des Corps, Desire,” ELH 77, 
no. 2 (Summer 2010): 313. Bennett’s interpretation is one of the most recent and impressive in a long line 
of criticism that descends from Frank Kermode’s influential The Romantic Image, which views Wilde’s 
Salomé as a post-Romantic text whose titular character exemplifies the archetypal Romantic image, the 
dancer, self-begotten, timeless, complete, gazing only at herself. John Paul Riquelme counters Kermode’s 
interpretation, along with the reactionary vision of modernism to which it lends itself, in his essay 
“Shalom/Solomon/Salomé: Modernism and Wilde’s Aesthetic Politics,” The Centennial Review 39, no. 3 
(Fall 1995). As his title suggests, Riquelme advocates an approach that blends concerns of aesthetics and 
politics. “In Salomé by means of a textualizing, echoic process,” he writes, “Wilde stages in the central 
character’s actions and words,” especially in her address to Iokanaan, which draws heavily from The Song 




argue that the self-negating, self-generating properties of language in the play bespeak a 
fantasy both aesthetic and political, whereby the artist, as image-maker, verges on a 
world historical transition that would restore authenticity to the commodified work of art. 
In order to elucidate this fantasy, however, it is first necessary to examine the strange 
quality of generative negation that Bennett and other critics have sought to explain. 
 As one embodiment of generative negation in the play, Herodias is a figure of 
contradiction. Though in her initial appearance, via the Second Soldier’s comment and 
Iokanaan’s subsequent denunciations, Herodias signifies an excess of carnality and 
figurative language, in her own speech the queen is much more prosaic. Indeed, she is at 
times the play’s most vocal proponent of literal interpretation, i.e., “unimaginative 
realism.” When Iokanaan announces his apocalyptic vision in a flourish of figurative 
language—“the sun shall become black like sackcloth of hair, and the moon shall become 
like blood, and the stars of the heaven shall fall upon the earth like unripe figs that fall 
from the fig-tree, and the kings of the earth shall be afraid”—Herodias remarks that “this 
prophet talks like a drunken man” (SE, 318). Herod warns that Iokanaan’s words “may be 
an omen,” to which Herodias replies, “I do not believe in omens. He speaks like a 
drunken man.” When Herod counters his wife’s dismissal of the prophet as “like a 
drunken man” by adapting her conceit—“It may be he is drunk with the wine of God”—
Herodias gleefully excoriates the Tetrarch’s rhetorical flourish: “What wine is that, the 
                                                                                                                                            
mimicry, which combines text and gaze, Echo and Narcissus, embodies a self-correcting contradiction,” 
which itself echoes the chiastic structures Riquelme identifies throughout the play: “As in the rhetorical 
figure of chiasmus, a repetition and a reversal occur together, for the object of the manipulative look is a 
man, not a woman” (590). Riquelme argues that the gender-reversal at work in Salomé’s appropriation of 




wine of God? From what vineyards is it gathered? In what wine-press may one find it?” It 
would be incorrect to read exchanges like these and conclude, as Nicholas Joost and 
Franklin E. Court do, that Salomé aims primarily to discredit figurative language, to show 
that symbolism is “not to be trusted.”49 Chad Bennett grants that Joost and Court’s  
reading is in keeping with Salome’s self-reflexive questioning of its own 
signifying procedures, but to privilege it entirely, one would have to 
imagine Wilde’s text in close sympathy with Herodias—quite an 
imaginative leap, given her unsympathetic portrayal as a dogged literalist 
in the midst of a drama about language’s relationship to desire and the rich 
and varied pleasures to be mined in this relationship.50 
 
Bennett raises a valid objection. Nevertheless, when confronted with the two extremes of 
interpretation offered by Joost and Franklin (i.e., the play champions literalism at the 
expense of symbolism), on the one hand, and Bennett (i.e., the play champions 
symbolism at the expense of literalism), on the other, the only logical solution is to do 
what Wilde himself advocated when faced with two mutually exclusive options: choose 
both.51  
 One can hardly accept uncritically Herodias’s assertion that, “No; the moon is like 
the moon, that is all” (SE, 312); to do so would indeed foreclose “the rich and varied 
pleasures” the text offers in its exploration of “language’s relationship to desire.” It 
would be unfair not only to the text (and to Aubrey Beardsley’s illustrations), but also to 
Herodias, who embodies much more than the curt axioms of a dull empiricism. Insofar as 
                                                
49 Nicholas Joost and Franklin E. Court, “Salomé, the Moon, and Oscar Wilde’s Aesthetics: A Reading of 
the Play,” Papers on Language and Literature: A Journal for Scholars and Critics of Language and 
Literature 8 (Fall 1972): 102. 
50 Bennett, “Oscar Wilde’s Salome,” 317. 




any single personage in Salomé expresses the characteristic Wildean wit that permeates 
Wilde’s comedies and novel, but seems mostly absent from Salomé, it is Herodias. “I do 
not believe in miracles. I have seen too many,” she says in response to a Nazarene’s 
praise of Jesus the miracle-worker (SE, 316). Though her disgust with Herod, hostility 
toward Iokanaan, and delight at Salomé all prove that her passions can be stirred, 
Herodias’s moments of dismissive indifference are worthy of Wilde’s finest dandies, 
including Lord Henry. The one occasionally flippant major character in the play, if there 
is a dandy in Wilde’s first-century Judea, it is Herodias. The point is certainly not to 
choose between two versions of Herodias, either she who pours the wine of sexual and 
linguistic excess or she who caps the carafes before the party is done. Herodias is both at 
once, and as such, she embodies one locus in the play of the dialectic of the literal and the 
figurative. 
Idol-buyers, Idol-sellers, and the Lure of the Permeable Veil 
 Few Englishmen would see Wilde’s daring artistic experiment literalized on stage 
in living, breathing bodies during the playwright’s lifetime. E. F. Smyth Pigott, England’s 
Examiner of Plays in the early 1890s, famously forbade London performances of Salomé 
on the grounds that they would violate the prohibition against biblical characters in the 
theatre.52 Critics often question the sincerity of the Examiner’s official rationale, arguing 
instead that the play’s violent and disturbing sexuality was the real reason productions of 
                                                





Salomé were banned in Britain.53 In contrast, I argue that there is much to be gained from 
taking the Examiner at his (official) word, i.e., that Salomé scandalizes Victorian 
sensibility not chiefly because of its sexual impropriety per se, but rather because of its 
idolatry. As my above comments on the Israelite’s “cup” in Ezekiel 23 suggest, sexual 
and linguistic excess are inextricably bound up with the idolatrous in Salomé, a text 
obsessed with idolatry, even as it disavows that obsession. In what follows I will explain 
in detail how idolatry functions in specific passages from Salomé. This will allow me to 
situate Salomé in a properly modernist context, rather than the postmodern one favored 
by critics like Bennett, who argues that there is ultimately no reality behind the words of 
Wilde’s play.54  
 There are only two direct references to idols in Salomé, and they occur in quick 
succession. Princess Salomé hears the prophet Iokanaan cry out from the cistern in which 
he has been imprisoned and is immediately enthralled by the sound of his voice. She 
commands the soldiers to “bring forth this prophet” that she may see him, but they 
compunctiously reply that they cannot, for the Tetrarch has forbidden it. Salomé then 
turns to the Young Syrian, Narraboth, Captain of the Guard: “Thou wilt do this thing for 
me. I have ever been kind towards thee. Thou wilt do it for me. I would but look at him, 
                                                
53 Powell advances this argument in Oscar Wilde and the Theatre of the 1890s, 34. Lois Cucullu does the 
same, citing a June 1892 letter from Pigott to Spencer Ponsonby-Fane, the Lord Chamberlain’s 
Comptroller: “[L]ove turns to fury because John will not let [Salomé] kiss him in the mouth—and in the 
last scene, where she brings in his head—if you please—on a ‘charger’—she does kiss his mouth, in a 
paroxysm of sexual despair. The piece is written in French—half Biblical, half pornographic—by Oscar 
Wilde himself. Imagine the average British public’s reception of it” (emphases in original), quoted in Lois 
Cucullu, “Wilde and Wilder Salomés: Modernizing the Nubile Princess from Sarah Bernhardt to Norma 
Desmond,” Modernism/Modernity 18, no. 3 (September 2011): 519n3. 




this strange prophet” (SE, 306). Though the Young Syrian also initially refuses, Salomé 
persists: 
SALOME. Thou wilt do this thing for me, Narraboth, and tomorrow when 
I pass in my litter beneath the gateway of the idol-sellers I will let fall 
for thee a little flower, a little green flower. 
THE YOUNG SYRIAN. Princess, I cannot, I cannot. 
SALOME [Smiling]. Thou wilt do this thing for me, Narraboth. Thou 
knowest that thou wilt do this thing for me. And on the morrow when I 
shall pass in my litter by the bridge of the idol-buyers, I will look at 
thee through the muslin veils, I will look at thee, Narraboth, it may be 
I will smile at thee. Look at me, Narraboth, look at me. Ah! thou 
knowest that thou wilt do what I ask of thee. Thou knowest it. … I 
know that thou wilt do this thing. 
THE YOUNG SYRIAN. [Signing to the third Soldier.] Let the prophet 
come forth. … The Princess Salome desires to see him. (SE, 306-7) 
 
In her interactions with the Young Syrian, Salomé displays a hypnotic, almost vampiric 
power of seduction.55  
Though Douglas’s translation preserves the unnerving insistence with which 
Salomé asserts not only her will, but also her absolute certainty that her interlocutor will 
submit, the original French couples this tenacity with even greater lyricism and coquetry. 
For example, many critics point to the “little green flower” as a possible reference to 
Wilde and others in his milieu who made a habit of wearing a green carnation 
boutonnière.56 Regardless of its precise implications, the greenness of the flower is 
startling, given that each of the previous two instances of flower in the text has been a 
                                                
55 Many critics have discussed Salomé as vampire. See, for example, Cucullu, “Wilde and Wilder Salomés,” 
499-500; Jarlath Killeen, The Faiths of Oscar Wilde: Catholicism, Folklore and Ireland, Palgrave Studies in 
Nineteenth-Century Writing and Culture (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 70-71; and Riquelme, 
“Shalom/Solomon/Salomé,” 578. 
56 See, for example, Isobel Murray, ed., Oscar Wilde: The Major Works, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford 




“silver flower” (SE, 304). The word green is only uttered one other time: much later in 
the play, when Herod is trying to dissuade Salomé from demanding the head of the 
prophet, Herod mentions “green topazes” (326). The topazes are just one image in a long 
litany of treasures Herod rattles off in his frenzy, however. They command none of the 
singularly strange power of the green that bursts forth from the duplicative “a little 
flower, a little green flower.” In the French, conventional word order requires a slightly 
different phrasing: “je laisserai tomber une petite fleur pour vous, une petite fleur verte” 
(SF, 23). Because verte (green) must follow the noun fleur, French syntax naturally 
delays the surprise of the verdant adjective till the last moment, a delay that can be 
exaggerated even further in actual performance. Alliteration is also more prominent in the 
original, where the placement of vous anticipates the subsequent placement of verte. 
When Salomé shifts from tempting the Young Syrian with what she will do to teasing 
him coyly with what she might do—“I will look at thee, Narraboth, it may be I will smile 
at thee”—this coyness is even more exaggerated in the original: “je vous regarderai, 
Narraboth, je vous sourirai, peut-être” (SF, 24).57 Instead of prefacing her promise of a 
smile with equivocation as she does in Douglas’s translation, in the original Salomé 
withholds the equivocation of peut-être (as she did with verte several lines earlier), only 
at the end of the sentence qualifying the guarantee that had initially seemed so solid. 
N’est-ce pas, which Douglas does not include in any form, functions similarly in “Vous 
le savez bien, n’est-ce pas?” Conversely, the final sentence of Salomé’s solicitation is 
                                                




more terse and definitive in the original—“Moi, je sais bien”—than in Douglas’s 
translation—“I know that thou wilt do this thing.” 
 Just as syntax subtly colors tonal inflection in the original, word choice too 
suggests connections that elude translation. In “je laisserai tomber une petite fleur pour 
vous, une petite fleur verte” (SF, 23), the verb tomber (to fall) recalls the noun tombeau 
(tomb) from the play’s striking initial metaphor: “Regardez la lune. La lune a l’air très 
étrange. On dirait une femme qui sort d’un tombeau. Elle ressemble à une femme morte. 
On dirait qu’elle cherche des morts,”58 says the Page (SF, 5). Between the tombeau of the 
play’s opening and tomber in Salomé’s seduction of the Young Syrian, there is only one 
other instance in which the signifier tombe appears in any form, and like the “woman 
rising from a tomb,” it once again suggests a return from death. Just before Salomé turns 
to the soldiers and then the Young Syrian, she looks deep into the cistern where Iokanaan 
has been imprisoned: “Comme il fait noir là-dedans! Cela doit être terrible d’être dans un 
trou si noir! Cela ressemble à une tombe … [aux soldats] Vous ne m’avez pas entendue? 
Faites-le sortir. Je veux le voir” (SF, 21).59 Thus, Salomé’s speeches, clustered around the 
seduction of the Young Syrian, link desire, death, and—one of the text’s central 
theological and metaphysical questions—the possibility of the resurrection of the dead. 
Salomé’s status as Christ-figure is implied not only by her association with the “woman 
                                                
58 “Look at the moon. How strange the moon seems! She is like a woman rising from a tomb. She is like a 
dead woman. One might fancy she was looking for dead things” (SE, 301). Other phrases, in both French 
and English variants, from Salomé’s seduction of the Young Syrian also recall the opening conversation 
between the Young Syrian and the Page. Most notably, Salomé’s promise to “look at thee through the 
muslin veils” clearly harkens back to the Young Syrian’s first comment on the moon: “She is like a little 
princess who wears a yellow veil, and whose feet are of silver” (SE, 301). 
59 “How black it is, down there! It must be terrible to be in so black a hole! It is like a tomb. … [To the 




rising from a tomb,” but also by her act of ordering the symbolic resurrection of Iokaanan 
from his “tomb.”60 This act recalls Christ’s act of raising the daughter of Jarius from the 
dead, which is the one instance of literal resurrection explicitly discussed in the play, 
much to Herod’s consternation.61 
Very shortly after the Page observes that the moon “is like a woman rising from a 
tomb,” the play’s focus shifts to a different conversation: 
FIRST SOLDIER. What an uproar! Who are those wild beasts howling? 
SECOND SOLDIER. The Jews. They are always like that. They are 
disputing about their religion. 
FIRST SOLDIER. Why do they dispute about their religion? 
SECOND SOLDIER. I cannot tell. They are always doing it. The 
Pharisees, for instance, say that there are angels, and the Sadducees 
declare that angels do not exist. 
FIRST SOLDIER. I think it is ridiculous to dispute about such things. (SE, 
301) 
 
The beliefs of Pharisees and Sadducees differed in several significant ways, but the most 
important difference, in terms of the small but growing movement among the Jewish 
people that would become the early Christian Church, concerned resurrection: the 
                                                
60 Other critics have also recognized Wilde’s Salomé as a Christ-figure. See, for example, Jarlath Killeen, 
The Faiths of Oscar Wilde, esp. 69-77. “Ultimately,” writes Killeen, “the message of Christ’s love is 
actually channeled through the pagan Salome in her majestic paean to Love at the end of the play” (69). 
See also Guy Willoughby, Art and Christhood: The Aesthetics of Oscar Wilde (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh 
Dickinson University Press, 1993), esp. 84-86. According to Willoughby, “The sheer force of her 
[Salomé’s] experience, like the stupendous heat required by precious stones for their gestation, evokes in 
her a revelation of Christ’s transfigurative love: […] Here, stripped of the carnal context that engenders it, 
is the gospel of Christ: ‘the mystery of love is greater than the mystery of death. Love only should one 
consider’” (85). See also Regenia Gagnier, Idylls of the Marketplace: Oscar Wilde and the Victorian Public 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986), esp. 168-69. “As Salome makes lawless love to the head 
of Iokanaan, Herodias preempts the Father’s Word from Luke 3:22 upon the descent of the Dove, ‘Thou art 
my beloved Son; in thee I am well pleased’ with ‘I am well pleased with my daughter,’ fulfilling the 
promise and prophecy of the Word in Salome” (168-69). Here, as in the rest of the passage from which this 
excerpt is quoted, Gagnier implies that Salomé is a perverse Christ-figure, an interpretation that aligns well 
with my own. 




Pharisees believed in the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the dead, 
whereas the Sadducees denied both. In terms of sacred ritual, they also disagreed over the 
criteria for purity and impurity, an ongoing dispute Salomé invokes when, having just 
emerged from the banquet hall, she complains of the “Jews from Jerusalem who are 
tearing each other in pieces over their foolish ceremonies” (SE, 304). Jerusalem was the 
center of the Jewish world in the first century C.E., and the “foolish ceremonies” 
practiced in the city took place in the Second Temple, over which the Sadducees wielded 
primary authority. Among the Jewish people, the Sadducees were of the wealthy, 
aristocratic class. They were the priests, largely in league with Rome, whereas the 
Pharisees were of the common people, whose interests often diverged from those of their 
Roman overlords. Thus, any dispute between the Pharisees and Sadducees was always 
also a political dispute, regardless how rarefied it might otherwise seem.62 
 One need not be an expert in Jewish history and customs of the Herodian Dynasty 
to see that most, perhaps even all, the metaphysical or theological concerns that appear in 
Salomé are also political concerns. If the abrupt shift from the Page’s extended metaphor 
of “a woman rising from a tomb” to the soldiers’ musings on religious disputes between 
Pharisees and Sadducees were not enough to suggest the political valence of the 
possibility of resurrection, Herod’s later horror at the notion—“no man shall raise the 
dead. … It would be terrible if the dead came back”—clearly indicates that resurrection 
poses a political threat. For Herod, who has executed his elder brother and married that 
                                                
62 The Jewish Encyclopedia, s.vv. “Pharisees,” “Sadducees,” accessed January 18, 2014, 
http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/. This online version of The Jewish Encyclopedia reproduces the full 
contents of The Jewish Encyclopedia as originally published in twelve volumes from 1901 to 1906 in New 




brother’s wife, the dead returning to life would very directly challenge the legitimacy of 
his rule. What’s more, no matter how much a reader or viewer of Salomé might attempt 
to render unto Caesar that which is Caesar’s, unto God that which is God’s, many details 
of the play subtly suggest the momentous threat Christ poses to Caesar’s rule, even as 
that threat is disavowed, repressed, relegated to the chatter of peripheral characters, or 
subsumed by the figurative language of the major characters. When Iokanaan shouts “I 
hear upon the mountains the feet of Him who shall be the Saviour of the world,” an 
allusion to Nahum 1:15,63 Herod, who mistakenly assumes Iokanaan refers to Caesar 
rather than Christ, is puzzled: “But Caesar cannot come. He is too gouty. They say that 
his feet are like the feet of an elephant. Also there are reasons of state. He who leaves 
Rome loses Rome. He will not come. Howbeit, Caesar is lord, he will come if such be his 
pleasure. Nevertheless, I think he will not come” (SE, 315). There is no historical 
evidence that Tiberius Caesar, the Emperor of Rome in the time of Jesus’ ministry, or any 
of the other Caesars suffered from gout. The condition is pure fiction, a joke contrasting 
the resounding “feet of Him who shall be the Saviour of the world” with the decrepit feet 
of an earthly ruler whose political power requires that he remain physically in Rome, lest 
he lose it.64 Christ, on the other hand, “is in every place, my lord [Herod], but it is hard to 
                                                
63 “Behold upon the mountains the feet of him that bringeth good tidings, that publisheth peace! O Judah, 
keep thy solemn feasts, perform thy vows: for the wicked shall no more pass through thee; he is utterly cut 
off.” 
64 The world of the play largely aligns with accepted historical and biblical narratives, but it also deviates 
from these narratives in key ways. For example, Robert Ross points out that, though the Herod of Salomé 
derives primarily from the historical and biblical Herod Antipas, this character also incorporates elements 
of Herod the Great, father of Antipas, and Herod Agrippa, nephew of Antipas. Ross, preface to Salomé, La 
Sainte Courtisane, by Oscar Wilde (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, [1915?]), vii. I would also point out 
that new historicist and post-colonial accounts of Salomé seem to have overlooked the significance of the 




find Him” (SE, 317), a claim that points both to the peripatetic ministry of Christ as Jesus 
of Nazareth and to the omnipresence of Christ as Holy Spirit.  
 Insofar as Christ is discussed in Salomé, much of the discussion concerns his 
contradictory, iconoclastic nature. He is not the sort of Messiah (Messias or Le Messie in 
the text) the Jews are expecting: 
                                                                                                                                            
HEROD. That [suicide of the Young Syrian] seems strange to me. I had thought it was but the 
Roman philosophers who slew themselves. Is it not true, Tigellinus, that the philosophers at Rome 
slay themselves? 
TIGELLINUS. There be some who slay themselves, sire. They are the Stoics. The Stoics are 
people of no cultivation. They are ridiculous people. I myself regard them as being perfectly 
ridiculous. 
HEROD. I also. It is ridiculous to kill one’s-self. 
TIGELLINUS. Everybody at Rome laughs at them. The Emperor has written a satire against them. 
It is recited everywhere. 
HEROD. Ah! he has written a satire against them? Caesar is wonderful. He can do everything. 
(SE, 312) 
Founded in Athens in the third century B.C.E., by the first century C.E., Stoicism had become a dominant 
philosophy in Rome. The Stoics did consider suicide morally acceptable in certain circumstances, and the 
most famous Stoic suicide, now and in the time during which Salomé takes place, is probably that of Cato 
the Younger, a Roman philosopher and statesman known for his moral fortitude and unbending will. An 
ardent defender of republicanism and longtime opponent of Julius Caesar, Cato joined Pompey and others 
in a military campaign to defend the authority of the Roman Senate when Caesar committed treason by 
marching a legion of troops across the Rubicon in 49 B.C.E. to install himself as supreme ruler of Rome. In 
46 B.C.E. having retreated to North Africa, the cohorts once under his command now defeated by Caesar’s 
army, Cato chose to disembowel himself rather than acquiesce to life under Caesar’s tyrannical rule. Mark 
Morford, The Roman Philosophers: From the Time of Cato the Censor to the Death of Marcus Aurelius 
(London: Routledge, 2002), 48-49. F. H. Sandbach, The Stoics, 2nd ed. (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1989), 
142-43. It would seem reasonable then to read Herod’s veneration of the Emperor Caesar (Tiberius, not 
Julius) in Salomé, coupled with his ridicule of the Stoics’ willingness to commit suicide, specifically as an 
endorsement of an imperial occupier in the face of unyielding republican opposition. That this political 
tension has an obvious counterpart in Wilde’s own political and historical situation need hardly be 
elaborated. Cato’s ghost rises all the more forcibly in the passage quoted above when Tigellinus says that 
Caesar “has written a satire” against the Stoics. Though the historical Tiberius Caesar did not write any 
satires or invectives against the Stoics, the historical Julius Caesar wrote a tract, entitled “Anticato,” 
attacking the late Stoic. It was a response to Cicero’s “Cato,” which praised Cato for his life and death. 
Despite attacks from his opponents, Cato’s prestige remained undiminished in the centuries following his 
death. He became a republican hero both for those within the Empire who still believed in the republican 
cause and also for many of those who, centuries later, rose up against autocracy during the European 
Enlightenment. If suicide in Salomé, by virtue of the “ridiculous” suicide of the Stoic, is equated to 
unyielding defiance in the face of oppressive imperial rule, then Salomé’s own death at the end of the 
play—a death that could be read as a kind of suicide and must, at the very least, be read as the outcome of 




FIRST NAZARENE. It is said that He is now in Samaria. 
A JEW. It is easy to see that this is not Messias, if He is in Samaria. It is 
not to the Samaritans that Messias shall come. The Samaritans are 
accursed. They bring no offerings to the Temple. (SE, 317) 
 
The Jew’s reaction typifies the mutual disgust and animosity Jews and Samaritans of the 
first century C.E. felt toward each other. Christ’s message, as elaborated most thoroughly 
by Paul, Apostle of the Gentiles,65 was available in equal measure to Jew and Gentile; that 
is, Christ presented himself as a teacher and God for all people, regardless of ethnicity or 
political allegiance. In the above quotation, the Jew frames his disdain for Samaritans 
specifically in terms of their disregard for Jewish custom and ritual: “They bring no 
offerings to the Temple.” Moreover, the reader or viewer of Wilde’s play could hardly 
pass these lines without recalling what has been since the Middle Ages one of the most, if 
not the most, famous parables of the Bible, i.e., the parable of the Good Samaritan.66 In 
this story, the Samaritan assists a beaten, bloody, and naked man lying by the side of the 
road after a Jewish Priest and a Levite both neglect the injured stranger, even crossing to 
the opposite side of the path, presumably to avoid potential ritualistic contamination by 
what might have been a dead body. In the other well-known New Testament story of a 
Samaritan, Jesus sits down by a well to rest as a Samaritan woman approaches to draw 
water. She is shocked when he defies custom by requesting to drink from her pail, an act 
that would have made him ritualistically unclean according to Mosaic Law. After their 
conversation, the woman, who is not only a Samaritan but also an adulteress (the latter 
                                                
65 For the source of this moniker, see Romans 11:13. Paul had a very great advantage as a proselytizer for 
early Christianity in that he was both a Jewish man and a Roman citizen. 




would have made her unclean regardless of her ethnicity), is so inspired that she returns 
to her city to spread the message of Christ.67 
 A recurring motif throughout Salomé, the Judaic concern for taharah and tumah 
(that is, ritual purity and impurity) emerges most forcibly in the speeches of Iokanaan. 
When Salomé asks to touch the prophet’s hair, for example, he replies, “Back, daughter 
of Sodom! Touch me not. Profane not the temple of the Lord God” (SE, 309).68 In 
addition to the popular Christian metaphor of the body as God’s temple, which must be 
guarded against impurity, the prophet’s words also recall the literal Second Temple in 
Jerusalem, to which the play elsewhere refers directly, along with the ritualistic 
purification required to enter certain parts of the Temple or, in the case of the Temple 
priests, to perform the animal sacrifices demanded by God. To be touched by Salomé, 
Iokanaan implies, would profane the purity of his body with the impurity of her sexual 
iniquity. As the play repeatedly reminds us, Salomé herself is a virgin, but Herodias has 
committed the depraved sins of adultery and incest, and in the prophet’s reckoning, 
Salomé bears the sins of her mother. The princess is not only “daughter of Sodom,” but 
also “daughter of adultery,” “daughter of an incestuous mother,” and “daughter of 
Babylon” (SE, 308, 309, 310; 311; 311; 308, 309, 310, 317).  
The last of these epithets, which appears four times in the text, more than any of 
the others, alludes to Revelation 17:4-5: “And the woman was arrayed in purple and 
                                                
67 See John 4:1-42. Jarlath Killeen also points out the allusion in Salomé to the story of the Samaritan 
woman at the well, noting that “First-century Samaritans were considered culturally unclean by official 
Judaism” (70).  
68 Sodom, of course, refers to that city of the plain destroyed by God in Genesis, ostensibly for its rampant 
sexual perversion (see Genesis 18 and 19)—hence the words sodomy and sodomite, terms that would one 




scarlet colour, and decked with gold and precious stones and pearls, having a golden cup 
in her hand full of abominations and filthiness of her fornication: And upon her forehead 
was a name written, MYSTERY, BABYLON THE GREAT, THE MOTHER OF HARLOTS AND 
ABOMINATIONS OF THE EARTH.” In The Faiths of Oscar Wilde: Catholicism, Folklore and 
Ireland, Jarlath Killeen argues that  
Salome should be seen as representative of a version of Catholicism as the 
“Whore of Babylon,” emanating from Protestant texts of this period. Her 
desire for the food and drink she sees imaged in Iokanaan is a rereading of 
the exchange of faith for food during the Famine [i.e., Souperism]. Wilde 
reformulates the image of Salome’s gaze, from the literal consumption of 
Iokanaan through his death to a more symbolic consumption of Christ 
through the rituals of the Catholic Church.69 
 
Though I am not entirely persuaded that Salomé is most productively read in light of 
Souperism, Killeen’s new historicist interpretation is laudable for its attempt to anchor 
the text in the particular historical context that enables the text’s production, rather than 
allowing it to float unmoored in an ahistorical sea of allusion and language play. 
Furthermore, much of his interpretation of Salomé’s “consumption of Iokanaan” is very 
compelling. He points out, for instance, that “Salome herself is clearly an elaborate 
metaphor for Catholicism. Her characterization is dependent on depictions of the Roman 
Church in Victorian England which persistently refracted it through vampiric imagery.”70 
Killeen spends the rest of the chapter teasing out the complex dynamics of 
transubstantiation, and its anti-Catholic characterization as a kind of cannibalism, in the 
play. 
                                                
69 Killeen, The Faiths of Oscar Wilde, 65. 




 While Killeen’s focus on transubstantiation yields a valuable historically 
contextualized reading of the play, it also distracts from another important target of anti-
Catholic sentiment among Ireland’s Second Reformation Protestant Evangelicals, 
namely, their opposition to Catholicism’s alleged idolatry. By attending closely to the 
motif of idolatry in the play, one can account not only for the historicity of Salomé, but 
also its aesthetic. Prior to Salomé’s seduction of the Young Syrian, in which the princess 
invokes “the gateway of the idol-sellers” and “the bridge of the idol-buyers,” Iokanaan 
speaks three times. Each of these three speeches clearly alludes to particular biblical 
verses, none of which has anything to do with idolatry. After Salomé’s seduction of the 
Young Syrian, the prophet begins to draw from verses unmistakably concerned with 
idolatry, yet this concern, as it manifests in the allusions, remains muted, as if the text 
were disavowing the thematic importance of idolatry even as it asserts it.  
 Iokanaan’s first post-seduction speech begins with a question: “Where is he 
whose cup of abominations is now full?” (SE, 307). The “cup of abominations” alludes to 
Revelation 17:4,71 with a slight pronoun change. Whereas the biblical source refers to a 
“woman … arrayed in purple and scarlet colour,” Iokanaan has replaced she with he: just 
as Wilde’s Herodias and Salomé are identified with the Whore of Babylon, so too is 
Herod. In the Whore’s full name, “MYSTERY, BABYLON THE GREAT, THE MOTHER OF 
HARLOTS AND ABOMINATIONS OF THE EARTH,” the Greek word πόρνη, meaning “harlot” 
or “whore,” can also be translated as “idolatress.” The idolatry motif is slightly more 
direct in Iokanaan’s second post-seduction speech: “Where is she who saw the images of 
                                                




men painted on the walls, even the images of the Chaldæans painted with colours, and 
gave herself up unto the lust of her eyes, and sent ambassadors into the land of 
Chaldæa?” (SE, 307). The phrases Iokanaan plucks from Ezekiel 23:13-16 refer to 
idolatry,72 but this becomes clear only when those verses are considered in the context of 
the entire chapter, which presents the allegory of Aholah (Samaria) and Aholibah 
(Jerusalem), two sisters punished by God for having “committed whoredoms”73 with the 
men of Egypt, Assyria, and Chaldea. Aholah “committed her whoredoms … with all 
them that were the chosen men of Assyria, and with all on whom she doted: with all their 
idols she defiled herself.”74 Just as the Lord turned Aholah’s lovers against her, says 
Ezekiel, so the Lord “will raise up thy lovers against thee,”75 Aholibah. Ezekiel then 
details a gruesome series of punishments to which the Lord will subject Aholibah, 
capping off the list with a reminder of Aholibah’s transgressions: “I [the Lord] will do 
these things unto thee, because thou hast gone a whoring after the heathen, and because 
thou art polluted with their idols.”76 Ezekiel refers explicitly to idols two more times 
before concluding the chapter with a final declaration of God’s wrath: “Thus will I [the 
Lord] cause lewdness to cease out of the land, that all women may be taught not to do 
                                                
72 “Then I saw that she [Aholibah] was defiled, that they took both one way, And that she increased her 
whoredoms: for when she saw men pourtrayed upon the wall, the images of the Chaldeans pourtrayed with 
vermillion, Girded with girdles upon their loins, exceeding in dyed attire upon their heads, all of them 
princes to look to, after the manner of the Babylonians of Chaldea, the land of their nativity: And as soon as 
she saw them with her eyes, she doted upon them, and sent messengers unto them into Chaldea” (Ezek. 
23:13-16). 
73 Ezek. 23:3. 
74 Ezek. 23:7. 
75 Ezek. 23:22. 




after your lewdness. And they shall recompense your lewdness upon you, and ye shall 
bear the sins of your idols: and you shall know that I am the Lord GOD.”77 
 The idolatrous implications of the word images78 in Iokanaan’s phrase “the images 
of the Chaldæans” (des images de Chaldéens) (SE, 307; SF, 25) may elude contemporary 
Anglophone ears since the biblical usage of image to mean “idol” has largely disappeared 
from modern English; the original French of the play more clearly evokes the specter of 
idolatry, however, since modern French continues to employ the word image to refer to 
religious icons used as aids to prayer or worship. In any case, in the context of Ezekiel 23 
as a whole, concupiscence is clearly figured as a kind of idolatry. Given this conflation of 
sexual desire and idolatry, Salomé’s references to “the idol-sellers” and “the idol-buyers” 
in her attempt to seduce the Young Syrian make much more sense. Commanding him to 
“[l]ook at me, Narraboth, look at me,” Salomé positions herself as an idol to be 
worshipped, much as the painted “images of the Chaldæans” become idols that appeal to 
“the lust of her [Herodias’s or Jerusalem’s] eyes.”79  
 Ezekiel’s diction also frames sexual iniquity and idolatry as pollutants or 
contagions: “I [the Lord] will do these things [punishments] unto thee, because thou hast 
                                                
77 Ezek. 23:49. 
78 “Il se dit, particulièrement, Des images qui sont l’objet d’un culte religieux; et, en ce sens, on l’emploie 
souvent absolument, au pluriel. Les images des faux dieux. Briser, abattre les images. Léon l’Isaurien fut 
appelé Briseur d’images. Honorer les images des saints. Le culte des images. Une image de la Vierge.” 
Dictionnaire de l’Académie française, 7th ed. (1878), s.v., “image.”  
79 In the interest of clarity, I point out again that I quote the phrase “the lust of her eyes” from Iokanaan’s 
second post-seduction speech; the exact phrase does not appear in Ezekiel 23:13-16, though it is clearly 
inspired by those verses. In the context of Salomé, the phrase “the lust of her eyes” refers to the eyes of 




gone a whoring after the heathen, and because thou art polluted with their idols.”80 The 
sins of Ahola and Aholibah make the sisters ritually unclean, in the manner of 
menstruating women: “And the righteous men, they shall judge them after the manner of 
adulteresses, and after the manner of women that shed blood; because they are 
adulteresses, and blood is in their hands.”81 In addition, the sisters’ ritual impurity 
contaminates not just the women themselves, but also the Temple of the Lord:  
they have committed adultery, and blood is in their hands, and with their 
idols have they committed adultery, and have also caused their sons, 
whom they bare unto me, to pass for them through the fire, to devour 
them. Moreover this they have done unto me: they have defiled my 
sanctuary in the same day, and have profaned my sabbaths. For when they 
had slain their children to their idols, then they came the same day into my 
sanctuary to profane it; and, lo, thus have they done in the midst of mine 
house.82 
 
Though Wilde’s Salomé takes place in a cosmopolitan city whose diverse inhabitants 
constitute a microcosm of the Roman Empire, the play also continually reminds the 
reader or viewer of the Jewish people’s absolute difference, in the kind of deity they 
worship and in their insistence on ritual cleanliness, from the non-Jews of the Empire. 
When the First Soldier points out that “the Jews worship a God that one cannot see” and 
that “they only believe in things that one cannot see,” the Cappadocian responds, “I 
cannot understand that” and “that seems to me altogether ridiculous” (SE, 302). In this 
exchange, the first in the play to establish a belief or practice uniting all Jews, the 
difference between Jew and non-Jew is posed in terms of Judaism’s strict prohibition 
                                                
80 Ezek. 23:30. 
81 Ezek. 23:45. 




against idolatry.83 Idolatry is forbidden not only because it would challenge the supremacy 
of God, but also, as Ezekiel strongly implies by conflating sexual iniquity, idol worship, 
and profanation of the sacred, because it would challenge the absolute difference between 
God’s chosen people and the pagan masses.84 In both Ezekiel 23 and Salomé idolatry 
becomes the signifier of all that threatens to dissolve the racial, theological, and cultural 
barriers preserving a coherent Jewish identity through exclusion of the other. Thus, in 
Salomé, when the princess seduces the Young Syrian, her speech not only associates the 
temptations of sexual desire with “the gateway of the idol-sellers” and “the bridge of the 
idol-buyers,” but also tantalizes the Young Syrian with the prospect of a permeable 
barrier, Salomé’s “muslin veils,” through which “I will look at thee, Narraboth, it may be 
I will smile at thee” (SE, 306-7). 
The Veil of the Temple 
 Salomé’s “veils” also appear elsewhere, of course. They first emerge in the third 
speech of the play when the Young Syrian compares the moon to “a little princess who 
wears a yellow veil, and whose feet are of silver. […]. One might fancy she was dancing” 
(SE, 301). An empty signifier mirroring back to the gazer an image of his or her own 
desire, the moon foreshadows the fate of the Young Syrian: in the moon he sees a vision 
of the Dance of the Seven Veils, and like Herod he is doomed by what he sees. Unlike 
His pagan counterparts, the Hebrew God, a deity one cannot see, enters into the terrestrial 
                                                
83 See Exod. 20:3-5. 
84 Ezekiel 23:20 emphasizes this difference in the starkest terms possible through two similes that cast the 
contemptible, corrupting other as a wholly different species: “For she [Aholiba] doted upon their [Egypt’s] 
paramours, whose flesh is as the flesh of asses, and whose issue is like the issue of horses.” According to 




world of His followers not through idols of wood, metal, or clay, but rather through the 
Holy of Holies, the innermost chamber of the Second Temple of Jerusalem, into which no 
person was permitted to step or see, except the High Priest, who entered once annually 
after extensive ritual purification.85 Wilde’s Herod twice refers to the Holy of Holies, 
which was partitioned off by “the veil of the sanctuary.” In the first instance, he asks 
Tigellinus, the court philosopher, “And that restoration of the Temple about which they 
have talked so much, will anything be done? They say that the veil of the Sanctuary has 
disappeared, do they not?” (SE, 319). In the second instance, Herod tries desperately to 
dissuade Salomé from demanding the head of Iokanaan: “I will give thee all that is mine, 
save only the life of one man. I will give thee the mantle of the high priest. I will give 
thee the veil of the sanctuary” (SE, 326). Herod offers Salomé the veil of the sanctuary 
only after exhausting all other options. He has already offered to her not just half his 
kingdom, but all that is his. The veil’s position at the end of a list of extraordinary riches 
marks it as the most precious item in Judea. The brevity of the Jews’ reaction—“Oh! 
oh!”—may strike the reader or viewer as comical, coming as it does directly after such a 
dazzling inventory of treasures. In truth, the wordless cry speaks to the enormity of 
Herod’s proposal, which would defile the only place on earth where God’s presence 
enters into the world of men.  
Herod’s questions about the Temple and the veil also suggest strange distortions 
whereby fictional and historical narratives converge. Built in the tenth century B.C.E., the 
First Temple was destroyed in the sixth century by the Babylonians. By the end of the 
                                                





sixth century, the slightly less impressive Second Temple had been erected on the same 
site where the First had stood. In the first century B.C.E., some fifty years before the 
events of Salomé ostensibly take place, King Herod the Great, father of Tetrach Herod 
Antipas, oversaw a tremendous expansion project that would restore the Temple to its 
former grandeur.86 Antipas himself undertook other building projects, but none having to 
do with the Temple. Thus, when Wilde’s Tetrarch asks whether “anything [will] be done” 
about “that restoration of the Temple about which they have talked so much,” his 
question implies that Herod the Great’s most memorable architectural achievement never 
occurred, or else that at these lines Wilde has merged Antipas with his father and we have 
momentarily shifted back several decades in time. The Tetrarch’s next question—“They 
say that the veil of the Sanctuary has disappeared, do they not?”—implies a shift into the 
future by alluding to the moment of Christ’s death, whereupon “the veil of the temple 
was rent in twain from the top to the bottom.”87 I am not suggesting that the Tetrarch’s 
questions signal actual time travel within the play, of course. I mean simply that the two 
questions, taken together, mark a clear deviation from historical narrative within the 
fictional world of the play and that this deviation entails a subtle but significant pull 
between past and future that momentarily disrupts the play’s ostensibly linear 
temporality. The disappearance of the veil of the sanctuary would signify one of two 
things: a prodigious insult to God and his chosen people, defiling the Holy of Holies and 
                                                
86 The Jewish Encyclopedia, s.vv. “Temple of Herod,” “Temple, the Second,” “Temple of Solomon,” 
accessed January 20, 2014, http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/. 
87 Matt. 27:50-51, Mark 15:37-38, and (with slightly different phrasing) Luke 23:45-46. Isobel Murray, 
editor of the Oxford World’s Classics Oscar Wilde: The Major Works, also sees in Herod’s remark an 




denying God the veneration He deserves as one entirely apart from man’s sinful nature 
or, alternatively, the dissolution of the barrier between God and man through an act of 
divine grace. The latter is precisely what the rending of the veil symbolizes in the 
Christian tradition, and as such, it marks in that tradition the most important theological 
and historical transition of mankind’s existence since the fall from Eden. For the first 
time, man has the opportunity to overcome his alienation from God engendered by 
original sin and achieve eternal salvation through Jesus Christ. The temporal 
indeterminacy inherent to the Tetrarch’s question emphasizes the unique historical 
rupture potentially signified by the veil’s disappearance. 
 The disappearance or rending of veils is crucial not only to the biblical narrative 
of Christ’s death and resurrection, but also to Wilde’s Salomé. No aspect of the play 
continues to haunt popular consciousness as much as the Dance of the Seven Veils, 
which has no precedent in any pre-Wildean version of the Salomé tale. Almost as 
notorious as the dance itself is the casual brevity with which it passes in the script: 
“Salome dances the dance of the seven veils” (SE, 323). A playwright with few 
reservations about indulging decorative, detailed stage direction, Wilde has confounded 
many critics over the decades with his reticence about Salomé’s dance. Insofar as the 
play is meant to be read—and I argue that Salomé has value both as a written and as a 
performed text—the absence of any visual description for the dance is clearly meant to 
contrast the excessive display of anticipation—in the form of Herod’s repeated requests 
that Salomé dance, Herodias and Salomé’s repeated refusals, and the many images of 




lack of description makes the stage direction a kind of empty signifier, much like the 
moon, onto which the reader can project his or her own desire. In this way the stage 
direction complies with the Judaic prohibition against “graven image[s],” for when 
Salomé dons the veils, she becomes the symbolic equivalent of the Holy of Holies, a 
sacred entity both desired and forbidden. Stripping away the veils, she becomes a Christ-
figure: her body the incarnation of God’s presence on earth, her striptease the rending of 
the barrier between God and man. Salomé’s dance, like the vanishing of the veil of the 
sanctuary, is either an act of idolatrous blasphemy or one of divine revelation. Given the 
play’s setting on the verge of a profound historical rupture, whereby the pagan world will 
give way to the Christian, I argue the dance is both blasphemy and revelation at once. At 
the center of Salomé stirs a gesture of disavowal, a spectacle both presented and withheld 
in an act both profane and sacred. 
Salomé as Figure of Abjection  
The paradoxical nature of idolatry in Salomé marks it as a Freudian taboo: it is a 
source of sacred awe and abject horror;88 it is continually implied but nowhere directly 
spoken.89 When Iokannan declares, “Behold the day is at hand, the day of the Lord, and I 
                                                
88 “The meaning of ‘taboo,’ as we see it, diverges in two contrary directions. To us it means, on the one 
hand, ‘sacred,’ ‘consecrated,’ and on the other ‘uncanny,’ ‘dangerous,’ ‘forbidden,’ ‘unclean.’ The 
converse of ‘taboo’ in Polynesian is ‘noa,’ which means ‘common’ or ‘generally accessible.’ Thus ‘taboo’ 
has about it a sense of something unapproachable, and it is principally expressed in prohibitions and 
restrictions.” Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of 
Savages and Neurotics, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: Norton, 1950), 24. 
89 According to Freud, “One of the most puzzling, but at the same time instructive” aspects of “the taboo 
upon the dead” is “the prohibition against uttering the name of the dead person.” Freud attributes the taboo 
upon names to a kind of idolatrous orientation toward language, whereby words become reified as actual 




hear upon the mountains the feet of Him who shall be the Saviour of the world” (SE, 
315), the court philosopher explains “Savior of the world” as “a title that Caesar adopts.” 
Herod’s subsequent remarks include the amusing quip that Caesar’s feet are “like the feet 
of an elephant,” much “too gouty” for Caesar to make the trip from Rome to Judea. Yet 
Iokanaan’s prophesy of the mighty “feet of Him who shall be the Saviour of the world,” 
taken from Nahum 1:15, not only leads to an implicit condemnation of idolatry by 
contrasting Christ’s firm foundation on feet whose footfall resounds through the 
mountains with the diseased foundation of a false idol, the immobile Tiberius Caesar; it 
also derives from an explicit biblical condemnation of idolatry. One of the last books in 
the Hebrew Bible, Nahum comprises just three short chapters devoted to the imminent 
destruction of Nineveh. The final two verses of the first chapter are as follows:  
And the LORD hath given a commandment concerning thee [Nineveh], that 
no more of thy name be sown: out of the house of thy gods will I cut off 
the graven image and the molten image: I will make thy grave; for thou art 
vile. Behold upon the mountains the feet of him that bringeth good tidings, 
that publisheth peace! O Judah, keep thy solemn feasts, perform thy vows: 
for the wicked shall no more pass through thee; he is utterly cut off.90 
 
Like Iokanaan’s borrowings from Ezekiel, his borrowings from Nahum—and the text of 
the play more broadly—not only demonstrate an obsession with idolatry, which functions 
in Salomé as a central generative trope, but also disavow that obsession through strategic 
exclusion. 
                                                                                                                                            
name as an essential part of a man’s personality and as an important possession: they treat words in every 
sense as things.” Freud, Totem and Taboo, 68; 71. 




 Idolatry, as taboo, is continually cast out of the text through its exclusion; as 
abject, it continually returns. The abject is “what disturbs identity, system, order. What 
does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the 
composite.”91 It is what “emerges when exclusions fail, in the sickening collapse of 
limits.”92 For example, invoking the dialectical opposition of the seen vs. the unseen, 
Herod states that Iokanaan “is a man who has seen God” (SE, 314). This claim prompts a 
debate among five Jews, who echo Ezekiel’s denunciation of idolatry as they argue over 
whether God can be seen. One remarks that “no man … hath seen God since the prophet 
Elias,” while another says that “no man knoweth if Elias the prophet did indeed see God. 
Peradventure it was but the shadow of God that he saw.” The other three speculate further 
on the relation of God to good, evil, and the material world. These speculations point to 
the wide range of philosophical approaches to divinity available in the cosmopolitan 
setting of first-century Judea. When the Third Jew says that “God is at no time hidden. 
He showeth Himself at all times and in all places. God is in what is evil even as He is in 
what is good,” the Fourth Jew chastises him for endorsing “a very dangerous doctrine,” 
dangerous because it is a “philosophy of the Greeks. And the Greeks are Gentiles. They 
are not even circumcised.” The rationale the Fourth Jew offers for his objection to the 
Third appeals not to the truth value of the Third Jew’s claims, but rather to the capacity of 
those claims to dilute the purity of Jewish thought, culture, and ethnicity. The “dangerous 
                                                
91 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1982), 4. Kristeva develops her theory of the abject out of Freud’s theory of the taboo. 
92 This apt definition of the Kristevan abject is proffered by Maud Ellmann in “The Waste Land: A Sphinx 
without a Secret,” in The Poetics of Impersonality: T.S. Eliot and Ezra Pound (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 




doctrine” of the Gentiles is dangerous precisely insofar as it threatens to collapse the 
distinction between Jew and non-Jew. It is dangerous for its abjection. In this way the 
Fourth Jew’s rationale recalls that of Ezekiel when the latter chastises Aholah and 
Aholibah for their idolatrous sexual iniquity.93 
Salomé is a text centrally concerned with the abject, the “collapse of limits” that 
“disturbs identity, system, order.” This concern manifests not only in the ways the play 
literally and symbolically transgresses the Judaic parameters of purity, the clean vs. the 
unclean, but also in Salomé’s many expressions of desire. When Salomé seduces the 
Young Syrian, she tempts him with the prospect of a permeable veil. Her veils later 
become symbolically identified with the veil of the sanctuary and her stripping an act 
both blasphemous and revelatory. When, entranced by the body of Iokanaan, Salomé 
moves to see more closely, then touch the prophet, he continually rebuffs her. The first 
time he directly rejects her, he invokes the metaphor of wine, which the text has already 
associated with violence and orgiastic revelry: “Back! daughter of Babylon! Come not 
near the chosen of the Lord. Thy mother hath filled the earth with the wine of her 
iniquities, and the cry of her sinning hath come up even to the ears of God” (SE, 308). In 
Douglas’s translation, Salomé replies, “Speak again, Iokanaan. Thy voice is as music to 
mine ear.” Presumably, Douglas translates the last sentence as he does in order to contrast 
the sinful cry with a musical voice and the ear of God with the ear of Salomé. Whatever 
its merits, his translation suffers by deviating from the original—“Parle encore, Iokanaan. 
                                                
93 In light of Kristeva’s tendency throughout Powers of Horror to identify excrement as one of the chief 
signifiers of the abject, it is probably worth noting that the Hebrew word גילולים, which is translated as 
“idols” in the Authorized Version of Ezekiel 23, is derived from the word for “shit.” Many thanks to my 




Ta voix m’enivre” (SF, 29)—which literally means, “Speak again, Iokanaan. Your voice 
intoxicates me.”94 In Salomé’s response, Iokanaan’s reproachful voice, which forbids 
Salomé to defile the prophet with her impurity, becomes one with “the wine of her 
[Herodias-Salomé’s] iniquities.” As the embodiment of the principle of abjection in 
Wilde’s play, Princess Salomé troubles fundamental binaries, both in the way she acts 
upon the world and in the way she perceives the world through her senses. 
Narcissism vs. The Truth of Masks 
 The trope of idolatry that permeates the play continually dissolves boundaries that 
the Judaic injunction against idolatry was meant to fortify. Despite Iokanaan’s absolute 
contempt for the body (whether Salomé’s or his own), Salomé nevertheless sees 
Iokanaan’s body as a kind of idol: “He is like a thin ivory statue. He is like an image of 
silver,” she says (SE, 308). Though the English word statue does not necessarily refer to 
an idol, the original French—“il ressemble à une mince image d’ivoire. On dirait une 
image d’argent” (SF, 27)—clearly indicates what sort of statue Salomé envisions since in 
a religious context the French word image, as I have already mentioned, means either 
“icon” or “idol.”95 In the rest of her initial appraisal of Iokanaan’s body—“I am sure he is 
chaste, as the moon is. He is like a moonbeam, like a shaft of silver. His flesh must be 
very cold, cold as ivory” (SE, 308)—Salomé echoes her earlier description of the moon, 
which she says is like “a little silver flower. She is cold and chaste. I am sure she is a 
virgin. She has the beauty of a virgin. Yes, she is a virgin. She has never defiled herself. 
                                                
94 Translation mine. 




She has never abandoned herself to men, like the other goddesses” (SE, 304-305). 
Salomé sees herself in the moon and thus, by extension, in Iokanaan as well. One could 
argue that Salomé’s intense libidinal investment in Iokanaan stages an extreme 
narcissism, a show of desire analogous to that forbidden desire, incest, which haunts the 
play throughout and brings Salomé and Iokanaan together.96 Iokanaan explicitly invokes 
“the bed of her incestuousness” in his denunciations of Herodias-Salomé (SE, 307), 
which draw from Ezekiel, and he obliquely hints at what Ezekiel, in the passages alluded 
to, makes clear: sexual iniquity, including incest, is a kind of idolatry. By expressing her 
craving for Iokannan as the craving for an idol, Salomé therefore already positions her 
desire in analogous relation to the incestuous desire of Herod for Herodias and Salomé. 
That Salomé also frames her desire in terms that could be interpreted as narcissistic 
strengthens the analogy. Just as narcissism signifies the inability to direct desire away 
from the self, so incest, with its thwarting of exogamy, also signifies a failure to direct 
desire outward toward its proper object. 
 Nevertheless, it would be wrong to read Salomé’s desire for Iokanaan as 
narcissistic. As Riquelme has demonstrated, Salomé’s echoic speech counters her 
narcissistic gaze when, in praising Iokanaan’s beauty, the princess voices the Song of 
Songs, thereby confounding the traditional gender dichotomy of male-subject and 
female-object in an echo that is also a reversal.97 I would extend Riquelme’s assessment 
by way of Herod’s one Wildean aphorism: “Only in mirrors is it well to look, for mirrors 
                                                
96 Recall that Iokannan originally comes to Herod’s court to denounce the incestuous marriage of Herod and 
Herodias. 




do but show us masks” (SE, 324). This line, uttered in desperation as Herod searches for 
some way to appease Salomé without acquiescing to the execution of Iokanaan, seems to 
endorse narcissism with a warning to each of us to keep his gaze, and thus his desire, to 
himself. In fact, the aphorism endorses not narcissism, but rather “the truth of masks,” 
which Riquelme explains as “the double mask of drama, tragedy and comedy in perpetual 
oscillation and indissoluble conjunction. It is also the truth of the veil as a permeable 
membrane, whose dance Salomé performs, that marks boundaries involving aesthetic 
relations and those of power.”98 
The truth of masks, like Herod’s claim that “[o]nly in mirrors is it well to look, for 
mirrors do but show us masks,” warns against essentializing the image and, by extension, 
the self. Thus, Herod’s aphorism, which says more than Herod intends, is also an 
acknowledgment by Wilde of Lacan’s dictum that “I is an other.”99 Salomé sees in 
Iokanaan what Lacan would call the objet petit a, that in Iokanaan which is greater than 
Iokanaan. She recognizes in him the object cause of her desire. Iokanaan is a Hebraic 
prophet in the tradition of Isaiah, Nahum, Ezekiel, and others whom he repeatedly 
echoes. His is the tradition of “a God that one cannot see,” a God that forbids His people 
to image Him. Iokanaan wholly spurns the material body, such that even when he quotes 
New Testament apostles, he does so almost exclusively for the purpose of denouncing the 
sensuality and idolatry of Herodias-Salomé. He therefore signifies a spirituality to which 
                                                
98 Ibid., 579. The phrase “the truth of masks” originates and features prominently in Wilde’s dialogue “The 
Truth of Masks: A Note on Illusion” (1885/1891). 
99 Jacques Lacan, “Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis,” in Écrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: 




Salomé has no direct access since it is divorced from the bodily. The object cause of her 
desire, which she recognizes in Iokanaan, is both an excess and a lack: an excess in that it 
provides something she lacks in herself (spirituality that exceeds the sensual), a lack in 
that it provides a void into which she can insert herself (spirituality bereft of the sensual). 
Such is the double-meaning of Lacan’s expression “the desire of the other” (le désir de 
l’Autre), which denotes both subjective and objective genitive.  
 Her recognition is a misrecognition, however, in that she cannot ultimately 
conceive her desire, the objet a Iokanaan represents, outside the terms of the bodily. Her 
first assessment of Iokanaan suggests otherwise—that perhaps she does recognize that 
what draws her to him is distinct from the bodily—with imagery emphasizing pure lack: 
“It is his eyes above all that are terrible. They are like black holes burned by torches in a 
tapestry of Tyre. They are like the black caverns where the dragons live, the black 
caverns of Egypt in which the dragons make their lairs.” This lack is one in which 
Salomé, double of the moon, sees herself reflected and into which she can insert herself: 
“They are like black lakes troubled by fantastic moons” (SE, 308). But the brief glimmer 
of what appears to be genuine recognition is as evanescent as a moonbeam on lake water, 
and Salomé’s attempt to vocalize her desire quickly reverts to images of the bodily: e.g., 
“Thy body is white, like the lilies of the field that the mower hath never mowed”; “thy 
hair is like clusters of grapes”; “thy mouth is like a band of scarlet on a tower of ivory” 




speech, each figure generating the next figure even as it masks or dissolves the preceding 
one.100  
Salomé’s speeches, which alternately praise and revile Iokanaan’s features, can be 
productively understood in terms of “the truth of masks” (Riquelme’s focus) or in terms 
of a deconstructionist “discursive engine of desire”101 (Bennett’s focus). In addition, the 
abrupt shifts from attraction to repulsion also manifest the text’s tendency to disavow its 
fascination with idolatry, as Salomé alternately covets and rejects her idol, “une mince 
image d’ivoire” (SF, 27). Like Vivian in “The Decay of Lying,”102 Wilde’s play clearly 
values the Jews’ unprecedented insistence on “worship[ing] a God that one cannot see” 
and that forbids “graven images” for its potential to liberate the mind from slavish 
adherence to the literal.103 In this way Salomé anticipates Freud’s position in Moses and 
Monotheism: 
Among the precepts of Mosaic religion is one that has more significance 
than is at first obvious. It is the prohibition against making an image of 
God, which means the compulsion to worship an invisible God. [… 
Moses’] God was to have neither a name nor a countenance. The 
prohibition was perhaps a fresh precaution against magic malpractices. If 
this prohibition was accepted, however, it was bound to exercise a 
                                                
100 “We see this process in Salome’s individual similes, which both figure and distance us from the object 
they describe; Iokanaan’s white body is glimpsed only as it is covered over by that to which it is compared. 
Recuperating the body from the first simile (‘white like the lilies’) generates a second (‘white like the 
snows’), hardwired with the same problem as the first and now also forcing us to imaginatively reconstitute 
the object of desire, as if each figure removed us from this object by another degree. After Salome’s two 
initial similes, those that follow reverse tenor and vehicle […]. Instead of enclosing the bodily tenor (‘thy 
body’) in its vehicle (what it is ‘like’), the body now becomes vehicle for a series of tenors (‘The roses in 
the garden … are not so white as thy body’), as if this switch will more successfully bring forth the object 
of desire.” Bennett, “Oscar Wilde’s Salome,” 304. 
101 Ibid., 309. 
102 See note 40 and corresponding block quotation above. 
103 See my comments above, pp. 27-28, on the exchange between the Second Soldier, the Cappadocian, and 




profound influence. For it signified subordinating sense perception to an 
abstract idea; it was a triumph of spirituality over the senses; more 
precisely, an instinctual renunciation accompanied by its psychologically 
necessary consequences.104 
 
Freud’s Judaism and Wilde’s Salomé are both sustained by the renunciation of idolatry. 
For Freud “the psychologically necessary consequences” of Judaism’s key 
renunciation—first of idolatry itself, then of many related instinctual urges, particularly 
sexual ones—consist primarily of the satisfaction derived by the superego through the 
suppression of instinct.105 Salomé is ambivalent in its renunciation, which is why I have 
preferred the term disavowal to describe the play’s relationship toward idolatry. The 
significance of the period of momentous historical change in which the events of Salomé 
unfold is only partially captured by the First Soldier’s remark that “the Jews worship a 
God that one cannot see” (SE, 302). This transition from the old pagan gods, who can be 
seen, to the new God of the Jews, who cannot be seen—indeed, who commands, “Thou 
shalt not make unto thee any graven image”—marks a radical break with the cultures 
represented by the Cappadocian, the Nubian, and others and would eventually consign an 
entire class of artisan-merchants, “the idol-sellers,” to obsolescence. At the same time, 
disagreements among the Jews reveal they are not a monolithic bloc, and rumors of Jesus, 
who can resurrect the dead, circulate in Judea. Even as Judaism (the unseen) displaces 
paganism (the seen), Christianity, with its God incarnate (the seen), is on the verge of 
displacing Judaism. In this text, Judaism occupies the strange position of new and old 
                                                
104 Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism, trans. Katherine Jones, with the assistance of James Strachey 
and Wilfred Trotter (New York: Vintage, 1939), 144. 




order at once, an uncanny doubling accompanied by a double-reversal:106 
seenàunseenàseen. 
 In The Fragile Absolute; or, Why Is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For? 
Slavoj Žižek writes, “One becomes a full member of a community not simply by 
identifying with its explicit symbolic tradition, but only when one also assumes the 
spectral dimension that sustains this tradition, the ghosts who haunt the living, the secret 
history of traumatic fantasies transmitted ‘between the lines,’ through the lack in, and 
distortions of, the explicit symbolic tradition.” Moses and Monotheism is Freud’s attempt 
to reconstruct Judaism’s “secret, disavowed tradition” (Moses the Egyptian, his murder, 
his mythic remaking, etc.). “The paradox of Judaism,” says Žižek, “is that it maintains 
fidelity to the founding violent Event precisely by not confessing and symbolizing it: this 
‘repressed’ status of the Event is what gives Judaism its unprecedented vitality.”107 
Though Žižek does not use the term in this passage, he is describing the Lacanian Real of 
Judaism, the hard kernel at its traumatic center. What Freud’s last book does for Judaism, 
Wilde’s play does for Christianity, albeit in a less direct way, by partially symbolizing the 
disavowed tradition of pagan idolatry that sustains Christianity. This tradition was 
certainly never as “buried” for Christianity as the one Freud proposes for Judaism. 
Protestants hostile to Catholicism have hurled charges of idolatry (e.g., Mary-worship 
and the like) at the Church of Rome since the sixteenth century. Salomé does not attempt 
                                                
106 Riquelme identifies doubling accompanied by reversal as a key mechanism of what he calls “modernist 
negativity.” See Riquelme, “The Negativity of Modernist Authenticity/The Authenticity of Modernist 
Negativity: ‘No Direction Home’ in Yeats, Dylan, and Wilde,” Modernism/Modernity 14, no. 3 (September 
2007): 535-41.  
107 Slavoj Žižek, preface to The Fragile Absolute; or, Why Is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For? 2nd 




to repudiate or even directly qualify these charges, but instead allows the contradictions 
of the Judeo-Christian tradition to play out as part of the libidinal economy that structures 
the text. The dynamics of this economy of desire, most clearly operative in the play’s 
exchange of gazes, are especially pronounced in the scene in which Salomé seduces the 
Young Syrian. As Salomé beguiles the Young Syrian with both the command to “look at 
me, Narraboth, look at me” and also the prospect of a look to be returned “through the 
muslin veils,” the play’s economy of desire is doubled by an economy of actual physical 
goods, a marketplace populated by two participants, “idol-buyers” and “idol-sellers,” in a 
return of the repressed that emerges as what appears at first to be little more than a 
passing detail (SE, 306-7). 
Fetishism: Erotic, Religious, Commodity 
In reality, of course, the play continually encourages us to see Salomé as a kind of 
idol, which by the end of the play has become analogous to the suffering Christ. Though 
critics have recognized the implied identity of Wilde’s Salomé with Christ,108 one 
significant trope seems to have escaped their attention: the contrast between “the feet of 
Him who shall be the Saviour of the world” and Caesar’s “gouty […] feet of an elephant” 
does not exhaust the foot motif in the play. In preparation for Salomé’s dance, slaves 
simultaneously hand Salomé the seven veils and remove the shoes from her feet. This 
sends Herod, already delighted that his step-daughter has agreed to dance for his 
pleasure, into a frenzied, overt display of foot fetishism: “Ah, thou art to dance with 
naked feet! ’Tis well! ’Tis well! Thy little feet will be like white doves. They will be like 
                                                




little white flowers that dance upon the trees.” Ecstasy quickly turns to horror, however, 
when the Tetrarch spots a threat to the purity of the fetish object: “No, no, she is going to 
dance on blood! There is blood spilt on the ground. She must not dance on blood. It were 
an evil omen” (SE, 322). Prior to this passage, the foot motif appears in Salomé’s blazon 
of Iokanaan as Salomé fetishizes different features of the prophet before finally fixating 
on his mouth. This obsession eventually drives her to contrive Iokanaan’s decapitation 
for the explicit purpose of kissing his mouth. Though the figurative language Salomé uses 
to describe Iokanaan’s mouth varies, feet act as metaphorical vehicle more times than any 
other image: “Thy mouth is redder than the feet of those who tread the wine in the wine-
press. It is redder than the feet of the doves who inhabit the temples and are fed by the 
priests. It is redder than the feet of him who cometh from a forest where he hath slain a 
lion, and seen gilded tigers” (SE, 310). The foot motif therefore links not only Christ and 
Caesar (by way of humorous juxtaposition), but also Christ, Iokanaan, and Salomé, 
whose feet function in key moments of the text as fetish objects.109  
                                                
109 Wilde had certainly encountered the discourse of late-nineteenth-century sexology and its theories of 
erotic fetishism. During the 1918 libel trial of Noel Pemberton-Billing, for example, Alfred Douglas 
confirmed that Wilde had read Richard von Krafft-Ebing’s Psychopathia Sexualis shortly before 
composing Salomé. (Neil McKenna, The Secret Life of Oscar Wilde: An Intimate Biography [New York: 
Basic Books, 2005], 165.) Though Krafft-Ebing discusses erotic fetishism (of the foot or otherwise) several 
times throughout the book, he initially explains the dynamics of erotic fetishism by analogy with idolatry. 
Fetishism, he says, 
is most common in two related mental spheres,—those of religious and erotic feelings and ideas. 
Religious fetichism [sic] differs in relation and significance from sexual fetichism, for it found, 
and still finds, its original motive in the delusion that the object of the fetichism, or the idol, 
possesses divine attributes, and that it is not simply a symbol; or peculiar wonder-working (relics) 
or protective (amulet) virtues are superstitiously ascribed to the fetich. 
 It is otherwise with erotic fetichism, which finds its psychological motive in fetiches 
which consist of physical or mental qualities of a person, or even merely of objects which a person 
has used. These always awaken intense associative ideas of the personality as a whole, and, 
moreover, are always colored with a lively feeling of sexual pleasure. Analogies with religious 




 In addition to the first two types of fetishism, erotic and religious, Salomé also 
evokes a third type, commodity fetishism, through the recurrent foot motif. According to 
Marx, commodity fetishism is an ideological effect whereby real social relations among 
persons are displaced onto the objects of labor, thus endowing those objects with a 
seemingly autonomous vitality of their own.110 In the early-twentieth century, Georg 
Lukács would develop Marx’s notion of commodity fetishism into the broader theory of 
reification, the process by which abstract entities are misapprehended as material things. 
The most obvious example of a reified entity in our contemporary world of global 
capitalism is money: money is an idea only, no longer backed in the US even by so-called 
precious metals; when the Federal Reserve decides to add another billion dollars into 
circulation, a Fed employee simply taps a few zeros into a computer program. Yet so 
often we fetishize money, as if the banknotes in our pockets or the balance figure in an 
online checking account has a material existence apart from the promise by the United 
                                                                                                                                            
insignificant objects (bones, nails, hair, etc.) become fetiches, and are associated with pleasurable 
feelings which may reach the intensity of ecstasy. (Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Psychopathia 
Sexualis, with Special Reference to Contrary Sexual Instinct: A Medico-Legal Study, 7th ed., trans. 
Charles Gilbert Chaddock [Philadelphia and London: F.A. Davis, 1892], 17.) 
110 In Capital: Volume 1, Marx elucidates commodity fetishism by comparing it to religious fetishism: 
In the act of seeing, there is at all events, an actual passage of light from one thing to another, from 
the external object to the eye. There is a physical relation between physical things. But it is 
different with commodities. There, the existence of the things quâ commodities, and the value 
relation between the products of labour which stamps them as commodities, have absolutely no 
connection with their physical properties and with the material relations arising therefrom. There it 
is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a 
relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy, we must have recourse to the mist-
enveloped regions of the religious world. In that world the productions of the human brain appear 
as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into relation both with one another and the 
human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men’s hands. This I call the 
Fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon as they are produced as 
commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities. 
(Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward 
Aveling, ed. Friedrich Engels [New York: Modern Library, 1906; Mineola, NY: Dover, 2011], 83. 




States government that our money means something. As Žižek points out, however, this 
now standard Marxist way of thinking about capital—as a reified object that, once 
exposed to the cold, sober light of demystification, clearly has no material existence—is 
itself no longer adequate in an age where the fates of entire nations of people are 
determined by the errant shifts of the stock market or the vicissitudes of the futures trade. 
In the twenty-first century, the daily fluctuations of global capital unquestionably 
constitute an economic Real that determines the everyday material existence of actual 
persons.111  
 But Salomé is not the product of the age of global capitalism. Written in 1891, it 
is the product of the age of monopoly capitalism when Britain was at the height of 
imperial power. Though the Franco-Prussian Alliance of 1892 had yet to be devised, 
Britain still watched Russia closely, lest it should threaten British dominance in Central 
Asia. Meanwhile, German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who had not only created a 
powerful, unified German state in 1871, but had also maintained peace on the Continent 
in subsequent decades through his deft political maneuvering, was forced to resign the 
chancellorship in 1890 by Wilhelm II, the newly-crowned Emperor of the German 
Empire. Bismarck’s strategy had long been to isolate France from the rest of Europe 
diplomatically, and Bismarck’s dismissal, though not an immediate threat to British 
imperial dominance, certainly had the potential to upset politico-economic stability and 
                                                




the balance of power in Europe.112 In Ireland the campaign for greater autonomy from 
Britain had been gaining strength for decades. In 1886, however, the First Home Rule 
Bill, crafted by British Prime Minister William Gladstone, was defeated in the House of 
Commons, with many MPs concerned that passing it could precipitate the eventual 
dissolution of the British Empire. In 1890 MP Charles Stewart Parnell, leader of the Irish 
Parliamentary Party and chief campaigner in the push for Irish Home Rule, was 
irreparably damaged by the fallout from his adulterous affair with Catherine O’Shea. His 
party divided into bitterly opposed Parnellite and anti-Parnellite factions in December 
1890, and he died the following year.113 
 Thus, when Wilde sat down in 1891 to write Salomé, a play set in a minor 
colonial territory of a vast empire, he did so at a very politically volatile time for both 
Ireland and Imperial Britain. Parnell was not yet dead, but the Irish Home Rule 
movement was in disarray. Britain had to contend not only with the hostility of Irish 
nationalists, but also with the prospect of political instability on the Continent, where any 
number of contingencies—such as an emboldened France or Russia—could pose serious 
problems for the British Empire. Salomé is clearly subtended by the utopian fantasy that 
the oppressed will rise up to overthrow their oppressors. Christ may be a peripheral figure 
in the action of the play, but one would have to be especially myopic to miss the implied 
significance of his legacy: in the battle between Christ and Caesar, Christ will emerge 
                                                
112 For a succinct but wide-ranging account of Bismarck’s diplomatic maneuvers and their implications for 
the stability of Europe in the late nineteenth century, see Encyclopaedia Britannica, s.v. “Otto von 
Bismarck: German Chancellor and Prime Minister,” by Kenneth Barkin, accessed June 25, 2015. 
113 For a detailed account of the tumultuous political consequences of the Parnell-O’Shea affair, see Alvin 




victorious in the long-run. Titus may raze Jerusalem to the ground, but Peter will be the 
rock upon which the God of Abraham erects his Church, and that Church will define 
Rome, not to mention the Holy Roman Empire, long after Caesar’s empire has crumbled. 
The periphery will subvert and become the center.  
In Wilde’s play, Salomé is identified not only with Christ, but also, as Killeen 
points out, the Catholic Church (and thus Catholic Ireland), which Protestant detractors of 
the nineteenth-century regularly depicted as the Whore of Babylon.114 Killeen quotes an 
1850 article by Speranza (the penname of Lady Jane Wilde, Oscar Wilde’s mother) to 
demonstrate the reverence for Catholicism that she, nominally a Protestant, continually 
modeled for her sons: 
Indeed, the sole patron of the Arts is the Catholic Church and considering 
the scant and insufficient means supplied by the faithful and impoverished 
people, it is marvellous to what an amount we are indebted to it for all that 
is best in architectural, pictorial or sculptured art throughout the country. 
Catholicism alone has comprehended the truth that Art is one of the 
noblest languages of religion.115 
 
One could easily imagine Oscar Wilde inserting that last clause—“Art is one of the 
noblest languages of religion”—into any one of the essays in Intentions. Regarding the 
Catholic Church as Ireland’s “sole patron of the Arts,” the “pictorial or sculptured art” 
Speranza praises is the same art that would, from the anti-Papist point-of-view, be 
denounced as idolatry. In Salomé the conflating of art and idolatry plays a fundamental 
role: the play includes its own artists—not in the figurative sense in which, say, Salomé is 
                                                
114 Killeen, The Faiths of Oscar Wilde, 65-67. I discuss the relation between Salomé and the apocalyptic 
Whore of Babylon in detail above; see pp. 16-18. 




a version of the artist (which she undoubtedly is), but literally in the persons of the idol-
sellers. These artisan idol-sellers, as I have pointed out, appear at a crucial moment in the 
text. With their counterpart, the idol-buyers, they form a complete economy governed by 
supply and demand of a physical product.116 This economy of physical goods doubles the 
libidinal economy of desire that manifests in the exchange of gazes throughout the play 
as a whole and in Salomé’s seduction of the Young Syrian in particular.  
 The signifiers of desire that feature prominently in this seduction scene—e.g., the 
gaze, the veil, the idols—are all present or implied at the very beginning of the play. The 
first line of Salomé—“How beautiful is the Princess Salome tonight!” (SE, 301)—
channels the desire of the reader or viewer through the desire of the other, much as the 
gaze of the (male) agent in classic Hollywood film channels the gaze, and thus the desire, 
of the viewer toward the on-screen (female) object of desire. At the opening of the play, 
however, the object of desire is not directly visible on-stage to the viewer (for the reader, 
one would say the object has not appeared directly in the diegesis of the text), thereby 
setting in motion the dialectic of seen and unseen. The imperative to gaze appears in the 
second line—“Look at the moon”—as the Page of Herodias responds to the Young 
Syrian. When the Page sees in the moon “a woman rising from a tomb,” he foreshadows 
his own desire for the possibility of resurrection in the aftermath of the suicide of the 
Young Syrian, whom he loves. The vision of “a woman rising from a tomb” also 
foreshadows the possibility of the resurrections of both Christ and Salomé. When the 
                                                
116 The complementary fit of idol-buyers and idol-sellers is doubled by the landmarks associated with them, 
“gateway” and “bridge,” respectively. The Freudian reading of these two structures as stand-ins for vagina 





Young Syrian replies by thoroughly conflating Salomé and the moon, he introduces for 
the first time in the text both the veil motif and the foot motif—“She is like a little 
princess who wears a yellow veil, and whose feet are of silver. She is like a princess who 
has little white doves for feet. One might fancy she was dancing”—which together 
clearly foreshadow the Dance of the Seven Veils. Regarding Salomé’s “feet of silver,” 
which will return again and again as fetish objects throughout the play, the original 
French phrasing, “des pieds d’argent,” is revealing. The word argent can mean “silver,” 
but it also very often means “money,” so that in Salomé’s opening lines, which lay out 
many of the key terms and motifs that structure the play’s economy of desire, two 
prominent fetish objects, the veil and feet, are introduced in the same sentence as a 
common signifier for “money,” a third fetish object. 
 When Salomé, the object of desire that has determined the Young Syrian’s visions 
of the moon, appears on-stage, one of the first things she does, after describing the feast 
she has just left, is look toward the moon:  
How good to see the moon! She is like a little piece of money [une petite 
pièce de monnaie], a little silver flower [une toute petite fleur d’argent]. 
She is cold and chaste. I am sure she is a virgin [Je suis sûre qu’elle est 
vierge]. She has the beauty of a virgin [Elle a la beauté d’une vierge]. Yes, 
she is a virgin [Oui, elle est vierge]. She has never defiled herself. She has 
never abandoned herself to men, like the other goddesses. (SE, 304-5; SF, 
17) 
 
As I mention above, Salomé clearly sees herself, a virgin, in the moon. The moon “is like 
a little piece of money” in that the moon looks like a small silver disc, but how does the 




“is a virgin”? Again, the original French signifies doubly:117 “elle est vierge” could mean 
“she [or it] is a virgin,” but it could also mean “she [or it] is blank.” The latter statement 
perfectly characterizes the moon as it has operated up to this point in the text: it is a blank 
screen, an empty signifier onto which the viewer projects his or her own desire. In the 
same way, Salomé herself serves repeatedly as a blank onto which other characters (e.g., 
Herod, the Young Syrian, Iokanaan) project their desire. Read in this context, the 
assertion that the moon “is like a little piece of money” assumes another meaning: neither 
money nor the play’s moon has any meaning, any substance, in itself; it only takes on 
meaning through the process of reification.  
 Salomé “is like a little piece of money” in that she has initially no meaning in 
herself, but only as a result of her position among a network of signifiers. She is like a 
little silver coin circulating in the libidinal economy of the text, and the constant 
invocations of her pieds d’argents subtly recall her fetishized status. As she markets 
herself to the Young Syrian in an attempt to obtain Iokanaan, her object of desire, the text 
produces symptoms of its own disavowal in the form of a market of idols. These idols 
suggest fetishes in two senses of the word. In Lacanian terms, fetishism occurs when the 
object-cause of desire (the object petit a) is taken not as the remainder, surplus, or excess 
that enables desire for the object, but rather as the object of desire itself.118 The distinction 
                                                
117 Just before Salomé turns to the moon, as she describes the ongoing feast, she mentions the “Romans 
brutal and coarse, with their uncouth jargon [gros mots]” (SE, 304). A more accurate translation for gros 
mots would be “swear words.” In any case, one could justifiably read this line as a barb aimed at the 
imperial English and a reminder that Wilde deliberately chose not to write Salomé in the language of 
Ireland’s imperial oppressor. 
118 Žižek elaborates on this definition of fetishism with regard to Alfred Hitchcock’s Vertigo (1958) in The 




between the object-cause of desire and the object of desire corresponds to the distinction 
between the icon and the idol.119 The icon facilitates or inspires veneration for a holy being 
that is different from the icon, which is only a piece of wood, metal, canvas, etc. (i.e., the 
left-over, meaningless bit of debris that is the objet petit a). In contrast, the idol is itself 
the object of veneration; the meaningless bit of debris is reified as the sacred deity. The 
Bible continually demystifies idols by pointing out that they are nothing more than the 
lifeless products of men, as distinct from the one true God of Abraham, who forbids His 
followers to make idols: 
Thy name, O LORD, endureth for ever; 
and thy memorial, O LORD, throughout all generations. 
For the LORD will judge his people, 
and he will repent himself concerning his servants. 
The idols of the heathen are silver and gold, 
the work of men’s hands. 
They have mouths, but they speak not; 
eyes have they, but they see not; 
they have ears, but they hear not; 
neither is there any breath in their mouths. 
They that make them are like unto them: 
so is every one that trusteth in them.120  
 
The Hebrew word for breath121 in this passage could also be translated as “wind,” “mind,” 
or “spirit.” Hence, the term contains both the concrete (breath, wind) and the abstract 
(spirit, mind). The line “neither is there any breath in their mouths” de-sublimates the 
idol, transforming it from sublime object back into useless bit of inert matter.  
                                                
119 Of course, neither Catholics nor Protestants of nineteenth-century Europe would have considered 
themselves idolaters. Among Catholics, the Eastern Orthodox have always been more likely than their 
Roman counterparts to refer to visual aids to worship as icons, but both traditions use icons of various 
kinds. Among anti-Catholic Protestants, icons were often condemned as idols. 
120 Ps. 135:13-18. 
121 James Strong, Abingdon’s Strong’s Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible (Nashville: Abingdon, 1980), 




 The idol market in Wilde’s play signifies fetishism not only in the sense just 
outlined—i.e., fetishism as the process by which an object that enables worship of the 
divine is mistaken for the divine itself—but also in a second, more Marxian sense in 
which inert matter is reified with a vitality nowhere present in its material properties. The 
text specifies not simply “idol-makers,” but “idol-sellers” along with their transactional 
complement, “idol-buyers.” The emphasis on the monetary, transactional aspect of this 
marketplace in which artisans sell their wares recalls the commodification of art in late-
nineteenth century Britain that Wilde laments in an essay he composed the same year as 
Salomé, “The Soul of Man Under Socialism”: “as a certain advance has been made in the 
drama [in England] within the last ten or fifteen years,” writes Wilde, “it is important to 
point out that this advance is entirely due to a few individual artists refusing to accept the 
popular want of taste as their standard, and refusing to regard Art as a mere matter of 
demand and supply.”122 The implicit monetized exchange of these idol commodities, by 
virtue of its placement in the text, doubles the explicit libidinal exchange Salomé openly 
negotiates with the Young Syrian. This doubling marks a dual process whereby inter-
subjective relations are displaced from persons onto objects (the classic Marxist 
                                                
122 Oscar Wilde, “The Soul of Man Under Socialism,” in The Artist as Critic: Critical Writings of Oscar 
Wilde, 278. Elsewhere in the essay Wilde makes virtually the same point in terms of the “health” of a work 
of art: “An unhealthy work of art […] is a work whose style is obvious, old-fashioned, and common, and 
whose subject is deliberately chosen, not because the artist has any pleasure in it, but because he thinks that 
the public will pay him for it. In fact, the popular novel that the public calls healthy is always a thoroughly 
unhealthy production; and what the public call an unhealthy novel is always a beautiful and healthy work of 
art” (275, emphasis in the original). Wilde thus suggests that the authenticity of the artwork functions 
independently from, and even in opposition to, the dictates of “popular taste” and the commodifying law of 
“demand and supply.” Salomé, too, embodies the essential characteristic of both the artist and Christ that 
Wilde identifies in “Soul of Man,” absolute and unyielding individualism: “Art is the most intense mode of 
individualism that the world has known” (“Soul of Man,” 270, emphasis in the original). “And so he who 
would lead a Christ-like life is he who is perfectly and absolutely himself. […]. It does not matter what he 




definition of commodity fetishism) and, conversely, object-relations are displaced onto 
persons. Indeed, is there any better metaphor for commodity fetishism than the buying 
and selling of idols on the open market? Inanimate things are treated as vital beings; vital 
beings are treated as inanimate things.123 Salomé, with her pieds d’argent, becomes “a little 
piece of money.” 
J’ai baisé ta bouche: The Impossible Object of Desire  
 I do not mean to suggest that Wilde deliberately set out to produce a Marxist 
screed when he wrote Salomé. I do suggest, however, that recognizable threads of 
Marxist discourse inform the structure of the text and that these threads also appear in 
Wilde’s other writings, such as “The Soul of Man Under Socialism,” where they are even 
more overt. This realization will hopefully disabuse readers of the common but 
superficial impression that Salomé is not of a piece with the other work Wilde produced 
in the early 1890s. More important still, I am arguing that, in his endeavors as an artist at 
the end of the nineteenth century, Wilde was confronted with the historical problem of 
the ever more pervasive commodification of art in the age of monopoly capitalism and 
that Salomé addresses this problem obliquely and in theological terms, particularly 
through the motif of idolatry, which serves as something like the original sin of the text. 
It must be disavowed not despite the fact that it is the fundamental structuring trope of the 
                                                
123 Also relevant to this point is Wilde’s affirmation in “The Soul of Man Under Socialism” of the classical 
Marxist approach to being vs. having: “For the recognition of private property has really harmed 
Individualism, and obscured it, by confusing a man with what he possesses. […]. So that man thought that 
the important thing was to have, and did not know that the important thing is to be. The true perfection of 
man lies, not in what man has, but in what man is. Private property has crushed true Individualism, and set 




text, but rather precisely because it is the fundamental structuring trope of the text. As 
with the Lacanian barred subject ($), the integrity of the text depends on its fundamental 
difference from itself, on that remainder of the Real that eludes symbolization, the objet 
petit a.  
 Brilliant as Chad Bennett’s deconstructionist reading of Salomé is, it errs when it 
affirms Dowling’s wholly aesthetic interpretation of Salomé as “a vision of a world 
created and utterly disrupted by the powers of autonomous language”124 and Wilde’s own 
speculation that “try as we may, we cannot get behind the appearance of things to reality. 
And the terrible reason may be that there is no reality in things apart from their 
appearances.”125 Perhaps Wilde even believed this last statement. Nevertheless, Salomé is 
not a postmodern text caught up in its own “autonomous” linguistic operations unmoored 
from history like a dancer entranced by her own solipsistic pirouettes. It is instead a text 
that responds to the specific, historically contingent situation of the moment of its 
production. In Salomé the shifting status of the seen and the unseen that marks the 
transition from pagan, to Jewish, to Christian cultural dominant relates dialectically to the 
changes in socioeconomic structure that give rise to and arise from the crisis of art in 
Wilde’s historical moment.126 With its economy envisioned as a marketplace of “idol-
                                                
124 See note 48 above. 
125 Quoted in Bennett, “Oscar Wilde’s Salome,” 313. Bennett identifies the source of Wilde’s statement as 
Laurence Housman, Echo de Paris: A Study from Life (London: J. Cape, 1923), 22. 
126 These socioeconomic structures are a pre-capitalist mode in which the artist labors in organic relation to 
his work and society, and the artwork is authentically figured forth; a capitalist mode in which the artist has 
become alienated from his work and society, and the artwork reduced to just another commodity; and a 
longed for, as yet to be realized mode in which the commodification of art would be overcome, and the 





sellers” and “idol-buyers,” Salomé comments on cultural and economic commodification 
in a society undergoing a major historical transition that will alienate the artist by 
stripping him of his artisan status. Once idolatry is made obsolete, so too are the products 
of the artist idol-sellers, who must adapt by making a virtue of their inutility, transferring 
their skills to a new profession, or abandoning art altogether. This critique of the 
alienation of the artist under monopoly capitalism is similar to the critique implied by a 
number of Wilde’s dandies, whose privileged idleness grants them a position beyond 
capitalism’s reach—and therefore a potentially progressive position from which to 
critique capitalism’s effects—even as it marks them as members of an outmoded 
aristocratic order. 
 Of course, idolatry never becomes fully obsolete in Salomé since even as the 
Jews’ rigid interpretation of the second commandment introduces the revolutionary 
concept of “a God that one cannot see” (SE, 302), the play continually implies a utopian 
vision of the future in which Christ, as the bodily incarnation of a non-corporeal God, 
will have been crucified and resurrected, thereby establishing the new Christian world 
order in which the divine can once again be materially embodied—e.g., the statues, 
crucifixes, icons and other images that the anti-Catholic sentiment of Wilde’s time 
denounced as “idolatry.” On the one hand, then, Salomé’s utopian vision is a 
metaphysical, ontological one in which Cartesian mind-body dualism will have been 
overcome; on the other, that ostensibly non-political fantasy is grounded very much in the 
political fantasy of oppressed Christianity, like oppressed Ireland, rising up to overcome 




political aspect of the utopian fantasy, the uprising would overturn the existing global 
order, insofar as the Roman Empire circumscribes the world in its entirety in Salomé and 
the British Empire dominated the world politically and economically in the late 
nineteenth century. In both cases too the political uprising would herald a new cultural 
framework in which the artist could thrive: in the case of Salomé the artisans no longer 
able to craft and peddle statues of Baal or Astharte or Isis will instead be able to put their 
artistic talent to use in service of the soon-to-be-established Catholic Church; in the case 
of the late-nineteenth-century artist who like Wilde finds himself confronted with the 
ever-increasing commodification of art, it is not clear from the text exactly what form the 
new post-imperial world would take and how it would resolve the artist’s dilemma. The 
play does offer a symbolic resolution, however, in the person of Salomé who, as a Christ-
figure, redeems in her death the artistic potential of idolatry.  
 The manner of Salomé’s death is important in this regard. She is killed when at 
Herod’s command “the soldiers rush forward and crush beneath their shields Salome, 
daughter of Herodias, Princess of Judea” (SE, 329). Several key moments between 
Iokanaan’s and Salomé’s executions precipitate this final dramatic conclusion. As 
Salomé seizes the severed head of Iokanaan, she exclaims, “Ah! thou wouldst not suffer 
me to kiss thy mouth, Iokanaan. Well! I will kiss it now” (SE, 327). The English verb to 
kiss, however, does not convey the force of her desire as fully as the French baiser in the 
original: “Ah! tu n’as pas voulu me laisser baiser ta bouche, Iokanaan. Eh bien! je la 
baiserai maintenant” (SF, 87-88). Though baiser can mean “to kiss,” in today’s parlance, 




baiser was a common verb for to kiss. Nevertheless, the vulgar usage had been 
established well before the end of the nineteenth-century,127 and given the extreme 
carnality of the scene, it would be a mistake to overlook the intensity that inheres in the 
double meaning of baiser. Killeen points out that the promised kissed is supplemented by 
images of consumption—e.g., “I will bite it [Iokanaan’s mouth] with my teeth as one 
bites a ripe fruit” (SE, 327)—which turn Salomé’s desire to kiss Iokanaan into the desire 
to consume the body and blood of Christ, as in the Eucharist:128 “I am athirst for thy 
beauty; I am hungry for thy body; and neither wine nor apples can appease my desire” 
(SE, 328). As noted above, the vampiric inflections of Salomé’s behavior very strongly 
resonate with hostile Protestant depictions of the Catholic Church in Victorian Britain 
and Ireland.129 Salomé’s desire appears insatiable as she echoes the Song of Songs— 
“Neither the floods nor the great waters can quench my passion” (SE, 328)—until the 
moment she finally kisses the prophet’s mouth. In Lacanian terms, one would say that she 
at last achieves the impossible object, the objet petit a, which is the excess that 
                                                
127 See, for example, the song “Tombeau des aristocrates” (“Tomb of the Aristocrats”), published in 1790. In 
verse 3, the speaker makes the vulgar pun on the verb baiser: “Aristocrate, vous voila dans le Bahus./ Je 
baiserons [sic] vos femmes, et vous serez cocus./ Aristocrate, je vous vois tous cornus.” (Aristocrat, here 
you are in the Bahus [River]./ I will fuck your women, and you will be a cuckold./ Aristocrat, I see you’re 
all horned. [translation mine]) Readers familiar with French will notice that the verb baiserons in line 2 is 
conjugated in first-person plural, even though its subject, je (I), is the first-person singular personal 
pronoun. One would expect either “je baiserai” or “nous baiserons,” but not “je baiserons.” I suspect this 
discrepancy is politically motivated. The vocative “aristocrate” is singular, so the speaker is addressing one 
(presumably archetypal) aristocrat. The speaker derisively grants this aristocrat the courtesy of the formal, 
plural vous, rather than the familiar, singular tu. By declaring “je baiserons,” rather than the expected “je 
baiserai,” the speaker seems to be asserting the he, the common citizen, is just as worthy of a formal, plural, 
aggrandizing linguistic designation as the aristocrat. Tombeau des aristocrates: Air, vive en Henri quatre 
(Paris: Chez Frere Passage du Saumon, 1790), French Revolution Collection, Newberry Library, Chicago, 
https://archive.org/details/tombeaudesaristo00unse. 
128 Killeen, The Faiths of Oscar Wilde, 69-71. 




continually evades symbolization and thereby maintains the unbridgeable gap of desire—
but the subject ($) is nothing other than this gap, represented by the bar that divides the 
full (that is, unbarred) S from itself. Made whole through her consumption of the 
impossible object, Salomé ceases to exist as a subject: a sudden moonbeam bathes her in 
a sublime flash of light, and she is extinguished. 
 Unlike the majority of the play, Herodias’s last speech is actually more suggestive 
in the English translation than the original: “I am well pleased with my daughter. She has 
done well. And I would stay here” (SE, 328). The phrasing of the initial sentence recalls 
several passages from the New Testament, including Matthew 17:5 and 3:17. In Matthew 
17, days before the crucifixion, Jesus leads his disciples to the top of a mountain, where 
he is “transfigured before them: and his face did shine as the sun, and his raiment was 
white as the light,”130 a scene similar to Salomé’s own transfiguration when “a ray of 
moonlight falls on Salome and illumines her” (SE, 329). As the transfigured Christ stands 
before his disciples, “a bright cloud overshadowed them: and behold a voice out of the 
cloud, which said, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased; hear ye him.”131 In 
Matthew 3 Jesus comes to John the Baptist to be baptized. When Jesus rises from the 
water, “the heavens were opened unto him, and he saw the Spirit of God descending like 
a dove, and lighting upon him: And lo a voice from heaven, saying, This is my beloved 
Son, in whom I am well pleased.”132 Herodias’s statement—“I am well pleased with my 
                                                
130 Matt. 17:2. 
131 Matt. 17:5. The apostle Peter also recounts the story of the transfiguration, quoting the voice from heaven 
in 2 Pet. 1:17: “This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased.” 
132 Matt. 3:16-17. Mark and Luke also tell versions of Jesus’ baptism in which a voice from heaven affirms 




daughter”—echoes the voice of God from both Matthew 17:5 and Matthew 3:17. Placing 
Herodias in the position of God the Father implicitly places Salomé in the position of the 
Son, the two of which, along with the Holy Spirit, are one in the Trinity. Prior to 
Herodias’s proclamation, Salomé identifies herself with God as well when she exclaims, 
“Ah! wherefore didst thou not look at me, Iokanaan? With the cloak of thine hands, and 
with the cloak of thy blasphemies thou didst hide thy face. Thou didst put upon thine eyes 
the covering of him who would see his God” (SE, 328). The French version of Herodias’s 
last line—“J’approuve ce que ma fille a fait, et je veux rester ici maintenant” (SF, 91—
literally, “I approve of what my daughter has done, and I wish to remain here now”)133—
lacks the compelling allusiveness of Douglas’s translation. Whether Wilde directed his 
young lover’s hand in this instance is unclear. Regardless, in both original and 
translation, Salomé implicitly identifies herself with God. The English version of 
Herodias’s line simply emphasizes that identification and the transformative significance 
of Salomé’s kiss, illumination, and execution. 
 Few first-time readers or viewers foresee the unusual means by which Salomé is 
executed. Iokanaan alludes to it midway through the play—“Ah! The wanton one! The 
harlot! […] Let the captains of the hosts pierce her with their swords, let them crush her 
beneath their shields” (SE, 317)—but in context his remark is not especially remarkable, 
and like her daughter, Herodias continues to insist that Iokanaan’s denunciations are 
aimed primarily at herself, not Salomé. In the last line of the play, Herod’s soldiers do 
use their shields to “crush” (écraser) Salomé (SE, 320; SF, 92)—a fitting end for a 
                                                




personage who, like Christ, signifies a return to idolatry (albeit a return with a 
difference). One would hardly destroy an idol by stabbing it. More important than the 
verb, though, is the noun, boucliers (shields). As I argue above, Salomé sees Iokanaan as 
a kind of idol, and in her ravenous desire, she systematically fetishizes different parts of 
his body in an attempt to identify and obtain the impossible object of desire, which she 
finally does by biting into his lips and consuming his blood. The process by which she 
fetishizes his physical features is, as Bennett points out, an excellent example of the 
sixteenth-century French tradition of blazon (which is dialectical since it includes both 
blazon and anti-blazon). Riquelme does not focus on blazon, but instead focuses on the 
dynamics of gender-reversal that characterize Salomé’s attempt to objectify and possess 
the prophet as she echoes passages from the Song of Songs. I have attempted to show 
how the gender-reversal Riquelme identifies in Salomé’s lust for Iokanaan and the 
“engine of desire” Bennett identifies in the self-negating, self-generating aspect of 
Salomé’s language fit within a framework of dialectical oppositions such as the seen vs. 
the unseen and the literal vs. the figurative, both of which inhere in the text’s key 
generative trope of idolatry. Salomé figuratively takes apart Iokanaan (then has him 
literally taken apart) through blason, which, like bouclier, is French for “shield.” Thus, 
when the soldiers rush Salomé and crush her with their shields in the final line, the text 
presents one final reversal, in which blason turns back on its blasoneur. In addition, the 
French boucher (mouth) and bouclier (“shield”) are both derived from the same Latin 




j’ai baisé ta bouche,” encounters the prophet’s mouth in a double sense. Having attained 
the impossible object, the gap of desire closes, and the subject is no longer. 
Salomé, fille d’Hérodias, Princesse de Judée 
 Paradoxically, in ceasing to be, Salomé becomes most fully herself: Salomé, fille 
d’Hérodias, Princesse de Judée. Twice during the play, Salomé declares her full title, first 
when Iokanaan asks her to identify herself, then later as she despairs at being treated as a 
harlot. Both times her declaration sounds a false note: in the former, she is promptly and 
forcibly rebuffed by the prophet; in the latter, she is enraptured in a mad monologue with 
his severed head. The final line of the play, however, confers on Salomé the dignity of 
sublime triumph: “Les soldats s’élancent et écrasent sous leurs boucliers Salomé, fille 
d’Hérodias, Princesse de Judée” (The soldiers rush forward and crush beneath their 
shields Salome, daughter of Herodias, Princess of Judaea) (SF, 92; SE, 329). The manner 
of her death, far from suggesting an ignoble end, confirms that she truly has become 
daughter of Herodias, which is how the world first knew her from the Gospels134 and how 
Iokanaan identifies her even unto his death.  
 Before Herodias ever appears bodily in the play, her name is invoked as a 
signifier of excess. When the First Soldier declares, “Herodias has filled the cup of the 
Tetrarch” (SE, 302), the play presents her as purveyor of wine and the carnal 
extravagance wine signifies in the text. Later, Iokanaan echoes the prophet Ezekiel to 
                                                
134 “But when Herod’s birthday was kept, the daughter of Herodias danced before them, and pleased Herod” 
(Matt. 14:6). “And when the daughter of the said Herodias came in, and danced, and pleased Herod and 
them that sat with him, the king said unto the damsel, Ask of me whatsoever thou wilt, and I will give it 




denounce Herodias (and, by extension, Salomé), establishing that the sexual iniquity he 
associates with Herodias is also a form of idolatry that threatens to dissolve the 
boundaries so important to maintaining absolute identity (in particular, the identity of the 
Jews as distinct from all others). The First Soldier’s observation of Herodias filling 
Herod’s cup also leads directly to the metaphorical transformations of the Tetrarch’s 
“wine of three sorts,” which I discuss in detail above. The idolatry of Herodias therefore 
operates on levels both literal and figurative and threatens continually to dissolve one into 
the other. When Herodias actually appears in the play, she hardly seems the Whore of 
Babylon Iokanaan has been describing. This paradox, however, is the point.  
From the moment Herodias enters, her primary role is one of negation. She is 
fundamentally contrary. Her first statements are a warning to Herod that “You must not 
look at her [Salomé]” and a categorical denial of the value or existence of symbolism: 
“No; the moon is like the moon, that is all” (SE, 311; 312). The latter assertion is 
comically paradoxical in that it refutes outright the play’s entire aesthetic. This tendency 
toward contradiction and paradox is the position of the dandy, which underlies so much 
of Wilde’s work and has provided aphorisms for countless mass-produced refrigerator 
magnets: “I do not believe in miracles. I have seen too many,” says Herodias. Herodias’s 
tendency to literalize enacts the reifying capacity of idolatry, which manifests in the text 
as different kinds of fetishism, whether erotic, religious, or commodity. At the same time, 
the tendency to literalize undercuts itself, generating its opposite. This radical negativity 




Salomé achieves at the end of the play when she accedes fully to her position as Salomé, 
daughter of Herodias, Princess of Judaea.  
As daughter of Herodias, Princess of Judaea, Salomé defies the patriarchal 
authority of Herod and Iokanaan, the latter of whom had earlier declared, “Let the 
captains of the hosts pierce her with their swords, let them crush her beneath their 
shields” (SE, 317). The most conventional way for the soldiers to have killed Salomé at a 
moment’s notice would have been to “pierce her with their swords” or spears or some 
other phallic instrument. Yet that is precisely what does not happen. Salomé dies, but on 
her own terms, that is, having obtained the impossible object, achieved transfiguration, 
and resisted phallic penetration by the sword, despite Iokanaan’s prophecy and despite 
the soldiers’ attempt to erect with their shields one final barrier against her immense 
disintegratory power. Furthermore, Salomé succeeds not by denying the fantasy of sexual 
depravity and excess Iokanaan projects onto her—i.e., Salomé as “daughter of Sodom,” 
“daughter of adultery,” “daughter of an incestuous mother,” “daughter of Babylon,”135 all 
of these different ways of saying “daughter of Herodias”—but by embracing the fantasy 
and pressing it as far as possible.136 
 The radical negation Salomé achieves at the end of the play is a version of 
Wilde’s “truth of masks”: “A Truth in art is that whose contradictory is also true. And 
just as it is only in art-criticism, and through it, that we can apprehend the Platonic theory 
of ideas, so it is only in art-criticism, and through it, that we can realize Hegel’s system of 
                                                
135 See parenthetical reference on p. 41 above. 
136 In doing so, Salomé also becomes perversely and emphatically Christ-like, i.e., “perfectly and absolutely 




contraries. The truths of metaphysics are the truths of masks.”137 Salomé certainly 
comments on art and the artist in Britain at the height of monopoly capitalism, and 
through that commentary it realizes “Hegel’s system of contraries.” Žižek succinctly 
elucidates the nature of Hegelian radical negativity by way of Hegel’s famous statement 
“The spirit is a bone”: “our first reaction to Hegel’s ‘The spirit is a bone’ is ‘But this is 
senseless—spirit, its absolute, self-relating negativity, is the very opposite of the inertia 
of a skull, this dead object!’—however, this very awareness of the thorough incongruity 
between ‘spirit’ and ‘bone’ is the ‘Spirit,’ its radical negativity.”138 The self-perpetuating 
nature of this radical negativity recalls Wilde’s assessment of utopian fantasy: “A map of 
the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at, for it leaves out the 
one country at which Humanity is always landing. And when Humanity lands there, it 
looks out, and, seeing a better country, sets sail. Progress is the realisation of Utopias.”139 
As in the passage from “The Truth of Masks,” Wilde uses a form of to realize, a verb 
that, unlike apprehend, suggests not a process of seizing something already there, but 
rather a process of creating or becoming, as the French cognate realiser makes clear. 
Fittingly, the written text of Salomé renders ambiguous the precise moment 
Salomé achieves the impossible object of desire with her vampiric, necrophilic kiss. 
When the drama is staged, there is no question when the kiss occurs, of course, but in the 
writing itself, I would argue that the moment is not so clear. Presented with the prophet’s 
                                                
137 Oscar Wilde, “The Truth of Masks: A Note on Illusion,” in The Artist as Critic: Critical Writings of 
Oscar Wilde, 432. 
138 Žižek, The Fragile Absolute, 27. 




severed head during her penultimate speech, Salomé again insists that she will have her 
kiss: “Ah! thou wouldst not suffer me to kiss thy mouth, Iokanaan. Well! I will kiss it 
now. I will bite it with my teeth as one bites a ripe fruit. Yes, I will kiss thy mouth, 
Iokanaan. I said it; did I not say it? I said it. Ah! I will kiss it now. … But wherefore dost 
thou not look at me, Iokanaan?” (SE, 327). One might argue that Salomé has bitten the 
prophet’s cold lips at the ellipsis, since this is where she declares “I will kiss it now” (Je 
la baiserai maintenant). And yet, in this short passage, Salomé has already declared, in 
precisely the same words, “I will kiss it now,” after which she proceeds not to kiss it, but 
instead to continue talking about kissing it and then, after announcing once again that “I 
will kiss thy mouth,” to talk about having talked about her intention to kiss it. To a first 
time reader, this continual deferral feels a bit like a symphony that keeps striking a 
seemingly conclusive note, only to resume a half second later. One can’t be sure whether 
it’s really time to clap now. Furthermore, the speech, which proceeds for many more 
lines, is punctuated by five additional ellipses (six in the French version), none of which 
suggests any action, just a pause (as is the case for the dozens of other ellipses throughout 
the play). Perhaps most puzzling for the reader, directly after Salomé’s final affirmation 
that “I will kiss it now,” her speech continues without any reduction in desire or 
desperation. Indeed, she goes on to plead, “I am athirst for thy beauty; I am hungry for 
thy body; and neither wine nor apples can appease my desire. What shall I do now, 
Iokanaan?” (SE, 328). Only after an interim period during which Herod and Herodias 
speak and the slaves begin to put out torches does Salomé’s tone shift—and it shifts 




kissed thy mouth” (SE, 329). Now speaking in the past tense, Salomé confirms that she 
has kissed the prophet’s mouth, but the exact moment she does so has passed in an 
ambiguous barrage of deferral. One knows it only as an event that will be and then, 
suddenly, that has already been.  
Given the temporality of this kiss—this attainment of the impossible object, this 
fulfillment of utopian fantasy—I think it illuminating to read Wilde’s pronouncement 
from “The Soul of Man” on the striving for Utopia as a process of continual deferral 
through a short passage from Lacan’s Écrits. In this passage Lacan locates the 
temporality of the subject in the future anterior: “I identify myself in language, but only 
by losing myself in it like an object. What is realized in my history is not the past definite 
of what was, since it is no more, or even the present perfect of what has been in what I 
am, but the future anterior of what I shall have been for what I am in the process of 
becoming.”140 The I is not lost somewhere in the past, waiting to be discovered like change 
beneath the sofa cushions. It is instead an imaginary construct that must be realized 
sometime in the future as a solution to various symptom-traces that are in the process of 
manifesting. This trajectory of realization does not uncover the self; it creates the self, 
which will then be (mis)recognized as that which was always there. Thus, the I is not 
now, nor was it before; instead, it will have been (future anterior). One cannot say when 
precisely it will be, only that its coming into being will have occurred at an indefinite 
point prior to the moment it is recognized as such. 
                                                





 Similarly, the precise moment Salomé achieves the impossible object of desire 
exists in the written text only in the suspended temporality of the future anterior. The text 
indicates that the moment will be and then, suddenly, that it has already been. Through its 
shifts between the literal and the figurative, the language of Salomé both enacts and 
interrogates the process of reification as the text seeks a symbolic resolution to the 
dilemma of commodification faced by the artist at the end of the nineteenth-century. 
Salomé’s final victory provides this resolution within the text by opening the way toward 
a new era of Christian art that dialectically resolves the tensions between pagan and 
Judaic perspectives on idolatry. The way toward an actual historical resolution is much 
less clear, though the text seems to suggest that it would entail a fundamental 
restructuring of the global imperial power apparatus. If “progress is the realisation of 
Utopias,” it is a realization spurred forward by the radical Hegelian negativity of “the 
truth of masks.” Like the crucified Christ to whom she is intertextually joined, Salomé 
realizes the “disturbing and disintegrating force” of art141 and triumphs in the moment of 
death by pushing beyond the dialectic of corporeal and non-corporeal, seen and unseen, 
literal and figurative. All the while, the idol-sellers continue to peddle their wares, 
unaware of the momentous historical events that will forever alter the status of their 
artistry.  
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Chapter 2: Conrad and the Motion of Idolatry 
It’s the static quality of a grouping that disconcerts my imagination. 
When writing I visualise the successive scenes as always in motion—a 
flow of closely linked effects; so that when I attempt to arrest them in 
my mind at any given moment the first thought is always: that’s no 
good! 
 —Joseph Conrad, in a letter to W.T.H Howe, dated August 16, 1917 
Introduction 
In Joseph Conrad’s acclaimed preface to The Nigger of the “Narcissus,” one 
sentence especially has captured the attention of scholars: “My task which I am trying to 
achieve is, by the power of the written word, to make you hear, to make you feel—it is, 
before all, to make you see!”142 Ian Watt remarks that “scores of anthologists and critics 
have accorded the preface classic status, though usually by giving it their most bated 
breath, or intoning ‘To make you see’ as though it were a charm against literary 
blindness.”143 Paraphrasing Watt, Aaron Fogel writes “that the sentence has been breathily 
intoned too often and has become an idol.”144 The terminology these two critics use—
“charm” and “idol”—to characterize Conrad’s famous imperative indirectly suggests one 
of my main points: for Conrad, idol and image (that is, the thing that Conrad intends “to 
make you see”) are often closely related, and the relation tends to be antagonistic. As 
Conrad’s fiction matures, the idol becomes a figure for a kind of image-making the 
author ultimately rejects as he gradually embraces a technique that I call “retroactive 
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modification.” This technique constitutes an attempt to render an image in continuous 
flux,145 thus countering problems of representation in narrative—particularly 
commodification, reification, and the fixity of image that would inhibit authentic 
representation of history—with which Conrad’s work becomes increasingly concerned in 
the decade leading up to the publication of Nostromo: A Tale of the Seaboard. 
  In this chapter, I will show the development of three stages in Conrad’s 
representations of idols in relation to image-making: First, the narrative or a character 
within the narrative subscribes to a vision of the future that turns out to be a utopian 
fantasy rooted in an idealized past that never was. Second, the false ideal that engenders 
the fantasy is instantiated within the narrative as an idol. Third, the idol is somehow 
implicated in the process of artistic creation itself, adding a crucial self-reflexive 
component to the representation. Stages 1 and 2 begin to manifest in concert as early as 
An Outcast of the Islands, Conrad’s second novel. In subsequent narratives, the third 
stage, which is the focus of the bulk of this chapter, emerges more and more forcibly, 
culminating finally in Nostromo with Conrad’s most thorough critique of the artist as 
image-maker. 
Conrad’s earliest work mentions idols only sporadically, and those that are 
mentioned play relatively simple roles. For example, in Almayer’s Folly, Conrad’s first 
novel, idols are not physically present in the narrative; they are instead metaphorical 
vehicles suggesting a façade that conceals a very different reality. After Nina and Dain 
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have eloped, the narrator comments on Nina’s future plans for her new husband: “A very 
woman! In the sublime vanity of her kind she was thinking already of molding a god 
from the clay at her feet. A god for others to worship.”146 Nina intends to craft an idol, the 
divinity of which will appear incontestable to all but Nina herself, who knows the secret 
weakness of the man beneath the clay. Later, when Almayer, who has been pursuing his 
daughter and her lover, finally overtakes them, Nina rejects her father absolutely. 
Almayer is devastated: “He looked at them embarking and at the canoe growing smaller 
in the distance, with rage, despair, and regret in his heart, and on his face a peace as that 
of a carved image of oblivion. Inwardly he felt himself torn to pieces” (153).147 The main 
purpose of these metaphors is relatively straightforward: the idol suggests a false front. 
Yet the metaphors also hint at the complexity that attends the idolatry motif in later 
narratives. The second example especially elicits important questions: Can “oblivion” be 
represented in a carving? How are we to understand this attempt to concretize an 
abstraction? Why does it emerge at a moment of crisis for Almayer’s fantasy-construct of 
his own family? 
 An Outcast of the Islands, Conrad’s second novel and the prequel to Almayer’s 
Folly, features a metaphor of idolatry both more explicit and more complex than any 
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found in the author’s previous work. In An Outcast, Almayer invests all his hope for the 
future in the imagined prosperity he believes his infant daughter, Nina, will one day 
enjoy. In one elaborate sequence, Conrad uses sacred imagery to devise a scene in which 
spiritual ecstasy will overtake Almayer: “In the middle of the room a small cot, under a 
square white mosquito net, stood—the only piece of furniture between the four walls—
looking like an altar of transparent marble in a gloomy temple.”148 The periodic structure 
of the main clause, followed by the abrupt intervention of an oddly placed phrase 
between verb and participle, makes the eventual revelation of the simile, “like an altar of 
transparent marble in a gloomy temple,” all the more striking. As he “stood before the 
curtained cot looking at his daughter—at his little Nina—at that part of himself, at that 
small and unconscious particle of humanity that seemed to him to contain all his soul,” 
Almayer “could see things there”: 
Things charming and splendid passing before him in a magic unrolling of 
resplendent pictures; pictures of events brilliant, happy, inexpressibly 
glorious, that would make up her life. He would do it! He would do it. He 
would! He would—for that child! And as he stood in the still night, lost in 
his enchanting and gorgeous dreams, while the ascending, thin thread of 
tobacco smoke spread into a faint bluish cloud above his head, he 
appeared strangely impressive and ecstatic: like a devout and mystic 
worshipper, adoring, transported and mute; burning incense before a 
shrine, a diaphanous shrine of a child-idol with closed eyes; before a pure 
and vaporous shrine of a small god—fragile, powerless, unconscious and 
sleeping. (246) 
 
The final string of adjectives—“fragile, powerless, unconscious and sleeping”—suggests 
the impotence of the vision of future splendor Almayer attaches to the “child-idol.” This 
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utopian vision of things to come is also merely a reflection of an idealized past Almayer 
himself has never experienced firsthand. In the opening pages of Almayer’s Folly, the 
narrator affirms that Almayer has “absorbed himself in his dream of wealth and power 
away from this coast where he had dwelt for so many years, forgetting the bitterness of 
toil and strife in the vision of a great and splendid reward. They would live in Europe, he 
and his daughter. They would be rich and respected” (3). Later, in a conversation with 
Nina, who is now a grown woman, Almayer reveals that his fantasy of Europe is purely 
imaginary: “I myself have not been to Europe, but I have heard my mother talk so often 
that I seem to know all about it. We shall live a—a glorious life. You shall see.” Then, 
once “again he stood silent by his daughter’s side looking at that enchanting vision” (15). 
Almayer has borrowed his lost, idealized past from his mother, and he intends to restore 
it with and through his daughter. Thus, the elaborate “child-idol” sequence toward the 
end of An Outcast neatly enacts stages 1 and 2 of the three-stage development I have 
identified above.  
In the following analyses, I am concerned primarily with the addition of the third 
stage, whereby the idol is implicated in the act of artistic creation. I turn first to a novella, 
The Nigger of the “Narcissus,” followed by two short stories, “The Return” and “Karain: 
A Memory.” The final third of this chapter focuses on Conrad’s long novel Nostromo, in 





The Nigger of the “Narcissus” 
James Wait, the titular black sailor in The Nigger of the “Narcissus,” wields a 
strange power of fascination over his shipmates. In a key scene midway through the 
novella, the narrator explicitly characterizes the crew’s fixation on Wait as somehow 
idolatrous:  
But in the evening, in the dog-watches, and even far into the first night-
watch, a knot of men could always be seen congregated before Jimmy’s 
cabin. They leaned on each side of the door peacefully interested […] with 
their simple faces lit up by the projected glare of Jimmy’s lamp. The little 
place, repainted white, had, in the night, the brilliance of a silver shrine 
where a black idol, reclining stiffly under a blanket, blinked its weary eyes 
and received our homage.149 
 
On a basic level, the “projected glare” is the light emanating from the lamp, which allows 
the crew to see Wait. I would argue, however, that the “glare” also originates in the 
sailors themselves, who, in glaring at Wait, unconsciously but actively project their own 
desire onto the immobile “black idol.” Their desire is then reflected back at them such 
that what they see is not James Wait himself, but the embodiment of some long sought-
after ideal.  
This ideal, in the most immediate sense, is one of Victorian charity, or, as Conrad 
puts it elsewhere, “philanthropy.” The philanthropic impulse carries with it sinister 
undertones, however. Donkin, a vilely manipulative, vulture-like character, is the first 
crewmember to dedicate himself to Wait: “His devotion to Jimmy was unbounded. He 
was for ever dodging in the little cabin, ministering to Jimmy’s wants, humouring his 
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whims, submitting to his exacting peevishness, often laughing with him. Nothing could 
keep him away from the pious work of visiting the sick, especially when there was some 
heavy hauling to be done on deck” (63). Donkin’s selfish motives are unique only in their 
brazenness. Even the less crudely self-serving crewmembers manifest the narcissism 
inherent to the philanthropic impulse. In the final stages of Wait’s illness, for instance, 
Belfast becomes the black idol’s most ardent attendant: “Belfast’s devotion—and also his 
pugnacity—secured universal respect. He spent every moment of his spare time in 
Jimmy’s cabin. He tended to him, talked to him; was as gentle as a woman, as tenderly 
gay as an old philanthropist, as sentimentally careful of his nigger as a model slave-
owner” (86). Despite Belfast’s ostensible sympathy, Wait is little more to him—or to any 
of the crew—than a possession. Caring for that possession bolsters the possessor’s sense 
of moral superiority and self-righteousness, what the narrator calls “[t]he latent egoism of 
tenderness to suffering” (85). 
Donkin’s sympathetic devotion to Wait also stirs the crew to collective 
indignation at the officers. Angered by Donkin’s laziness, “Mr. Baker [the first-mate] had 
on two occasions jerked” Donkin back to work “by the scruff of the neck to our 
inexpressible scandal. Was a sick chap to be left without attendance? Were we to be ill-
used for attending a shipmate?—‘What?’ growled Mr. Baker, turning menacingly at the 
mutter, and the whole half-circle like one man stepped back a pace” (63). Gradually, 
Donkin incites the crew to near mutiny by stoking class-division and instilling in the crew 
a parodically Marxist ideal of solidarity: “inspired by Donkin’s hopeful doctrines they 




sea, manned by a wealthy and well-fed crew of satisfied skippers” (63). James Wait, then, 
is an idol onto which the crew can project not only their narcissistic desire for self-
aggrandizement (via the philanthropic impulse), but also, paradoxically, their desire for 
solidarity. Though the latter would ordinarily constitute an ideal toward which a ship’s 
crew must strive for survival, this form of solidarity—channeled by Donkin through 
Wait, rooted in narcissism, and driven by misplaced anger—directly threatens the success 
of the ship’s mission and the well-being of all on board.  
Wait is not the only object-cause of solidarity, however. Just as the frequently 
silent and immobile Wait becomes a figure around which the crew can rally and a surface 
onto which they can project meaning according to their desire,150 so too does the taciturn 
Singleton.151 The oldest man aboard the Narcissus, Singleton is portrayed as the lone 
representative of a venerable, bygone race of sailors, “the everlasting children of the 
mysterious sea”: “The men who could understand his silence were gone—those men who 
knew how to exist beyond the pale of life and within sight of eternity. They had been 
strong, as those are strong who know neither doubts nor hopes. They had been impatient 
and enduring, turbulent and devoted, unruly and faithful” (15). Elemental like titans, 
these seafarers from a distant past resisted the temptations of the philanthropic impulse—
they were “men enough to scorn in their hearts the sentimental voices” (15)—and were 
steadfastly devoted in their work to sea, ship, and fellow sailors. Singleton, whose 
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commitment to duty is matched only by Wait’s abnegation of it, demonstrates his 
unwavering devotion when he single-handedly steers the helm of the Narcissus through 
the bulk of the storm. The “sense of contest in the air” between Wait and Singleton (87) 
marks the opposition between the contrasting ideals of solidarity they represent, one 
motivated by the narcissistic philanthropic impulse, the other motivated by selfless 
devotion to duty. 
By opposing Wait and Singleton, Conrad suggests not only that they represent 
two irreconcilable ideals of solidarity, but also that each ideal is ultimately untenable. To 
be sure, Conrad does demonstrate sincere reverence for the legendary seamen of 
Singleton’s brood. They “were strong and mute; they were effaced, bowed and enduring, 
like stone caryatides that hold up in the night the lighted halls of a resplendent and 
glorious edifice” (15). Nevertheless, the strength of the ideal represented by Singleton is 
troubled by a recurring contradiction that portrays him as a being both within and outside 
of time. A “lonely relic of a devoured and forgotten generation,” he clearly belongs to the 
past, yet he also exists in an eternal present, “a ready man with a vast empty past and with 
no future” (15). Conrad contrasts Singleton’s generation, “the everlasting children of the 
mysterious sea,” with “[t]heir successors […] the grown-up children of a discontented 
earth.” This opposition verges on the status of a pre- / postlapsarian divide, whereby the 
fallen generation has lost its faith and innocence and has been corrupted by the power of 
speech.152 By depicting the ideal of Singleton as one of everlasting childhood, Conrad 
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concedes, however reluctantly, that it is an ideal that cannot be preserved any more than 
the passage of time can be arrested. In addition, by depicting Singleton early in the 
narrative as the last of the great “stone caryatides,” Conrad also establishes a mythic 
framework for later instances in which Singleton, like James Wait, will be portrayed as a 
sculpted monument or idol.153 Wait and Singleton both represent untenable ideals of 
solidarity, but for different reasons. One ideal, centered on Wait, is untenable because its 
narcissistic underpinning makes it a ready but weak foundation for collective unity; the 
other, centered on Singleton—a being both mythic and contradictory—is untenable 
because it issues from a past that has only ever existed in imagination. 
Neither Wait nor Singleton appears as an idol unaided; each is attended by an 
artist who directs the crew’s gaze and makes the idol accessible to the devout. Donkin, 
the first man aboard the Narcissus to devote himself to Wait, is described not simply as a 
devotee, but, in the run-up to the image of Wait the “black idol,” as the “consummate 
artist.”154 The epithet “consummate artist” is a pun on “con(fidence) artist”: Donkin 
manipulates the crew’s sympathy for Wait in order to sow discord between the crew and 
their officers, all in an attempt to benefit himself. In “the brilliance of a silver shrine 
where a black idol, reclining stiffly under a blanket, blinked its weary eyes and received 
our homage […] Donkin officiated. He had the air of a demonstrator showing a 
                                                                                                                                            
mute; they were effaced, bowed and enduring, like stone caryatides that hold up in the night the lighted hall 
of a resplendent and glorious edifice. They are gone now” (15). 
153 The old sailor is “monumental, indistinct, with his head touching the beam; like a statue of heroic size in 
the gloom of a crypt” (79). He is an “oracle” (26) and “an oracle behind a veil” (80). 
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phenomenon, a manifestation bizarre, simple, and meritorious that, to the beholders, 
should be a profound and everlasting lesson. ‘Just look at ’im, ’ee knows what’s what—
never fear!’” (64). If the artist is he who offers “that glimpse of truth for which you have 
forgotten to ask,”155 then Donkin is a grotesque parody of an artist, and the “consummate 
artist” epithet is bitingly ironic. At the same time, I would argue that the consummate / 
confidence pun suggests some anxiety on Conrad’s part that even the most sincere artist, 
in his attempt to make you see, can easily veer into deception, and in ways not always as 
obvious as the corrupt and self-serving Donkin.156 
Much more subtle than the relationship between Donkin and Wait is the 
analogous relationship between the narrator and Singleton. Donkin presides over Wait, 
making the “black idol” intelligible to its worshippers: “Just look at ’im, ’ee knows 
what’s what—never fear!” Similarly, the narrator must interpret Singleton’s “oracular” 
pronouncements to make them intelligible to the reader. When at the end of chapter 4 
Singleton appears “like a statue of heroic size,” his fragmentary words “out of a rugged 
past” are barely coherent (79): 
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He chewed words, mumbled behind tangled white hairs; incomprehensible 
and exciting, like an oracle behind a veil. …—“Stop ashore—sick.—
Instead—bringing all this head wind. Afraid. The sea will have her own.—
Die in sight of land. Always so. They know it—long passage—more days, 
more dollars.—You keep quiet.—What do you want? Can’t help him.” He 
seemed to wake up from a dream. “You can’t help yourselves,” he said 
austerely. “Skipper’s no fool. He has something in his mind. Look out—I 
say! I know ’em!” With eyes fixed in front he turned his head from right 
to left, from left to right, as if inspecting a long row of astute skippers. 
(80) 
 
Then, near the beginning of the next chapter, the narrator paraphrases the same speech: 
We all knew the old man’s ideas about Jimmy, and nobody dared to 
combat them. […]. Only once did he condescend to explain them fully, 
but the impression was lasting. He said that Jimmy was the cause of head 
winds. Mortally sick men—he maintained—linger till the first sight of 
land, and then die; and Jimmy knew that the very first land would draw his 
life from him. It is so in every ship. Didn’t we know it? He asked us with 
austere contempt: what did we know? What would we doubt next? 
Jimmy’s desire encouraged by us and aided by Wamibo’s (he was a 
Finn—wasn’t he? Very well!) by Wamibo’s spells delayed the ship in the 
open sea. Only lubberly fools couldn’t see it. Whoever heard of such a run 
of calms and head winds? It wasn’t natural. … We could not deny that it 
was strange. We felt uneasy. The common saying, “More days, more 
dollars,” did not give the usual comfort because the stores were running 
short. (87-88) 
 
Initially, this retelling of Singleton’s speech some half dozen pages removed from the 
original—and, what’s more, a retelling that simultaneously asserts that “the impression 
[of the speech] was lasting” while also feigning that the reader has never encountered that 
speech before—seems very peculiar. One could be forgiven for flipping back a few pages 
to ensure it is actually Conrad and the narrator, not just one’s own mind, that have veered 
into the unheimlich. By duplicating Singleton’s speech, the narrator renders visible a 
process of interpretation and artistic creation that turns fragmentary mumblings, which 




coherent narrative. The re-telling of Singleton’s speech makes most sense if we assume 
that Conrad intends to present the narrator as a kind of artist-priest who hears the orphic 
words of the “oracle behind a veil” and then renders those words in coherent prophecy 
for the audience of readers. Viewed in this light, a parallel emerges between Donkin, who 
presides over the black idol James Wait, and the narrator, who presides over the oracle 
Singleton. By presenting both Donkin, who is clearly a dissembler, and the narrator, who 
by comparison seems transparently sincere, as artist-priests attempting to grant access to 
their respective idols, Conrad encourages the reader to examine the validity of, or else the 
conditions of the possibility of access to, the ideals represented by each man’s idol, 
whether hale and hearty Singleton or bedridden Wait.  
 Just as Donkin artfully makes the crew see Wait as an idol onto which they can 
project their desire, so Conrad and his narrator make us see in Singleton the image of a 
romanticized sailor from an imagined past. This vision is precisely the fantasy in which a 
nineteenth-century reader of maritime adventure stories would likely wish to indulge. 
Conrad does not allow the reader to indulge uncritically, however. In one of the first 
scenes of the novella, Conrad offers the image of Singleton “lost in an absorption 
profound enough to resemble a trance” (3). The rugged old Sailor, who in the final pages 
of “Narcissus” cannot even write his name, is reading Pelham; or, Adventures of a 
Gentleman, a “highly fashionable novel” that “contributed greatly to the English concept 
of the dandy” in the nineteenth century.157 Conrad even has his narrator remark on the 
“wonderful and bizarre” sight of the working-class sailor enthralled by the tale of an 
                                                




upper-class fop. Singleton’s foray into wish-fulfilling fantasy through literature does not 
translate into real-world cross-class identification or fellowship, however. Back on shore, 
as the crew collect their wages at the Board of Trade shipping office, Singleton meekly 
approaches the middle-class clerk, who thinks all the sailors “stupid” and is especially 
shocked to find the “disgusting old brute” Singleton cannot sign his own name (104-5). 
Conrad seeks a role for literature that is not simple escapism through wish-fulfillment. 
Though it might be comforting to believe otherwise, the easy notion that literature 
provides a magical panacea for socioeconomic or class disparities is not true. Conrad 
makes the fantasy fail. 
 This failure is much more an indictment of the contemptuous middle-class clerk 
than the crusty old sailor, whose greatest failing is arguably that he must sometimes come 
ashore. The final passage of the Narcissus from the open sea onto the Thames and into a 
London dock is presented as a transition from freedom, movement, and vitality to 
confinement, stasis, and death. When the ship first enters the English Channel, she is 
described as “a great tired bird” with “white wings” that “skimmed low over the blue 
sea” (100). As she moves from Channel to Thames, her wings are clipped.158 Within sight 
of the dock, the bird imagery merges perversely with industrial machinery as “monstrous 
iron cranes crouched, with chains hanging from their long necks, balancing cruel-looking 
hooks over the decks of lifeless ships” (102). This progression is marked also by the 
conspicuous return of the signifier stone, which first appeared in the novella in reference 
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to Singleton’s mythic generation, “strong and mute […] enduring, like stone caryatides 
that hold up in the night the lighted halls of a resplendent and glorious edifice” (15). 
Now, however, stone returns not as the sturdy foundation for something resplendent and 
glorious, but as a signifier of the “soulless” and “sordid” reality of “stony shores,” 
weighting the Narcissus down (102). Passing “between two low walls of granite,” the 
ship is greeted by “men with check-ropes […] walking on the broad flagstones” and 
“dockmen, bending over stone posts.” The “noise of wheels rolling over stones, the 
thump of heavy things falling […] floated on the air,” and “the shadows of soulless walls 
fell upon her.” The Narcissus no longer soars on a romanticized sea; she has now docked 
back in prosaic reality. This reality is one of stony heaviness. In it the Narcissus has 
“ceased to live” (102). 
 The captive bird imagery returns a few paragraphs later in the person of the 
middle-class clerk, who dispenses payment from “a counter surmounted by a brass-wire 
grating.” He has “the quick, glittering eyes and vivacious, jerky movement of a caged 
bird” (104). The clerk’s inability to recognize the virtue of Old Singleton, Conrad 
implies, has something to do with the restrictive, isolating, even dehumanizing effect of 
the bourgeois, administrative side of the imperial trade enterprise, which reduces the 
clerk to his function of financial bookkeeper. Maintaining careful records of the flows of 
capital that enable the empire’s shipping industry, he is cut off from the lived experience 
of the seafaring crew, whose collective labor through the ordeals of their voyage 
constitute a shared, humanizing experience the clerk can never know. Even the 




capital. From behind the “brass-wire grating,” alongside the avian clerk “and sitting 
before a little table with piles of gold and notes on it,” the “poor” captain “appeared 
subdued by his captivity” (104). Outside the shipping office, related symbols of capital 
and confinement appear in the images of “the Tower” and “the Mint” (106-7). The 
former, which refers to the Tower of London, famously served not only as a prison for 
over eight hundred years, but also as the site of the Royal Mint, which in the thirteenth 
century assumed centralized control of the production of currency for the entire nation 
and, eventually, the great majority of the British Empire. By the early nineteenth century, 
imperial expansion and the consequent need for modernized equipment and greater 
production of coinage meant that the Royal Mint had to be moved from the Tower itself 
to the nearby location on Tower Hill that Conrad’s text calls simply “the Mint.”159 Thus, 
the images of Tower and Mint, which dominate the final pages of the novella, reinforce 
the association of captivity, oppression, and imperial capitalism originally presented in 
the image of the caged clerk. 
 At the same time, the last page also introduces a shift in imagery that indicates a 
potentially hopeful vision of the future. The previous scene, inside the shipping office, 
described Singleton as “venerable—and uncertain as to daylight; […] his hands, that 
never hesitated in the great light of the open sea, could hardly find the small pile of gold 
in the profound darkness of the shore” (105). In the final scene, the darkness and 
deadness of the stony shore is revitalized by images of “the sea of life.” The crew, 
“swaying about there on the white stones,” become “like mad castaways making merry in 
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the storm and upon an insecure ledge of a treacherous rock” as the solid stone of the city 
turns into a moving, metaphorical sea. A “flood of sunshine” enlivens the stones with 
memories of the past:  
The dark knot of seamen drifted in sunshine. To the left of them the trees 
in Tower Gardens sighed, the stones of the Tower gleaming, seemed to stir 
in the play of light, as if remembering suddenly all the great joys and 
sorrows of the past, the fighting prototypes of these men; press-gangs; 
mutinous cries; the wailing of women by the riverside, and the shouts of 
men welcoming victories. The sunshine of heaven fell like a gift of grace 
on the mud of the earth, on the remembering and mute stones, on greed, 
selfishness; on the anxious faces of forgetful men. And to the right of the 
dark group the stained front of the Mint, cleansed by the flood of light, 
stood out for a moment dazzling and white like a marble palace in a fairy 
tale. The crew of the Narcissus drifted out of sight. (107) 
 
“The play of light,” which activates in the stones the memory of “all the great joys and 
sorrows of the past,” allegorizes the work of literature. As mere wish-fulfillment, 
literature can evoke a false memory of an idealized past. Here, the “mute stones” and 
“flood of light […] dazzling and white like a marble palace in a fairy tale” recall the 
description of Singleton’s mythic generation, those “everlasting children of the 
mysterious sea,” who were “strong and mute […] like stone caryatides that hold up in the 
night the lighted halls of a resplendent and glorious edifice” (15). But whereas those great 
stone figures issue from an idealized past untethered to history, the stones in the novella’s 
final scene are inundated with the light of historical memory, in all its glory, elation, 
suffering, and ignominy: “the great joys and sorrows of the past, the fighting prototypes 
of these men; press-gangs; mutinous cries; the wailing of women by the riverside, and the 
shouts of men welcoming victories” (107). Too often, literature simply enchants with its 




processes of image-making in relation to history (and, to add an even finer Marxian point, 
to History), literature can also offer a path toward a demystified vision of the world as it 
is and as it could be. Precisely what this process of image-making as demystification 
would look like remains to be seen. 
“The Return” 
“The Return” is a short story about businessman Alvan Hervey and his wife, a 
prosperous young couple whose steady rise through London’s elite circles is predicated 
on strict conformity to bourgeois ideals of propriety and professional and civic 
engagement. When Hervey returns home one evening to find a letter from his wife 
announcing that she has left him for another man, his fantasy of a comfortable, secure 
existence and perfect communion with his wife is shattered. Hervey’s shock and 
confusion are further compounded when his wife unexpectedly returns home to him later 
that evening. After much wrangling both internal and external, unable to understand her 
motives and come to terms with his now significantly altered reality, Hervey rushes out 
into the wet London night, away from his home and marriage, never to return. 
 As my brief synopsis indicates, many turns and returns shape this psychologically 
tortuous tale. In terms of imagery, Wilfred Dowden sees “The Return” as a major turning 
point in Conrad’s oeuvre. Whereas in earlier narratives, such as Almayer’s Folly, An 
Outcast of the Islands, and “The Lagoon,” Conrad had “pyramid[ed] images simply for 
immediate evocative effect,” by the time he wrote “The Return,” Conrad had realized he 




patterns.”160 Dowden identifies two key images in the story, that of “reflection or 
duplication” (35) and that of “the marble statue of the sightless woman holding at arm’s 
length a cluster of lights” (36). As these images recur and interact throughout the 
narrative, their significations continually shift. For example, says Dowden, “the dullness 
of Alvan Hervey’s life is symbolized by the identical appearance of the men who are 
vomited forth from the train on a rainy afternoon (each of whom is a reflection of 
Hervey), and by the multiple reflection of his figure in the mirrors of his dressing room” 
(35). Mrs. Hervey’s “sexual frigidity” (37) is “reflected in the marble statue of the 
sightless woman” (36). This sexual frigidity in turn signifies the impossibility of two 
becoming one, of one person ever truly knowing another. Alvan Hervey recognizes the 
inauthenticity of his relationship, which then reverberates out in his emerging 
“conscious[ness] of the real world, which he sees as a long multiplicity [i.e., duplication 
or reflection] of gaslights strung together like beads of fire” (36).  
 Though Dowden’s reading, echoed by many critics over the decades, does 
provide a solid foundation for understanding how imagery works in “The Return,” the 
analysis still underestimates the degree to which reflection affects (and effects) the return 
of the image of the marble woman. The statue first appears, as if it were the presiding 
genius of the household, moments after Alvan Hervey enters his home: “He ascended 
[the stair from the foyer] without footfalls. Brass rods glimmered all up the red carpet. On 
the first-floor landing a marble woman, decently covered from neck to instep with stone 
draperies, advanced a row of lifeless toes to the edge of the pedestal, and thrust out 
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blindly a rigid white arm holding a cluster of lights.”161 In the next sentence, the narrator 
ironically quips that Hervey “had artistic tastes—at home,” after which there follows a 
list of artworks in various genres, “sketches, watercolours, [and] engravings,” decorating 
the walls: 
Old church towers peeped above green masses of foliage; the hills were 
purple, the sands yellow, the seas sunny, the skies blue. A young lady 
sprawled with dreamy eyes in a moored boat, in company of a lunch 
basket, a champagne bottle, and an enamoured man in a blazer. Bare-
legged boys flirted sweetly with ragged maidens, slept on stone steps, 
gamboled with dogs. A pathetically lean girl flattened against a blank wall 
turned up expiring eyes and tendered a flower for sale. (104) 
 
These clichéd images, indicative of an idealized English existence and a misplaced 
sentimentality, suggest artistic sterility. Conrad will later identify the marble woman with 
Hervey’s wife—he will refer to the “marmoreal impassiveness” of Mrs. Hervey’s face, 
“as of a wonderful statue” (139-140)—and thus with the bourgeois ideal of hearth and 
home that Mrs. Hervey is, in the role of wife, obligated to uphold:  
And more than ever the walls of his house seemed to enclose the 
sacredness of ideals to which he [Alvan Hervey] was about to offer a 
magnificent sacrifice. He was the high priest of that temple, the severe 
guardian of formulas, of rites, of the pure ceremony concealing the black 
doubts of life. And he was not alone. Other men, too—the best of them—
kept watch and ward by the hearthstones that were the altars of that 
profitable persuasion. (128) 
 
Passages like those above, which link the marble woman to Hervey’s wife or Hervey’s 
wife to ostensibly sacred ideals, gradually accumulate between the initial appearance of 
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the statue and its re-presentation over forty pages later. This accumulation changes the 
statue’s signification: when it is re-presented, it is no longer simply a statue; it is a sacred 
idol that embodies the Victorian ideal of marriage and its attendant virtues. When the 
statue first appears, however, the reader knows only that, whatever it may represent, both 
the form and the content of its representation are marked, by association with the 
insipidly bucolic art objects that follow, as somehow atavistic.  
 Crucially, when the statue and its attendant art objects are initially presented, 
Alvan Hervey does not see them: “He looked, of course, at nothing, ascended another 
flight of stairs and went straight into the dressing room” (104). When virtually the same 
scene is re-presented in the final pages of the story, however, Conrad explicitly states that 
Hervey does see; the descriptive paragraph itself starts with the words “He saw,” the 
subsequent paragraph with “He watched” (147). This dramatic turn, from blindness to 
sight, is accompanied by several rhetorical turnings on the page; the re-presented scene 
is, on multiple levels, the chiastic counterpart of its original: in the original the statue 
appears first, the other artworks second; in the re-presentation, the order is reversed. The 
original refers to “sands yellow” and “skies blue”; the re-presentation refers to “blue 
skies” and “yellow sands.” The original refers to the “marble woman,” the re-presentation 
to the “woman of marble.” By presenting the return of the statue, which Hervey finally 
sees, as the mirror image of its initial appearance, Conrad implies that Alvan Hervey now 
sees something essential reflected back at him in the scene of re-presentation.  
This essential something is suggested by the word idyll, which appears only once 




lady sprawled with dreamy eyes in a moored boat, in company of a lunch basket, a 
champagne bottle, and an enamoured man in a blazer” (104). In the re-presentation, the 
image of the lovers becomes simply “the delicious idyll in a boat” (147). The word idyll 
performs a dual function here. First, in referring directly to the image of a young man in 
thrall to a young woman on a beautiful summer day, it recalls the passage mid-way 
through the “The Return” (and mid-way between the two statue scenes) in which Alvan 
Hervey “seemed to see himself proposing to [his wife]—ages ago.” Seemed is key in this 
sentence; what Hervey sees in his memory is as much fantasized idyll as it is the 
recollection of an actual event: 
They were strolling up the slope of a lawn. Groups of people were 
scattered in sunshine. The shadows of leafy boughs lay still on the short 
grass. The coloured sunshades far off, passing between trees, resembled 
deliberate and brilliant butterflies moving without a flutter. Men smiling 
amiably, or else very grave, within the impeccable shelter of their black 
coats, stood by the side of women who, clustered in clear summer 
toilettes, recalled all the fabulous tales of enchanted gardens where 
animated flowers smile at bewitched knights. (126) 
 
The final verb phrase (from recalled onward) leaves no doubt that Hervey’s memory of 
the past, in the scene of his marriage proposal, consists largely of images drawn not from 
his own lived experience, but from chivalric romance, fairy tales, and other fabuleuse 
histoires that make up a collective literary and artistic tradition (and that, with their 
“animated flowers” that “smile,” are more than a bit ridiculous). Hervey’s vision of 
marriage, which is shattered by the revelation of his wife’s infidelity, is merely the 
pastiche of so many idylls handed down from the past. Second, the word idyll suggests its 




share the same Greek root, eidos, meaning “form, picture, shape.”162 The moment Hervey 
finally sees the statue is the moment he finally recognizes it as an idol, i.e., an illusory 
reification of false ideals that have been accorded sacred status, “the certitude of love and 
faith” (148). When the lights held aloft by the marble woman are extinguished, 
immediately Hervey’s “obedient thought traced for him the image of an uninterrupted 
life, the dignity and the advantages of an uninterrupted success [...]. And then he thought 
of [his wife] as we think of the dead—in a tender immensity of regret, in a passionate 
longing for the return of idealized perfections” (148). The “image” of future success that 
Hervey envisions is the forward projection of “idealized perfections” now lost to a 
protagonist who realizes they never actually existed outside imagination. When Hervey 
finally sees the statue in the chiastic scene of its re-presentation, he sees a mirror 
reflecting back at him the inauthenticity of his own existence. 
 The trauma of recognition, whereby Hervey sees the statue and thus the 
inauthenticity of his own existence, does not occur all at once, however. Its belated onset 
enacts a kind of narratological Nachträglichkeit. Even before Hervey sees the statue, the 
image has clearly imprinted itself on his unconscious, as demonstrated by the free 
indirect discourse in which he compares his wife’s face to that “of a wonderful statue” 
(139). With the news of his wife’s infidelity, the meaning of that face’s “marmoreal 
impassiveness” has shifted. Whereas the “imposing, unthinking stillness of her features, 
                                                







had till then mirrored for him the tranquil dignity of a soul of which he had thought 
himself—as a matter of course—the inexpugnable possessor,” Hervey now encounters in 
his wife’s face the cipher of inaccessible knowledge: “And he would never know what 
she meant. Never! Never! No one could. Impossible to know” (140). Conrad offers his 
bourgeois readership, in the person of Alvan Hervey, a bourgeois observer continually 
trying and failing to “read” the cipher of his wife: “All that time he glared at her 
watchfully as if expecting every moment to find in her deliberate movements an answer 
to his question. But he could not read anything, he could gather no hint of her thought” 
(122). Hervey rearranges and reinterprets what had previously been meaningless, 
disparate images into a new, coherent narrative of the past: 
He perceived in a flash that he could remember an infinity of enlightening 
occurrences. He could recall ever so many distinct occasions when he 
came upon [his wife and her lover]; he remembered the absurdly 
interrupted gesture of his fat, white hand, the rapt expression of her face, 
the glitter of unbelieving eyes, snatches of incomprehensible 
conversations not worth listening to, silences that had meant nothing at the 
time and seemed now illuminating like a burst of sunshine. He 
remembered all that. He had not been blind. Oh! No! And to know this 
was an exquisite relief: it brought back all his composure. (123) 
 
Yet these retroactive impositions of narrative offer only brief respite from the specter of 
obscene knowledge—obscene in the etymological sense of “that which is not or cannot 
be seen”—which continually shatters Hervey’s certainty and composure. 
The obscene knowledge desired by Alvan Hervey eventually expands to 
encompass not just Hervey’s wife, but also the household servants, all of whom are 
women: “They moved silently about, without one being able to see by what means, for 




rigid in black and white, with precise gestures, and no life in their faces. […]. That such 
people’s feelings or judgment could affect one in any way, had never occurred to him 
before” (141). The bourgeois ideals that define Hervey’s existence would generally 
dictate that fiction elevate the perspective of the bourgeois observer to universal status. 
Under this model, the narrative would construct a reader who, like Hervey, would never 
consider the “feelings or judgment” of the servant class. By turning Hervey’s attention to 
the inscrutable humanity of his servants and instilling in Hervey the desire to know them, 
Conrad both draws attention to the class conventions—and obfuscations—of Victorian 
fiction and further destabilizes the bourgeois ideals that have heretofore defined Alvan 
Hervey’s world. The “faces of those girls,” Hervey thinks, are, like his wife’s face, 
“[i]mpossible to know” (141). As the obscene expands to include additional elements, the 
signification of the marble woman—which is, first and foremost, that which Hervey does 
not see—retroactively changes. The enormity of the statue’s signification will only be 
fully and belated activated for Hervey when, in the concluding pages of the story, he 
finally does see. 
The servant girls, who “moved silently about, without one being able to see by 
what means,” also allegorize the machinery of narrative itself, the subtle techne of 
storytelling that the adept writer of Victorian fiction usually keeps out of sight to create 
the illusion of realism, but that Conrad, in “The Return,” actively draws attention to and 
interrogates. Essential to the obscene machinery of narrative is the impossible knowledge 
that propels narrative desire. By making the marble statue the marker of impossible 




Opening the drawing room door onto the first-floor landing, Hervey and his wife stand in 
the presence of the marble woman, which he still does not see. Immediately thereafter, as 
if triggered by the statue, Hervey experiences a new revelation: “It was through the pain 
of losing her [his wife] that the knowledge had come. She had the gift! She had the gift! 
And in all the world she was the only human being that could surrender it to his immense 
desire” (144). Loss produces desire and in doing so also produces the “knowledge” of 
“the word of the enigma” as objet petit a (i.e., “the gift”). When Hervey laments that 
“[s]he had no gift—she had no gift!” (148), he acknowledges that there is no “word of the 
enigma” (144) which, once attained, would satisfy desire by supplying the impossible 
knowledge that woman has come to signify in “The Return.” Narrative traditionally 
resolves with the fantasy that the gap of desire can be closed. The ideal of marriage 
provided one such fantasy for Victorian writers. “The Return,” however, denies neat 
closure. 
One way “The Return” resists closure is the textual Nachträglichkeit that 
continually loops back to destabilize the narrative. In a general sense, this retroactive 
modification destabilizes the narrative by preventing the reader from immediately and 
absolutely fixing an image in place. Thus, the technique anticipates what Ian Watt has 
famously identified in Heart of Darkness and other works by Conrad as “delayed 
decoding,” which “combines the forward temporal progression of the mind, as it receives 




their meaning.”163 The word decoding, however, suggests that the point of the technique is 
to lead the reader to a final solution that will solve an initial misperception. In coining 
“retroactive modification” and comparing it to the psychodynamic process of Freudian 
Nachträglichkeit, I want to avoid suggesting that the narrative works toward a telos, a nut 
that, once cracked, will reveal the final and absolute kernel of meaning. 
The retroactive process of modification manifests not only in parts of the narrative 
filtered through Alvan Hervey’s consciousness, but even in some passages that are 
independent of it. Consider, for example, the two scenes in which the statue appears 
before Hervey actually sees it: 
On the first-floor landing a marble woman, decently covered from neck to 
instep with stone draperies, advanced a row of lifeless toes to the edge of 
the pedestal, and thrust out blindly a rigid white arm holding a cluster of 
lights. (104) 
 
[O]n the landing, the sightless woman of marble appeared, draped to the 
chin, thrusting blindly at them a cluster of lights. (144) 
 
There are two significant differences between these two passages. First, though the word 
decently in the first passage already mocks Victorian attitudes toward nudity, a slight 
shift in description between the first and second passages makes this critique even more 
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biting. That the marble woman is “decently covered from neck to instep” suggests that 
her clothing stops at the base of her neck. This would be unusual enough for authentic 
classical sculpture, in which the woman’s clavicle, at the very least, would likely be 
exposed. The later description, however, suggests that even the neck itself is covered: she 
is “draped to the chin.” By subtly changing the image of the marble woman, Conrad 
raises the level of prudishness expressed in the image from amusing to absurd. Second, in 
both passages, the marble woman is said to thrust “blindly.” This adverb indicates that 
the personified statue holds forth the cluster of lights without paying attention to or 
thinking about where or to whom she thrusts. That she thrusts “blindly” does not tell the 
reader anything about her ability to see; instead it qualifies the manner in which she 
performs a specific act. The second passage, however, adds that the marble woman is 
“sightless.” This adjective indicates that the woman actually is blind, not simply that she 
thrusts blindly. In the second passage, the woman, like Alvan Hervey, fails to see not 
because she is careless, but rather, because she is fundamentally incapable of seeing. 
Later, when Hervey finally does see the marble woman along with all the art objects 
around her, there is no mention of her “thrusting,” blindly or otherwise, and she is, in no 
uncertain terms, blind: “the woman of marble, composed and blind on the high pedestal, 
seemed to ward off the devouring night with a cluster of lights” (147). She has become 
the mirror image of Alvan Hervey, whose emotional and ethical blindness plagues him 
throughout the narrative. Also like Hervey, she seems to hold back darkness with the 




Retroactive modification alters not simply the perception of an image, but the 
image itself. When the statue of the marble woman shifts from being “decently covered 
from neck to instep” to being “draped to the chin,” the subtle change performs an 
important retroactive operation on the paragraph in which the marble woman is initially 
presented. This paragraph, as previously noted, begins by describing the statue clad in 
“stone draperies,” then goes on to describe several other works of art. The final image in 
the paragraph is of “the large photographs of some famous and mutilated bas-reliefs 
[which] seemed to represent a massacre turned into stone” (104). For Conrad, the 
photograph was the quintessentially inauthentic image masquerading as art,164 and at first 
glance, the relation between the paragraph’s bookend images—that is, the marble woman 
of stone and the photographs of stone—appears to be a juxtaposition of the authentic 
medium of classical sculpture and the inauthentic medium of modern photography.  
More careful consideration of the photographs and their subject matter, however, 
reveals a different relation between the marble woman and the photographs of bas-reliefs. 
In the context of the bas-reliefs, the medium of photography does in fact add a 
conspicuous layer of inauthenticity and implies that there is something also already 
inauthentic about the attempt to represent the brutal mobility of a “massacre” in the cold 
immobility of “stone.” By juxtaposing the violent motion evoked in the image of a 
massacre and the absolute immobility of stone, Conrad recalls the elaborate simile two 
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paragraphs prior, in which Hervey and his wife are compared to two persons “skimm[ing] 
over the surface of life hand in hand, in a pure and frosty atmosphere—like two skilful 
skaters cutting figures on thick ice for the admiration of the beholders, and disdainfully 
ignoring the hidden stream, the stream restless and dark; the stream of life, profound and 
unfrozen” (104). The rigidly choreographed moves of the skaters locks them into a 
Symbolic Order both predetermined and fixed (or frozen, to use the language of the 
simile). Meanwhile, the unseen and incomprehensible Real of the “stream of life, 
profound and unfrozen” churns on chaotically underneath.  
The inauthenticity of the “massacre turned into stone” echoes in the description of 
the marble woman’s “stone draperies,” which themselves betray the inauthenticity and 
bourgeois pretensions of Alvan Hervey. Unlike the non-aristocratic Hervey, an aristocrat, 
whose family name would ground him in an elite status conferred by the ages, would 
presumably own actual classical sculpture. If Hervey’s marble woman were authentically 
classical, either she would be nude or, if clothed, at the very least, her neck would be 
exposed. Thus, though the original image of “a marble woman, decently covered from 
neck to instep with stone draperies,” is plausibly classical, when Conrad later rewrites the 
image of statue as a figure “draped to the chin,” Victorian prudery belies classical 
authenticity even as it attempts to summon the latter’s authority. The statue on Alvan 
Hervey’s first-floor landing is not classical art; it is not even a replica of classical art. 
Instead, it is a neo-classical bastardization of the artistic tradition of Greece and Rome 




Reading the paragraph bookended by the images of the marble statue and the 
photographs through the lens of the statue’s later description (a figure “draped to the 
chin”), one now recognizes the relation between the two images is not a contrast of 
authenticity versus inauthenticity, but rather an identification, two mirrored 
manifestations of inauthenticity. Just as the two extremes of classical and modern, 
authentic and inauthentic, collapse together in the rewritten image of the marble woman, 
so the metaphor of surface versus depth, neatly captured by frozen ice concealing a 
rushing stream, will collapse as the narrative progresses. In the end, the statue’s stone 
draperies are not a cover beneath which is hidden some great treasure, the objet petit a 
that Alvan Hervey calls “the gift.” The statue is not manifest content symbolizing some 
deeper, ultimately meaningful latent content that, once revealed, will solve the puzzle of 
the story. Instead, the statue is only its “impenetrable” surface, and it signifies a 
fundamentally impossible knowledge, the Real which cannot be assimilated to speech or 
understanding.165 
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before. He understood they had no prospects, no principles—no refinement and no power. But 
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What impenetrable duplicity. Women—nothing but women round him. Impossible to know. (141)  
Conrad uses free indirect discourse to great effect in this passage. If anyone is being “irremediably hostile,” 




 In “The Return” Conrad demonstrates that memory, the process through which 
the thinking subject constructs a coherent narrative of reality, is a process of creation, re-
creation, and assembly that takes as its materials images derived not only from 
experience, but also from popular culture and artistic and literary traditions. Conrad 
vividly renders this process by presenting in detail Alvan Hervey’s memory of his 
marriage proposal. The proposal vignette suggests that the images from which Hervey 
constructs an idealized version of the past, which he then projects forward into a utopian 
vision of the future (before that vision is shattered by news of his wife’s infidelity), are 
analogous to the idealized, cliché images portrayed in the art objects that attend the statue 
of the marble woman. As the story unfolds, the statue accrues sacred connotations, 
elevating it to the status of an idol. Ultimately, the statue becomes a figure for figurality, 
i.e., a signifier of the possibility of constructing a reality through images. By posing the 
statue as a figure for figurality, Conrad begins to offer a solution to the dilemma of 
image-making. That is, he begins to answer the question, which I posed at the end of the 
last section, of how to enact image-making as demystification. How does one construct a 
reality through images without reifying that reality-construct as a sacred idol? How does 
one avoid misrecognizing the images as fixed, absolute truths representing a fixed, 
absolute reality? Through the process of retroactive modification, Conrad destabilizes the 
narrative’s key image—the statue of the marble woman, the figure for figurality—thereby 
                                                                                                                                            
do not dictate the standards of conduct when interacting with the master. They utterly ignore his existence 
because that is what their master’s bourgeois ideals demand in order to preserve the illusion of his 





denying the fixity that would misrepresent contingent ideals and artistic conventions as 
absolute truths. 
“Karain: A Memory” 
 When Conrad completed “The Return” in the first months of 1897, he was already 
at work on another short story, “Karain: A Memory,” in which idols are presented more 
overtly and persistently than in any of his previous fiction. “Karain” fully enacts the 
three-stage development that I described in the introduction to this chapter: First, the 
narrative or a character within the narrative subscribes to a vision of the future that turns 
out to be a utopian fantasy rooted in an idealized past that never was. Second, the false 
ideal that engenders the fantasy is instantiated within the narrative as an idol. Third, the 
idol is somehow implicated in the process of artistic creation itself, adding a crucial self-
reflexive component to the representation. The third stage, which is much more explicit 
in “Karain” than in either The Nigger of the “Narcissus” or “The Return,” manifests 
chiefly through Hollis, who in the latter half of the story crafts a special charm for the 
troubled chief Karain. The final two pages of “Karain” comprise an epilogue separated 
from the main action of the story by seven years and seven thousand miles. Many critics 
choose to ignore the epilogue, and those who do address it often struggle to account for it 
as a necessary part of the preceding narrative. I argue that the epilogue provides a crucial 
final comment on the relation between idolatry and artistic creation in “Karain,” which is 





The word idol appears only once in the narrative. In section 4 of the story, Karain 
tells the three European gunrunners—Hollis, Jackson, and the unnamed narrator—the tale 
of a fantastical journey he undertook many years ago with his friend and fellow tribesman 
Pata Matara when Matara’s sister abandoned her betrothed and her tribe to sail away with 
a Dutch trader. Scandalized by his sister’s behavior, Matara recruited Karain to join him 
in pursuit of the lovers, whom Matara intended to murder. During the journey, Karain fell 
in love with the image of Matara’s sister, who regularly appeared to him in dreams and 
visions. “One night, in a tangled forest,” says Karain,  
we came upon a place where crumbling old walls had fallen amongst the 
trees, and where strange stone idols—carved images of devils with many 
arms and legs, with snakes twined round their bodies, with twenty heads 
and holding a hundred swords—seemed to live and threaten in the light 
our camp-fire. […]. I sat and thought and thought, till suddenly I could see 
again the image of a woman, beautiful, and young, and great, and proud, 
and tender, going away from her land and her people.166 
 
This passage achieves two things central to the overall theme of “Karain: A Memory.” 
First, with the appositional phrases “stone idols—carved images,” it equates idols and 
images and thus implies that the “image of a woman” is in some way also an idol. 
Second, it suggests a dual identity for that woman. The “image of a woman” is not only 
the image of Matara’s renegade sister, whom Matara and Karain are chasing throughout 
the Malay Peninsula, but also the image of Karain’s own mother, who, like Matara’s 
sister, was a woman of noble blood within the tribe, took a foreign husband of whom the 
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chiefs did not approve, and was eventually forced into exile, “away from her land and her 
people.” 
Karain’s mother’s exile is the great unspoken trauma of Karain’s narrative, 
repeatedly implied, but never stated outright. This trauma, which cannot be symbolized in 
language, instead finds expression in Karain’s pursuit of the idealized/idolized “image of 
a woman,” which promises to restore an idealized past (the lost mother) in the union of a 
utopian future (the longed-for lover). The fantasy enacts, on one level, an oedipal 
struggle: Karain is driven to murder the father-figure Matara when the latter threatens to 
deprive Karain forever of the image of his lover/mother. Karain’s fantasy of lost 
wholeness restored is not only personal, however; it is also political, as the narrator 
implies when he describes Karain’s insatiable and abiding fascination with Queen 
Victoria:  
He multiplied questions; he could never know enough of the Monarch of 
whom he spoke with wonder and chivalrous respect—with a kind of 
affectionate awe! Afterwards, when we had learned that he was the son of 
a woman who had many years ago ruled a small Bugis state, we came to 
suspect that the memory of his mother (of whom he spoke with 
enthusiasm) mingled somehow in his mind with the image he tried to form 
for himself of the far-off Queen whom he called Great, Invincible, Pious, 
and Fortunate. We had to invent details at last to satisfy his craving 
curiosity; and our loyalty must be pardoned, for we tried to make them fit 
for his august and resplendent ideal. (36) 
 
Here again, the desired “image” is a fictionalized one, an impromptu assemblage of 
embellishment and “invent[ed] details.” 
Throughout his oeuvre, Conrad repeatedly examines broad social and political 
dynamics through the lens of familial conflict (The Secret Agent immediately comes to 




the story of the fantasy’s determinant image—that is, the “image of a woman”—and, by 
extension, the enormous ethical dilemma faced by the artist who deals in images: To 
what ends should the power of the image be used? One glimpses faintly a portrait of the 
artist in the narrator himself when the latter admits to spinning tales with “invent[ed] 
details.” The primary artist in “Karain,” however, is the narrator’s younger shipmate, 
Hollis, who provides a crafty solution—in the form of a makeshift “charm” he fashions 
from ribbon, a strip of leather, and a Queen Victoria Jubilee sixpence—when a panic-
stricken Karain arrives aboard ship one night. It is during this unexpected visit that 
Karain narrates the oedipal tale of himself, Matara, and Matara’s sister. The tale ends in 
failure, of course: though Karain kills the father figure, he is still unable to secure the 
affections of the mother/lover. In subsequent years, Karain enlists an old sorcerer to 
protect him from Matara’s avenging ghost. Now that the sorcerer has died, Karain once 
again suffers ghostly persecution both personal and political (he has lost the air of regal 
authority necessary to maintain his status as chief). He begs the European gunrunners to 
take him to the “unbelieving West,” from which, he says, all ghosts have been expelled. 
 The charm itself engenders a complex and contradictory cultural matrix, which 
knots the idolatrous threads of Karain’s individual, oedipal tale into the global fabric of 
empire and imperialism. Before fabricating the charm from “the image of the Great 
Queen,” Hollis explicitly reinforces the link between image and idol when he asks the 
narrator whether Karain “is fanatical—I mean very strict in his [Islamic] faith.” The 
sixpence shows “a likeness—an engraved image” (61), which Hollis worries might 




“a thing like those Italian peasants wear” (63)—that is, necklaces bearing the image of 
the Madonna—and assures his shipmates the makeshift fetish will work “if only 
[Karain’s] puritanism doesn’t shy at a likeness” (62). The term puritanism collapses 
together Islam and English Protestantism—by virtue of a shared aniconic tradition—in 
opposition to the pointedly un-English Catholicism of “those Italian peasants.” The irony 
is obvious: rather than opposing the ethos of Italian, papist idolatry, the Englishness on 
display in Conrad’s tale, in the persons of the gunrunners, is perfectly willing to 
encourage idolatrous impulses and is itself brazenly idolatrous in its exaltation of “the 
image of the Great Queen […] the most powerful thing the white men know” (62). As 
head of state, Victoria’s face is the image of empire. As the head side of the coin, her face 
is the image of imperial capitalism. The face of the Great Queen also harkens back to the 
image of Karain’s mother and thus to Matara’s sister. Conrad emphasizes the link 
between the image on the coin and the image of the idealized woman when his narrator 
remarks on the contents of the small box from which Hollis initially retrieves the Jubilee 
sixpence: the box contains a “girl’s portrait,” a “cabinet photograph” that, we are led to 
believe, depicts a woman for whom Hollis still yearns. 
 By presenting this complex web of associations in the image of the Great Queen, 
Conrad showcases for the reader the power of the image as such, overdetermined, at 
times contradictory, never entirely predictable. By presenting the image as idol, Conrad 
suggests that the power of the image is not necessarily derived from its authenticity. That 
power may instead depend on a lie,167 just as money, a “thing […] of great power” is a 
                                                




kind of lie, a reified fiction.168 If the image inspires belief, however, it may work, as the 
charm does for Karain, and if it works, can it not, at least potentially, serve a productive 
purpose?  
Though Conrad does not provide a clear answer to this question, he does 
scrutinize the presentation of the image even more closely than I, or any other critic, have 
thus far indicated. On the imperative “to make you see,” Conrad’s depiction of Hollis-as-
artist emphasizes not only the role of the image itself, but also of its container: “Karain 
seemed to take no notice of us, but when Hollis threw open the lid of the box his eyes 
flew to it—and so did ours. The quilted crimson satin of the inside put in a violent patch 
of colour into the somber atmosphere; it was something positive to look at—it was 
fascinating” (60). The box opens and, commanding the gaze of all present, issues forth as 
pure, abstract form, “a violent patch of colour.” As the object-cause of desire, Hollis’s 
box also recalls the box that appears earlier in Karain’s framed tale. When Karain and 
Matara finally locate Matara’s sister after years of searching, she is framed by a garden 
scene: “She sat on a bench under the wall, and twigs laden with flowers crept high above 
her head, hung over her hair. She had a box on her lap, and gazed into it, counting the 
increase of her pearls. The Dutchman stood by looking on, he smiled down at her; his 
white teeth flashed; the hair on his lip was like two twisted flames” (53). Like Hollis’s 
box, this box also commands the gaze of a rapt audience, including Karain, his listeners, 
the reader, the Dutchman, and the woman herself, across diegetic boundaries. Placed 
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suggestively “on her lap,” the box and its contents, “her pearls,” signify the mystery and 
desire of female sexuality. In “Karain,” as in “The Return,”169 female sexuality signifies an 
impossible knowledge, both irresistible and terrifying, the loss or lack of which produces 
desire. Karain’s fantasy of the ideal woman exists only in the visual realm of the 
imaginary. When Karain attempts to penetrate that imaginary boundary with his voice, 
the fantasy immediately starts to fall apart, as the pearls literally tumble from their 
container:  
I cried aloud—‘Return!’  
She leaped up; the box fell; the pearls streamed at her feet. (53) 
 
Unable to unite with the mother/lover, Karain must appeal to the phallic power of the old 
sorcerer who, armed with an imposing sword, can fend off the ghost of the vengeful 
father-figure Matara. When the sorcerer dies, Karain is again thrust into oedipal battle 
with the ghost. The artist craftsman Hollis then helps Karain regain equilibrium by 
restoring, in the “infallible charm” (64), the idealized image of woman denied to him so 
many years earlier when his fantasy shattered in a shower of pearls. 
 But the resolution is not a neat one. Conrad still insists on breaking the box: “He 
[Karain] stood up in the boat, lifted up both his arms, then pointed to the infallible charm. 
We cheered again; and the Malays in the boats stared—very much puzzled and 
impressed. I wonder what they thought; what he thought; … what the reader thinks?” 
(64-65). The box, in this case, is the barrier between the world of the narrative and the 
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world of the reader. Rarely does Conrad so explicitly and unexpectedly break the fourth 
wall by addressing “the reader” directly. He does so here not only to emphasize the 
ethical ambiguity of what has just transpired—the gunrunners have “lie[d] a little … for a 
friend”—but also the status of “Karain” itself as a made thing that relies on specific 
narrative conventions to delimit it and make it recognizable to the reader as a story. In 
fact, the narrative abounds with box-like structures, which Conrad uses first to establish, 
then to destabilize, an inside-outside binary. Section I, for example, repeatedly presents 
Karain’s domain as a kind of kingdom in a box, hermetically sealed from the outside 
world. Paradoxically, it is both “an insignificant foothold on the earth […] a conquered 
foothold that, shaped like a young moon, lay ignored between the hills and the sea” (30) 
and “something so immense and vague that for a moment it appeared to be bounded only 
by the sky. And really, looking at that place, landlocked from the sea and shut off from 
the land by the precipitous slopes of mountains, it was difficult to believe in the existence 
of any neighbourhood” (30). Whether the kingdom appears as trivial speck or sublime 
immensity depends on one’s vantage point, inside or outside the box. Karain’s framed 
tale, which comprises almost the entirety of section IV, is another box, visibly partitioned 
off from the rest of the narrative by numbered section breaks. Midway through section 
IV, Conrad interrupts the framed tale with a single paragraph describing the scene of 
discourse (Karain is narrating his story to the European gunrunners aboard their ship).170 
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This short paragraph notes that “[t]he restrained fierceness of [Karain’s] tone seemed to 
rise like a voice from outside, like a thing unspoken but heard; it filled the cabin and 
enveloped in its intense and deadened murmur the motionless figure in the chair” (52). 
Karain’s voice seems to originate both from within and from without. The confounding 
of inner and outer replicates the intrusion of the paragraph itself, which is part of the 
outer framing narrative even as it is physically positioned on the page within the tale it 
ostensibly frames. 
All this dizzying indeterminacy—what is inside and what is outside? How can a 
voice be both “unspoken” and “heard”?—leads back, I would argue, to Hollis’s box and 
the engraved image on the Queen Victoria sixpence: 
 Hollis rummaged in the box. 
 And it seemed to me, during that moment of waiting, that the cabin 
of the schooner was becoming filled with a stir invisible and living as of 
subtle breaths. All the ghosts driven out of the unbelieving West by men 
who pretend to be wise and alone and at peace—all the homeless ghosts of 
an unbelieving world—appeared suddenly round the figure of Hollis 
bending over the box; all the exiled and charming shades of loved women; 
all the beautiful and tender ghosts of ideals, remembered, forgotten, 
cherished, execrated; all the cast-out and reproachful ghosts of friends 
admired, trusted, traduced, betrayed, left dead by the way—they all 
seemed to come from the inhospitable regions of the earth to crowd into 
the gloomy cabin, as though it had been a refuge and, in all the 
unbelieving world, the only place of avenging belief. … It lasted a 
second—all disappeared. Hollis was facing us alone with something small 
that glittered between his fingers. It looked like a coin. (62) 
 
Referring to this passage, Mark Wollaeger remarks, “[T]he narrator gains sudden insight 




boundaries defined by ‘superstition’ break down.”171 This breaking down of boundaries is 
the sublime function of art, and in the passage quoted above, Conrad invites us to 
reconsider the boundary between West and East, between rational and irrational. Building 
on Wollaeger’s observation, I would add that, by reconfiguring the West-East binary as 
an outside-inside binary, Conrad reimagines the key dialectical relation in the passage 
such that it replicates the formal structure of “Karain” itself, with its many box-like 
structures. At the same time, Conrad also destabilizes the outside-inside distinction by 
using the same signifier, charm, to refer both to that which emerges from within the box 
(“[c]harms and talismans” [62]) and that which is drawn round from outside the box (“the 
charming shades of loved women” [62]). By destabilizing the outside-inside binary, 
Conrad implicitly questions whether received narrative conventions are adequate to the 
artistic process, whereby he intends “to make you see.” 
Hollis initiates the artistic process when he reaches into the box to retrieve the 
materials from which he will craft the “infallible charm,” and the charm, which Hollis 
identifies explicitly as a kind of idol, restores Karain’s equilibrium by granting him 
access to the image of woman. Here, as in so much of Conrad’s work, the image of 
woman is a metonym not only for the mystery of female sexuality but, more broadly still, 
for the desire of the other in the most fundamental sense. Because this desire is by 
definition elusive, in order to present it authentically, Conrad cannot conclude his tale 
with a fantasy that elides the essential un-possessablity of the object of desire. He cannot 
wrap up neatly with the image of Karain, charm in hand, confidence restored, back on the 
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beach among his people, as the gunrunners sail away for the last time. Instead, Conrad 
appends a two-page coda in which Jackson and the narrator meet by chance seven years 
later on a busy London thoroughfare.  
This strange coda features an elaborate and, I would argue, purposeful failure of 
images. Surrounded by the traffic and bustle of the city, Jackson and the narrator 
exchange snippets of conversation, which are juxtaposed by “[t]hree long descriptive 
paragraphs of a nearly hallucinatory intensity.”172 Each hallucinatory paragraph is a block 
built almost entirely from a paratactic succession of images.173 Wollaeger attributes the 
failure of these images to the text’s self-referentiality. “[C]ontrary to the narrator’s 
intentions,” he says, “the words seem not to represent an actual scene at all but rather to 
call attention to their own status as writing. The verbal texture of disjunctive images 
displaces the illusion of representation.”174 The images, in other words, do not quite work 
as images because readers are so insistently reminded that they are looking not at a 
London street, but at a page of text.  
Wollaeger is partially correct: the images do continually call attention to their 
own textuality, and on the level of individual sentences, this self-referential “verbal 
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texture” does distract from the images ostensibly conveyed. On the level of the 
paragraph, however, I would argue that the text of the “[t]hree long descriptive 
paragraphs” asserts itself as image precisely by calling attention to its status as text. As 
large boxes of text on the page, these paragraphs stand out in stark relief against the brief 
bits of conversation between Jackson and the narrator. By “call[ing] attention to their 
own status as writing,” the words in the three long paragraphs de-naturalize the reading 
process for the reader, making it more likely that he or she will recognize the boxes as 
such. Thus, the printed words themselves, marks of black ink arranged in rectangular 
boxes against a white background, constitute literal text-images,175 and as such, these long 
paragraphs, like the narrative’s many other charms, talismans, and graven images,176 
suggest a fundamental element of unreality. Conrad, I argue, is using the coda’s text 
boxes to prepare the reader for an iconoclastic reimagining of imagery. 
 Like Hollis’s box with its Queen Victoria sixpence and other assorted treasures, 
the text boxes in the coda contain many potentially powerful images. These images are 
idols of empire in the same sense that the image on the sixpence is: such images give 
body, and therefore the illusion of permanence, to the contingent ideals of empire. 
Liberated from Hollis’s box, the image on the coin provides “a moment of sublime 
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vision”177 in which the distinction between inner and outer dissolves. The text boxes of the 
coda, however, do not yield their contents so easily: the reader is not yet granted that 
sublime vision in which boundaries fall away and the object of desire—the image—is, if 
only for a moment, fully apprehended. Though I do not wish to discount Wollaeger’s 
explanation that the images fail because of their self-referentiality, I would argue that the 
perception, which I share with Wollaeger and Conrad’s Jackson, that something in the 
these images does fail issues primarily from the tension between motion and stasis that 
inheres in the images. That is, within each long paragraph of the coda, the many disparate 
images attempt to convey motion—e.g., “feet moved hurriedly, blank faces flowed, arms 
swung”; “a pale-faced youth strolled, overcome by weariness” while “horses stepped 
gingerly”; “red, yellow, and green omnibuses rolled swaying, monstrous and gaudy” (66-
67)—but this attempt ultimately fails. Paradoxically, despite chaotic movement, the scene 
suggests an overriding sense of petrification, of harsh stoniness. The final image in the 
three paragraphs is of “a policeman, helmeted and dark, stretching out a rigid arm at the 
crossing of the streets” (67). 
 By inundating readers with a cascade of images that ostensibly convey the 
dynamic vitality of London as the center of modern civilization, but that, taken together, 
express only the stagnation of modernity,178 Conrad indicates the kind of imagery he 
seeks: not the kind of image that fixes the object in place, like some strange stone idol, 
but rather the kind of image whose motion preserves the fundamental elusiveness of the 
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object of desire. Though the coda ultimately fails to produce this type of image, it 
nevertheless keeps the dilemma of the image at the forefront of Conrad’s narrative 
project. Indeed, by the time Conrad published “Karain” in 1897, he had already begun to 
develop narrative techniques, two of which I have already discussed, to achieve the new 
kind of imagery. One technique is “delayed decoding,” identified by Ian Watt in 1979. 
The other, which I explain above in relation to Freudian Nachträglichkeit, is retroactive 
modification. The two techniques differ in that Watt’s concept of delayed decoding 
suggests that there is something empirically true to be decoded, that careful inspection 
can replace the initial misrecognition with objective reality. Retroactive modification, on 
the other hand, does not replace; it compounds. The initial observation is not later 
revealed as a simple misrecognition. Instead, both the initial observation and the 
subsequent revision are superimposed as equally valid images of reality. The example I 
offered above in the context of “The Return” was the statue of the marble woman, whose 
neck is both covered and uncovered. For readers who would argue that this contradiction 
is simply an oversight on Conrad’s part, I turn now to Nostromo (1904), in which the 
process of retroactive modification takes on an even more prominent role in the utopian 
vision of a future attainable only in art. 
Nostromo  
Nostromo presents a society in transition from imperial capitalism to global 
capitalism and in which all work is fundamentally altered by pervasive commodification 
and reification. The text, I argue, continually signals the reified status of work by 




whose “water-colour sketch of the San Tomé mountain”179 signifies the artist’s attempt to 
provide an alternative to commodification and reification under advancing capitalism. 
The failure of this attempt bespeaks the ossification of several once vital ideals into 
lifeless idols, including the one most relevant to Mrs. Gould herself, the Victorian ideal 
of domesticity. The idols of the narrative instantiate the paralysis of a society in which 
authentic social relations have been obscured by reification. As a meditation on the uses 
and abuses of image-making under capitalism, Nostromo points to the technique of 
retroactive modification as a way to counter reification in narrative art. Ultimately, 
however, reactionary tendencies in the text prevent it from developing the technique 
fully. 
Throughout much of Conrad’s oeuvre, steadfast devotion to work—that is, to 
doing one’s duty—is a hallmark of authentic existence because work both constitutes an 
end in itself and builds a community of fellow laborers.180 In Nostromo, however, virtually 
all work is subordinated to “material interests,” a euphemism the novel continually uses 
to refer to the processes and products of burgeoning global capitalism and 
commodification. Conrad signals this perversion of the ideal of work early in the novel’s 
opening sequence, which describes the Golfo Plácido as a formerly “inviolable 
sanctuary,” geographically and commercially isolated “from the temptations of the 
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trading world […] as if within an enormous semi-circular and unroofed temple open to 
the ocean, with its walls of lofty mountains hung with the mourning draperies of cloud” 
(5). The temple, however, has been profaned by intimations of idolatry: 
Sky, land, and sea disappear together out of the world when the Plácido—
as the saying is—goes to sleep under its black poncho. The few stars left 
below the seaward frown of the vault shine feebly as into the mouth of a 
black cavern. In its vastness your ship floats unseen under your feet, her 
sails flutter invisible above your head. The eye of God Himself—they 
[anonymous sailors telling tales] add with grim profanity—could not find 
out what work a man’s hand is doing in there; and you would be free to 
call the devil to your aid with impunity if even his malice were not 
defeated by such a blind darkness. (7) 
 
The clause “what work a man’s hand is doing” marks the first instance of the word work 
in the novel. It also recalls the biblical expression “the work of men’s hands,” which 
appears five times in the Authorized Version and always refers to false idols worshipped 
by men who have turned away from or have yet to turn to the true God of Abraham.181 
This early allusion, I argue, alerts readers that “work” in the novel (whether artwork, 
manual labor, or financial speculation) should be conceived as a type of idolatry.  
Even as “material interests” degrade the ideal of work in the novel, Conrad uses 
another effect of advancing capitalism, the increasingly stark gendered-division of labor, 
                                                
181 See Deuteronomy 4:28, 2 Kings 19:18, Psalm 115:4, Psalm 135:15, and Isaiah 37:19. Other variations of 
the phrase “the work of men’s hands” occur later in the novel: Mrs. Gould on “the honest work of his [the 
outlaw Hernández’s] hands,” rendered impossible because of “the lawless tyranny of your [Blanco] 
Government” (82) and the San Tomé mine’s “hidden treasures of the earth, hovered over by the anxious 
spirits of good and evil, torn out by the labouring hands of the people” (361). The seamen’s quip about the 
impenetrability of the darkness in the Golfo Plácido also recurs in the final pages of the novel, drawing 
attention to the importance of the saying as a framing device for the narrative: in a clandestine encounter 
with Giselle Viola, Nostromo “flung the mastered treasure superbly at her feet”—that is, he tells her about 
the hidden silver—“in the impenetrable darkness of the gulf, in the darkness defying—as men said—the 
knowledge of God and the wit of the devil” (388); then, just after Nostromo departs, “Linda, stealing down 
from the tower in the exuberance of her happiness, found her [Giselle] with a lighted candle at her back, 
facing the black night full of sighing gusts of wind and the sound of distant showers—a true night of the 




to attempt to save one kind of work, that of the artist, from the debasement of 
commodification. We learn early in the novel that, a few months before inheriting the San 
Tomé mine from his father, Charles Gould meets Holroyd, the wealthy American who 
will one day finance Charles’s mining efforts. The two are introduced 
in an old historic German town, situated in a mining district. The 
American had his womankind with him, but seemed lonely while they 
were sketching all day long the old doorways and the turreted corners of 
the mediaeval houses. Charles Gould had with him the inseparable 
companionship of the mine. The other man was interested in mining 
enterprises, knew something of Costaguana, and was no stranger to the 
name of Gould. (49) 
 
Sketching, then, is something that women do, and it alienates them from men like 
Holroyd and Gould. Though presented initially as bourgeois leisure activity, sketching 
should be viewed in the overall context of Nostromo as a type of work. Specifically, it is 
a type of women’s work, and its chief practitioner is Mrs. Gould, whose “water-colour 
sketch of the San Tomé mountain—the work of Doña Emilia [Gould] herself” (53) is one 
of the narrative’s most significant recurring images. As a figure for the artist, Emily 
Gould stands alone amid the vast collection of characters (and caricatures) that populate 
Conrad’s longest novel. No other major character could be called an artist in any 
conventional sense. In the passage quoted above, the art of Holroyd’s “womankind” 
indicates a desire to preserve the authenticity of the past and the integrity of domestic 
space (two qualities combined succinctly in the phrase “mediaeval houses”). In contrast, 
men’s work, as practiced by Charles Gould and Holroyd, couples industrialization and 
finance as drivers of imperial capitalism transitioning to a truly global stage. This process 




Gould bears silently as she watches the mine gradually displace her in her husband’s life 
and foreclose any possibility that she will bear children—and effaces customs inherited 
through generations. 
 The Casa Gould vignette that introduces “the [art]work of Doña Emilia herself” 
(53) constitutes a self-contained unit. Running approximately three pages, the sequence 
begins with a detailed description of the Gould’s home (“Mrs. Gould loved the patio of 
her Spanish house…”), transitions into a conversation between Mr. and Mrs. Gould on 
Holroyd’s character and attitude toward the mine, and ends with Mrs. Gould conceding 
gently, “I only wondered what you felt” (52-54). Third-person narration is limited 
primarily to Mrs. Gould’s perspective, and direct speech belongs mostly to her rather 
than Charles. At the end of the sequence, the roles reverse: Charles becomes the 
dominant speaker and the filter for third-person narration. Their home, as described in the 
Casa Gould sequence, is a feminine space decorated and designed primarily for Mrs. 
Gould’s comfort and convenience,182 with one exception, her husband’s study. The 
moment we enter the study, however, Charles is “already strapping his spurs” so he can 
“hurry back to the mine” (i.e., the masculine space of capitalist productivity). Masculine 
symbols of imperial dominance that adorn his walls—books, guns, and “an old cavalry 
sabre”183—are separated by a paragraph break from the only other item on the study walls, 
the “water-colour sketch of the San Tomé mountain—the [art]work of Doña Emilia 
                                                
182 “All the lofty rooms on three sides of the quadrangle opened into each other and into the corredor, with its 
wrought-iron railings and a border of flowers, whence, like the lady of the mediaeval castle, she could 
witness from above all the departures and arrivals of the Casa, to which the sonorous arched gateway lent 
an air of stately importance” (52). 




herself” (53). The curiously self-contained nature of this vignette, I argue, enacts 
formally the reification and concomitant autonomization that occur under advancing 
capitalism, whereby old “natural” unities are broken up and the new parts then begin to 
operate autonomously or semi-autonomously.184 Historically, the processes of reification 
and autonomization gave rise to the modern conception of public space (of work and 
productivity, coded masculine) and private space (of domesticity and leisure, coded 
feminine), which is precisely the gendered division reified in the Casa Gould sequence.   
Like the Casa Gould sequence, the novel’s opening pages, mentioned briefly 
above, also evince the processes of reification and autonomization in both form and 
theme. Formally, the opening Golfo Plácido sequence is set apart as a chapter unto itself, 
and it presents the landscape, which is virtually devoid of characters, in a sustained, 
intensely impressionistic style that will emerge in subsequent chapters only in short 
bursts. The few characters that do appear are spectral presences that play no obvious role 
in the rest of the novel. According to Fredric Jameson, Conrad’s general “aestheticizing 
strategy” results from the 
fragmentation, reification, but also production, of new semi-autonomous 
[perceptual] objects and [psychic] activities, [which] is clearly the 
objective precondition for the emergence of genres such as landscape, in 
which the viewing of an otherwise (or at least a traditionally) meaningless 
                                                
184 “For the dynamic of rationalization—Weber’s term, which Lukács will strategically retranslate as 
reification in History and Class Consciousness—is a complex one in which the traditional or ‘natural’ 
[naturwüchsige] unities, social forms, human relations, cultural events, even religious systems, are 
systematically broken up in order to be reconstructed more efficiently, in the form of new post-natural 
processes or mechanisms; but in which, at the same time, these now isolated broken bits and pieces of the 
older unities acquire a certain autonomy of their own, a semi-autonomous coherence which, not merely a 
reflex of capitalist reification and rationalization, also in some measure serves to compensate for the 
dehumanization of experience reification brings with it, and to rectify the otherwise intolerable effects of 
the new process.” Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act 




object—nature without people—comes to seem a self-justifying activity. 
An even more pertinent example is a style like Impressionism, which 
discards even the operative fiction of some interest in the constituted 
objects of the natural world, and offers the exercise of perception and the 
perceptual recombination of sense data as an end in itself.185 
 
Though Jameson does not mention the opening pages of Nostromo, the Golfo Plácido 
sequence, in which both shape and color are continually autonomized, clearly exhibits 
this aesthetic of reification.186 Thematically, the isolation of the Golfo Plácido and the city 
of Sulaco is ascribed to the ability of imperial capitalism to surround the Golfo but not, 
until very recently, to penetrate its boundaries:  
In the time of Spanish rule, and for many years afterwards the town of 
Sulaco—the luxuriant beauty of the orange gardens bears witness to its 
antiquity—had never been commercially anything more important than a 
coasting port with a fairly large local trade in ox-hides and indigo. The 
clumsy deep-sea galleons of the conquerors that, needing a brisk gale to 
move at all, would lie becalmed, where your modern ship built on clipper 
lines forges ahead by the mere flapping of her sails, had been barred out of 
Sulaco by the prevailing calms of its vast gulf. (5) 
 
Even at the level of the sentence, these opening lines, with their periodic structure, 
engender a setting suspended outside the regular flow of time. Taken in its entirety, the 
Golfo Plácido sequence, as a landscape rendered in text, corresponds to the Casa Gould’s 
“water-colour sketch,” which, as we shall see, also presents a reified vision removed from 
history. 
                                                
185 Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious, 229-30. 
186 Conrad writes, for example, that “the shadow on the sky on one side with the round patch of blue haze 
blurring the bright skirt of the horizon on the other, mark the two outermost points of the bend” (6). “From 
that low end of the Great Isabel the eye plunges through an opening two miles away, as abrupt as if 
chopped with an axe out of the regular sweep of the coast, right into the harbor of Sulaco. It is an oblong, 
lake-like piece of water. On one side the short wooded spurs and valleys of the Cordillera come down at 
right angles to the very strand; on the other the open view of the great Sulaco plain passes into the opal 




Throughout the novel, reifying processes effect a false sense of substance and 
permanence. In a passage that succinctly allegorizes the work of reification—whereby 
social relations, which exist only in and through the dynamic interactions of living, 
breathing humans, are displaced onto and concretized in inert matter—even the astute 
Emily Gould is duped by the silver idol of the San Tomé mine: 
On the occasion when the fires under the first set of retorts in their shed 
had glowed far into the night she did not retire to rest on the rough cadre 
set up for her in the as yet bare frame house till she had seen the first 
spongy lump of silver yielded to the hazards of the world by the dark 
depths of the Gould Concession; she had laid her unmercenary hands, with 
an eagerness that made them tremble, upon the first silver ingot turned out 
still warm from the mould; and by her imaginative estimate of its power 
she endowed that lump of metal with a justificative conception, as though 
it were not a mere fact, but something far-reaching and impalpable, like 
the true expression of an emotion or the emergency of a principle. (80) 
 
Later, Conrad employs biblical allusion to liken Charles Gould’s act of reification (of 
“material interests”) to an act of idolatry.187 In part 3 of the novel, Charles decides to write 
to Holroyd to reaffirm their dual commitment to the mine. Mentally composing his 
message, “he saw these words as if written in letters of fire upon the wall at which he was 
gazing abstractedly” (271). Through this unmistakable allusion to the story of the prophet 
Daniel, in which King Belshazzar of Babylon is slain by the Lord for his rampant 
idolatry, Charles assumes at once the roles Belshazzar and the hand of God.188 Like the 
King of Babylon, Charles Gould, El Rey de Sulaco, will suffer for his idolatry. This sin is 
manifest in the irony of the last sentence “written in letters of fire upon the wall”: “I am 
                                                
187 The text continually affirms Charles Gould’s near-religious devotion to “material interest,” referring, for 
example, to “those material interests to which Charles Gould had pinned his faith” (221). Charles himself 
avows to his wife, “I pin my faith to material interests” (63). 




forced to take up openly the plan of a provincial revolution as the only way of placing the 
enormous material interests involved in the property and peace of Sulaco in a position of 
permanent safety” (271). Capitalism and its “material interests” preclude any “position of 
permanent safety.” As Dr. Monygham later remarks to Mrs. Gould, “There is no peace 
and rest in the development of material interests. They have their law and their justice. 
But it is founded on expediency, and is inhuman; it is without rectitude, without the 
continuity and the force that can be found only in a moral principle” (366). A poor 
substitute for Daniel, Charles Gould fails not only to interpret properly the writing on the 
wall, but also to recognize that it originates within himself. Instead, his reifying of 
material interests results in psychic fragmentation and autonomization.  
In light of the novel’s tendency to equate reification and idolatry, I argue that the 
Golfo Plácido and Casa Gould sequences—which, as we have seen, are self-contained 
units that enact reification of form—should themselves be viewed as idols. This is 
especially significant since both sequences contain references to idolatry, which suggests 
a reflexive critique of the text’s own reifying tendencies. In the Golfo Plácido sequence, 
the periodic structure of the sentence that alludes to idolatry (“what work a man’s hand is 
doing”) is especially instructive: “The eye of God Himself—they add with grim 
profanity—could not find out what work a man’s hand is doing in there” (7). By 
interjecting a comment on sailors (the referent of they) telling tales, the text pointedly 
emphasizes the work of narration at the same time it implies that work is idolatry. In the 
Casa Gould sequence, references to idolatry are more overt. In fact, Mrs. Gould, the 




“Mr. Holroyd’s sense of religion,” Mrs. Gould pursued, “was shocked and 
disgusted at the tawdriness of the dressed-up saints in the cathedral—the 
worship, he called it, of wood and tinsel. But it seemed to me that he 
looked upon his own God as a sort of influential partner, who gets his 
share of profits in the endowment of churches. That’s a sort of idolatry. He 
told me he endowed churches every year, Charley.” (54) 
 
The only thing Mr. Holroyd enjoys more than producing capital, it seems, is proselytizing 
for his Protestant faith. Though far from a monolithic or unambiguous force for good in 
the novel, Catholicism repeatedly figures as part of a long-established cultural expression 
of Costaguanan life, which is threatened by the imperial intrusion of the American 
financier Holroyd and the British Railway Company.  
Complicating Catholicism’s role in the text, the Casa Gould sequence is also 
framed at its beginning and end by an idol: “a Madonna in blue robes with the crowned 
child sitting on her arm,” both of which “overlooked silently from a niche in the wall” the 
daily activities of the Casa Gould (52). This statue functions in two ways: first, as a kind 
of household god or presiding genius entrusted with the blessing of domestic affairs; 
second, as a signifier of the Catholic Church as a political institution exerting temporal 
power over persons, land, and finances. Examined closely, these two functions reveal a 
deep political contradiction in the novel’s use of Catholicism. Historically, the ideal of 
domesticity emerged in the nineteenth-century as a corollary to the rise of capitalism. In 
Nostromo, written in the first decade of the twentieth century, the inner contradictions of 
capitalism are on full display as the Protestant-capitalist imperative, embodied by 
Holroyd and the “material interests” of the mine, threatens to undermine the ideal of 
domesticity entirely. Catholicism may seem like the logical counterpoint, then, to the 




Father Corbelán becomes “the first Cardinal-Archbishop of Sulaco” in the newly 
independent Occidental Republic, popular opinion holds “that his unexpected elevation to 
the purple was a counter-move to the Protestant invasion of Sulaco organized by the 
Holroyd Missionary Fund” (364). Corbelán’s primary goal in the novel is “the restitution 
of the confiscated church property. Nothing else,” as Decoud points out, “could have 
drawn that fierce converter of savage Indians out of the wilds to work for the Ribierist 
cause” (136-137). The terms used to classify the type of restitution Corbelán seeks—
“confiscated church property” (136), “old church lands and convents” (343)—
demonstrate that, unlike Holroyd, Corbelán does not desire wealth in the form of capital 
or commodities. Corbelán has no wish, for instance, to obtain any of Gould’s silver either 
for himself or for the Church; rather, he wants to restore to the Church its land, a pre-
capitalist measure of fixed wealth (unlike capital, land cannot multiply itself—there’s 
only so much land to be had) signifying hierarchy, vassalage, and agrarian production. 
Thus, Costaguana’s entrenched Catholicism, which the novel repeatedly depicts as a 
feudal institution,189 is a reactionary alternative to the Protestant-capitalist imperative. As a 
reactionary alternative, it does nothing to resolve the inner contradictions of capitalism, 
though it does add contradictions and antiquated ideals of its own.190 
                                                
189 For example, when the Monterist revolutionists ride into the Plaza of Sulaco, they are baffled by the 
statue of King Charles of Spain astride his horse. “What is that saint in the big hat?” they ask (276). The 
anachronistic signifier of royal power registers only through the iconography (that is, as an idol) of the 
Catholic Church. 
190 The Goulds themselves are continually described with feudal metaphors, as when, in the Casa Gould 
sequence, Mrs. Gould is compared to “the lady of the mediaeval castle” (52) or when Charles Gould is 
called El Rey de Sulaco (158, 173, 227, 290). Such flourishes point to the uneasy coupling of a fixed class 
system determined by heredity and a more fluid social structure in which the accumulation of capital 




Given the multiple direct and indirect references to idolatry within the Casa Gould 
sequence, readers are primed to interpret the items adorning the walls of Charles Gould’s 
study as idols themselves: 
One tall, broad bookcase, with glass doors, was full of books; but in the 
other, without shelves, and lined with red baize, were arranged firearms: 
Winchester carbines, revolvers, a couple of shot guns, and even two pairs 
of double-barreled holster pistols. Between them, by itself, upon a strip of 
scarlet velvet, hung an old cavalry sabre, once the property of Don 
Enrique Gould, the hero of the Occidental Province, presented by Don 
José Avellanos, the hereditary friend of the family. 
Otherwise, the plastered white walls were completely bare, except 
for a water-colour sketch of the San Tomé mountain—the work of Doña 
Emilia herself. (53)  
 
The two bookcases, one filled with books, the other with guns, represent the dual legacy 
of European imperial expansion into the Americas: on the one hand, the ostensibly 
edifying gift of millennia of accumulated knowledge culminating in Enlightenment 
rationality; on the other hand, the dark obverse of that trajectory of Enlightenment 
realized in the brutal subjugation or extermination of colonized populations and their 
traditions in the name of progress and prosperity. The description of the first item, a 
bookcase “full of books,” is almost tautological in its banality. This banality heightens 
the strangeness of the second bookcase, which is filled with things that ought to be alien 
to it. By cataloguing the variety of guns—as opposed to the generic “books” of the 
previous clause—mounted in the second case, Conrad suggests that violent conquest has 
always been the underlying truth of imperialism, which at times feigns a more altruistic 
and edified facade.  
 Flanked by books and guns, those twin sentries of imperial power, the “cavalry 




Gould was President of Costaguana during the era of Federation, before the revolutionary 
Guzmán Bento usurped power and executed most officials of the former regime, 
including Henry. Whereas firearms and mass-produced books are the products of 
modernity, the saber is much older, harkening back to the battles of Medieval Europe. A 
venerated relic, Henry Gould’s saber, unlike the carbines, shot guns, revolvers, pistols, 
and books, signifies an authentic connection to the history of the land and the socio-
political development of Costaguana. Though Charles Gould is not an indigenous 
Costaguanan—Conrad continually emphasizes that Gould’s ancestry is wholly English—
nevertheless, the Gould family has resided in the South American country for three 
generations. Charles himself admonishes his wife and the reader, “My dear, you seem to 
forget that I was born here” (39). In short, the Goulds have both shaped and been shaped 
by the material reality of life in Costaguana for some time. Henry Gould’s saber invokes 
metonymically this historical co-dependence of Costaguana and the Gould family.  
In opposition to the books, guns, and saber—symbols of imperial conquest and 
the work of the mine—hangs the “water-colour sketch of the San Tomé mountain—the 
work of Doña Emilia herself” (53). Late in the novel, weary and resigned, Mrs. Gould 
contemplates the relation between work and history: “It had come into her mind that for 
life to be large and full, it must contain the care of the past and of the future in every 
passing moment of the present. Our daily work must be done to the glory of the dead, and 
for the good of those who come after” (373). Mrs. Gould’s artwork, however, defies these 
sentiments. Instead of contributing to “the care of the past” and “the glory of the dead,” 




of the mine with an idealized fantasy. In one scene, as Charles and Emily Gould stare at 
the sketch in Charles’s study, Mrs. Gould laments, “We have disturbed a good many 
snakes in that Paradise [i.e., the San Tomé mine], Charley, haven’t we?” (151). Her 
husband replies, 
“Yes; I remember, […] it was Don Pepe who called the gorge the Paradise 
of snakes. No doubt we have disturbed a great many. But remember, my 
dear, that it is not now as it was when you made that sketch.” He waved 
his hand towards the small water-colour hanging alone upon the great bare 
wall. “It is no longer a Paradise of snakes. We have brought mankind into 
it, and we cannot turn our backs upon them to go and begin a new life 
elsewhere.” (151-52) 
 
Remarkably, the irony of the provocative epithet “Paradise of snakes” is lost on the 
Goulds.191 Mr. Gould implies that “when you made that sketch,” the gorge was an 
untouched, Edenic utopia, which of course is not true. Charles and Emily Gould have not 
“brought mankind into” Eden, and they know it, even though they disavow that 
knowledge:  
Mrs. Gould knew the history of the San Tomé mine. Worked in the early 
days mostly by means of lashes on the backs of slaves, its yield had been 
paid for in its own weight of human bones. Whole tribes of Indians had 
perished in the exploitation; and then the mine was abandoned, since with 
this primitive method it had ceased to make a profitable return, no matter 
how many corpses were thrown into its maw. Then it became forgotten. 
(40) 
 
The “Paradise of snakes,” with its history of enslavement and genocide in the name of 
profit, was stained by sin long before Charles and Emily Gould came along. The details 
                                                
191 The epithet “Paradise of snakes” is paradoxical, of course. As a biblical symbol, snakes signify evil, 
temptation, and the potential to commit sins, all of which ought to be incompatible with Paradise. The 
novel itself does recognize the irony of a “Paradise of snakes,” even if the Goulds do not. In coining the 
phrase, “Don Pepe […] rode up, and stretching his arm up the gorge, had declared with mock solemnity, 




of its history present the mine as a monstrous god hungry for human sacrifice; in 
particular, the “corpses […] thrown into its maw” recall biblical accounts of sacrifice to 
the god Moloch. In the modern English-speaking world, the image of parents throwing 
their children into the ravenous maw of the idol Moloch derives chiefly from John 
Milton’s Paradise Lost. The word maw also assumes special significance in Milton’s 
epic, referring in each of its three iterations to the voracity of Death, who, born of the 
incestuous pairing of Satan and Sin, is characterized by a boundless desire to consume—
an allusion that aptly emphasizes the voracity of “material interests” and the culture of 
consumption under capitalism.  
Mrs. Gould’s sketch of the Edenic gorge alters the historical narrative, however: 
over three successive scenes, the sketch displaces the symbols of imperial conquest and 
oppression—the books, the firearms, the saber—masking the dark history of the mine 
with the fantasy of a paradise that never was. This utopian vision of the mine becomes 
one with which Charles Gould fundamentally identifies: “ ‘I tried to make him [General 
Montero] see that the existence of the mine was bound up with my personal safety,’ 
continued Charles Gould, looking away from the doctor, and fixing his eyes upon the 
water-colour sketch upon the wall” (292). By the end of the novel Charles’s primary 
motivator is the utopian vision of the mine depicted in Emily Gould’s water-colour 
sketch. This vision becomes a stand-in for the lost innocence of childhood, an innocence 
that is lost to the young Charles as he observes his father destroyed slowly by the burden 
of the then unworkable San Tomé mine. Charles’s dedication to mine successfully the 




father.192 He is trying to restore the lost wholeness of a utopian past—a fantastical past 
created in imagination, not one preserved in memory.  
Yet, even though Mrs. Gould’s artwork fails, in the world of the story, to produce 
“that glimpse of the truth” it is art’s duty to reveal,193 the process by which that artwork—
and the fantasy reified in it—gradually displaces the books, firearms, and saber indicates 
a possible solution, on the level of form, to the dilemma of reification under capitalism. 
Of the four instances in which we encounter Mrs. Gould’s sketch, three occur in the 
present moment of the novel’s action. Taken in the order they appear, these three scenes, 
all set in Charles Gould’s study, constitute a progression whereby the attention of both 
reader and characters becomes singularly focused on the sketch, as the other objects 
vanish from the narrative. The first time the sketch appears, it seems almost an 
afterthought, separated by a paragraph break from the triad of books, saber, and firearms. 
When the sketch reappears some hundred pages later, however, the items on display have 
shifted slightly. Once again Charles and Emily stand in Charles’s study, and once again 
the text emphasizes “the four white walls of the room,” but this time the careful 
arrangement of books and firearms flanking the phallic saber as centerpiece, with the 
                                                
192 Charles’s father, hoping to spare his son a lifetime of torment and despair, had forbidden Charles from 
reopening the mine. On this point, as on many others, Stephen Ross’s thorough Lacanian reading of the 
novel is particularly insightful: “Initially motivated by the most basic logic of transgression (the desire to 
do that which is most often and most vehemently forbidden), Charles quickly accedes to a more complex 
logic, characterized by his belief that by transgressing his father’s prohibition and making the mine viable 
again he can triumph against the Costaguanan regime that broke his father’s fortune and spirit, 
simultaneously rebelling against his father’s word and redeeming his father’s life.” Stephen Ross, Conrad 
and Empire (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2004), 128.  
193 “My task which I am trying to achieve is, by the power of the written word, to make you hear, to make 
you feel—it is, before all, to make you see! That—and no more: and it is everything! If I succeed, you shall 
find there according to your deserts: encouragement, consolation, fear, charm—all you demand; and, 
perhaps, also that glimpse of truth for which you have forgotten to ask.” Conrad, preface to The Nigger of 




sketch somewhere off to the side, has given way to a different triad: “Two big lamps with 
unpolished glass globes bathed in a soft and abundant light the four white walls of the 
room, with a glass case of arms, the brass hilt of Henry Gould’s cavalry saber on its 
square of velvet, and the water-colour sketch of the San Tomé gorge” (151). The books 
have disappeared, and the sketch, no longer relegated to a separate wall and a separate 
paragraph, has taken their place. In the final appearance of the sketch, Mrs. Gould is 
absent when Mr. Gould returns to his study to find Dr. Monygham waiting for him. 
Neither saber nor firearms are mentioned, and Charles Gould, mesmerized by the sketch 
of the mine, only partially registers his interlocutor’s presence. Throughout this third 
scene, Charles has “fix[ed] his eyes upon the water-colour sketch upon the wall” (292). 
The phrasing recalls the earlier passage in which the allusion to the Book of Daniel—“He 
saw these words as if written in letters of fire upon the wall at which he was gazing 
abstractedly”—implicates Charles in an act of idolatry. In that scene, Mrs. Gould reflects 
that her husband’s “fits of abstraction depicted the energetic concentration of a will 
haunted by a fixed idea. A man haunted by a fixed idea is insane” (271). That Charles has 
once again “fix[ed] his eyes […] upon the wall” suggests that he is once again in the 
throes of idolatry, and his idol is the image of the reified fantasy of the mine. 
This process of displacement over successive scenes is the process of retroactive 
modification, which continually loops back on itself to render an image in a continuous 
state of flux. As such, retroactive modification is the opposite of reification, which 
concretizes the dynamic and abstract, thereby fixing it in place. Paradoxically, the 




enacts reification: the artist (Mrs. Gould) disappears, and the work of art assumes an 
autonomous existence as the image of the reified fantasy of the mine. This paradoxical 
double-movement, I argue, demonstrates the workings of the Political Unconscious. In a 
text that continually foregrounds, both formally and thematically, the dilemma of 
reification under capitalism, but that nevertheless outright rejects a classical Marxist 
resolution to the internal contradictions of capitalism and instead posits the force of 
feudal institutions (e.g., the Catholic Church, the Goulds as de facto aristocracy) as a 
counterweight to the capitalist imperative (e.g., Holroyd’s Protestantism, the British 
Railway Company, the mine), the process of retroactive modification arises in tandem 
with, and as a potential formal antidote to, the reification of the image of the mine as idol. 
Within the world of the story itself, Mrs. Gould’s own artwork, unfortunately, never 
makes use of this or any other potential remedy. Instead of conveying the movement of 
history, her sketch covers over the dynamic truth of forced labor and genocide with a 
fixed fantasy image of an unfallen paradise. 
In Nostromo, Conrad puts Mrs. Gould in the role of the artist as part of an 
extended meditation on the ethics of art as a vehicle for enchantment or mystification. 
This tendency to mystify, which the novel eventually dubs the “charm of art” (372), 
manifests as the fairy-like quality repeatedly ascribed to Mrs. Gould. For example, when 
affirming that “Mrs. Gould knew the history of the San Tomé mine,” which is a history of 
enslavement with a “yield [of silver] paid for in its own weight of human bones” (40), 
Conrad contrasts the heaviness of bones with the lightness of Emily Gould in the sanctum 




walls, tinted a delicate primrose-colour; and Mrs. Gould, with her little head and shining 
coils of hair, sitting in a cloud of muslin and lace before a slender mahogany table, 
resembled a fairy posed lightly before dainty philters dispensed out of vessels of silver 
and porcelain” (40). The periodic structure of the clause following the semicolon enacts 
syntactically the light, fairy-like semblance attributed to Mrs. Gould, as though the 
sentence were temporarily suspended, floating on air through the prepositional and 
participial phrases that separate subject from verb. The sentence, disabused of the weight 
of history, is lifted out of time and into in an alternative fantasy of “ancient days,” just as 
the periodic structure of the novel’s first two sentences temporarily lifts the reader out of 
the present moment to present Sulaco as a pre-capitalist paradise.194 In both cases, the 
fantasy is the fantasy of an idealized past that never was. Mrs. Gould’s sketch purports to 
“preserve” the “memory” of the grandeur of a prelapsarian paradise (79-80), before the 
intrusion of man.195 “Ah, if we had left it alone, Charles!” cries Emily Gould. “No,” says 
Charles, “it was impossible to leave it alone” (151). In a way, he is right: one cannot 
leave the Paradise of snakes alone, pristine and unfallen, because one never encounters it 
pristine and unfallen. As with Milton’s Eden in Paradise Lost, the precise moment of the 
fall for the Paradise of snakes is impossible to determine; at any given moment in the 
text, the fall seems always already to have occurred. 
                                                
194 See my analysis of the novel’s opening paragraph on pages 138-39 above. 
195 Thus, under my reading, the “charm of art” associated with Mrs. Gould marks a failure of sympathy 
(whereby the artist effaces the suffering of an enslaved people). In this way, I differ from critics who, like 
Edward Saïd, see Emily Gould’s fairy-like depiction as a positive testament to her capacity for sympathy: 
“Emelia’s ability to see accurately and at the same time charitably to accept people for what they are is so 
unique in the novel that every one of the men is attracted to her. Dr. Monygham sees her as a good fairy 
seated in a charmed circle.” Edward W. Saïd, Beginnings: Intention and Method (New York: Columbia 




In one of the final scenes of the novel, Basilio, head servant of the Gould 
household, appears with his small child in tow to deliver a message to Mrs. Gould, who is 
chatting in her garden with Dr. Monygham. Basilio’s “light burden”—that is, the child 
and his responsibility for raising the child, whom he carries away on his shoulders—
directly contrasts with Mrs. Gould’s burden of childlessness.196 Her burden manifests in a 
stance of “immobility” inflected by several kinds of light-ness: 
Behind him [Dr. Monygham] the immobility of Mrs. Gould added to the 
grace of her seated figure the charm of art, of an attitude caught and 
interpreted for ever. Turning abruptly, the doctor took his leave. 
 Mrs. Gould leaned back in the shade of the big trees planted in a 
circle. She leaned back with her eyes closed and her white hands lying idle 
on the arms of her seat. The half-light under the thick mass of leaves 
brought out the youthful prettiness of her face; made the clear light fabrics 
and white lace of her dress appear luminous. Small and dainty, as if 
radiating a light of her own in the deep shade of the interlaced boughs, she 
resembled a good fairy, weary with a long career of well-doing, touched 
by the withering suspicion of the uselessness of her labours, the 
powerlessness of her magic. (372) 
 
The various kinds of light-ness (none of which signify in the same way as Basilio’s “light 
burden,” that is, as the opposite of heaviness—Mrs. Gould is continually afflicted by the 
weight of the silver)197 all converge to make Mrs. Gould resemble “a good fairy.” This 
fairy-like quality, which is here identified with “the charm of art,” is the sublimated 
expression of Mrs. Gould’s unrealized desire for children. Her own “light burden,” her 
                                                
196 The word burden derives from the Old English byrðen, which means “child.”  
Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. “burden | burthen, n.,” accessed Oct 4, 2016, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/24885?isAdvanced=false&result=1&rskey=6aKWHT&. 
197 The image of silver pressing down upon Mrs. Gould appears throughout the novel. Consider this 
especially poignant image from the final chapter: “With a measured swish of her long train, flashing with 
jewels and the shimmer of silk, her delicate head bowed as if under the weight of a mass of fair hair, in 
which the silver threads were lost, the ‘first lady of Sulaco,’ as Captain Mitchell used to describe her, 
moved along the lighted corridor, wealthy beyond great dreams of wealth, considered, loved, respected, 




life’s work, manifests as “magic.” But in a phrase that evokes the clause “what work a 
man’s hand is doing” from chapter 1, along with that clause’s biblical echo, we see Mrs. 
Gould’s “white hands lying idle.” As the pun idle / idol suggests—and as I have 
previously stated—all work in Nostromo, including the work of the artist Emily Gould, 
must be conceived in terms of idolatry, “the work of men’s hands.”198 In this novel, 
idolatry, ineffectual as it ultimately is, continually results in impotence, inertia, stasis—in 
idleness. The work of Mrs. Gould’s hands has come to nothing; her “magic” is 
“powerless,” “useless” her “labours” (another pun, of course).  
If the artist Emily Gould’s objective in creating the water-colour sketch of the San 
Tomé mountain really is, as the text affirms, to preserve the memory of the gorge as it 
was when she and Charles first encountered it, then she fails in this objective. She knows 
the mine’s history of oppression and genocide, yet she substitutes for this history a 
utopian vision, on which her husband then fixates (quite literally, we see, as he stares at 
the sketch in multiple scenes while devising plans for the future of the mine) as a vision 
of lost, imaginary wholeness that he obsessively tries to restore in an attempt to avenge 
his late father. This obsession with an idealized past precludes any hope of a fulfilling 
future. In effacing the suffering of countless lives lost to the mine, Mrs. Gould’s art lacks 
sympathy, the very quality for which Mrs. Gould is revered and which, I argue, Conrad 
sees as a primary objective of art. Conradian sympathy is not synonymous with that 
Victorian buzzword philanthropy.199 It is instead a relationship between artist and audience 
                                                
198 See pages 134-35 and note 181 above. 
199 For a thorough examination of what type of sympathy is not endorsed in Conrad’s work, see Aaron Fogel, 




in which the artist crafts the artwork according to a singular vision in an attempt “to make 
you see.”200 Rather than uncovering “that glimpse of truth” it is art’s duty to reveal,201 
Mrs. Gould’s sketch of the San Tomé gorge obfuscates the truth. In the end, she proves to 
be what Conrad feared becoming: a barren artist whose labors produce only false visions, 
images of mystification rather than revelation. While writing the novel may have allowed 
Conrad to articulate this fear—which, in moderation, is a healthy one for any artist—he is 
careful not to fall into the illusion that he could or should entirely overcome it. The 
process of retroactive modification shadows the fear, not effacing it but keeping it, 
perhaps, from becoming too much to bear. 
  
                                                
200 The phrase, of course, is from the preface to The Nigger of the “Narcissus” (see note 193 above). The 
preface also affirms the supreme importance of sympathy (i.e., “the latent feeling of fellowship,” 
“invincible conviction of solidarity,” etc.) in art: “But the artist appeals to that part of our being which is 
not dependent on wisdom; to that in us which is a gift and not an acquisition—and, therefore, more 
permanently enduring. He speaks to our capacity for delight and wonder, to the sense of mystery 
surrounding our lives; to our sense of pity, and beauty, and pain; to the latent feeling of fellowship with all 
creation; and to the subtle but invincible conviction of solidarity that knits together the loneliness of 
innumerable hearts: to that solidarity in dreams, in joy, in sorrow, in aspirations, in illusions, in hope, in 
fear, which binds men to each other, which binds together all humanity—the dead to the living and the 
living to the unborn” (145-46). 




Chapter 3: Hitchcock’s Idols of Entrapment 
Here come the wolves. 
 —Saboteur, first line of dialogue, 1942 
 
Chè vuoi? 
 —Jacques Lacan, Écrits, 1966 
 
Wasn’t it Oscar Wilde who said, “You destroy the thing you love”? 
 —Alfred Hitchcock, interview with Peter Bogdanovich, 1963 
Introduction 
Across Hitchcock’s work, idols repeatedly appear as signifiers of narrative and 
cinematic tradition. This narrative and cinematic tradition is one into which Hitchcock 
enters, but also, crucially, one that he makes and, in making, confines himself.202 In part, 
then, I intend this chapter to complicate the auteurist vision of Hitchcock as absolute 
master of his own cinema, not by wresting that power away from him, per se, but by 
showing that, throughout his oeuvre, the films continually and deliberately acknowledge 
the limits of authorial power. Every assertion of authorial power is also a concession to 
its limitations.203 
The two films I analyze at length, Blackmail (1929) and Saboteur (1942), both 
include climactic sequences in which idols figure prominently. In each case, I show how 
specific cinematic techniques and motifs developed throughout the film generate an 
                                                
202 Asked whether he considered Edgar Allan Poe one of his artistic forebears, Hitchcock replied that they 
“certainly have a common point. We are both prisoners of a genre: ‘suspense.’ You know the story that one 
has recounted many, many times: if I was making ‘Cinderella,’ everyone would look for the corpse. And if 
Edgar Allan Poe had written ‘Sleeping Beauty,’ one would look for the murderer.” Alfred Hitchcock, 
“Why I am Afraid of the Dark,” trans. Claire Marrone, in Hitchcock on Hitchcock: Selected Writings and 
Interviews, ed. Sidney Gottlieb, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 171. Originally 
published in French as “Pourquoi J’ai Peur la Nuit,” Arts: Lettres, Spectacles, June 1-7, 1960. 
203 “I am a prisoner of my own success. I’m not an unwilling prisoner, but there are only certain types of 
films I can make.” Alfred Hitchcock, in a 1972 interview with CinemaTV Today, quoted in Donald Spoto, 




internal logic that purposefully culminates in the appearance of particular idols. The 
differing nature and significance of the idols in the earlier film versus the later film 
indicate key nodes in the development of Hitchcock’s art as the director transitions not 
only from a British to an American context, but also from a reckoning with the 
cumulative weight of history to the disturbing specter of its loss. In the final short section 
of this chapter, I analyze Shadow of a Doubt (1943) as a film poised on the edge of the 
world-historical shift from a modern to a post-modern global-capitalist paradigm. 
Blackmail  
The most conspicuous signifiers of cinematic tradition in Blackmail are two in 
number, the first visual, the second aural. First, the opening image of the film: a rotating 
wheel. Though there are other meta-cinematic images in Blackmail, this one claims 
preeminent status since it initially appears in close-up and without any context aside from 
the cinema itself. Perhaps for this reason, I cannot help seeing it as the image of a fast-
moving film reel. Even a viewer indisposed to admit this analogy, however, must admit 
that the rotating wheel, which is soon revealed to be the wheel of a police car in hot 
pursuit, recalls the origins of film in chase sequences, thus marking the film in its first 
image and first sequence as self-consciously meta-cinematic.  
 After this introductory sequence, in which a nameless criminal is pursued, 
captured, and booked at the precinct, the film transitions into a love story between Frank, 
a Scotland Yard police detective, and Alice White, the coquettish daughter of a London 
tobacconist. As the two sit down to dinner, Alice continues to chide Frank for being late, 




“going to the pictures.” When Alice objects that she doesn’t want to go, Frank remarks 
that the film, which is “about Scotland Yard […] might be amusing” since “they’re 
bound to get all the details wrong.” “I don’t see why,” says Alice. “I hear they’ve got a 
real criminal to direct it, just to be on the safe side.” These self-reflexive comments, 
which link the now clearly fictional narrative of Blackmail to its quasi-documentary-style 
introduction, could be seen merely as light humor from Hitchcock, who’s taking a jab 
both at motion pictures in general and at himself as “criminal” director, were it not for the 
title of the film Frank has suggested. When Alice complains she has “seen everything 
worth seeing,” Frank retorts, “You haven’t seen Fingerprints. I’d like you to see that.” 
Fingerprints, the title of the film within the film, cues the audience that Blackmail, the 
film now in progress, is to be viewed as self-consciously bearing the fingerprints of its 
criminal maker. In other words, Hitchcock is encouraging us to read his cinematic 
choices as ones that, to the discerning eye, will leave indelible marks on the cinematic 
tradition itself. Blackmail is a movie made by a man who knows he is making film 
history. 
The Cut 
 If in no other way, Hitchcock knew Blackmail would leave its mark on film 
history as the first feature-length British talkie. Ever the trickster, Hitchcock had fun with 
the new auditory tools he was given, particularly in what I have previously hinted at as 
the second of the film’s two most conspicuous signifiers of cinematic tradition: the 
repeated word knife in the famous breakfast sequence in the Whites’ parlor. The morning 




her mother and father as a neighbor stands by, prattling on about the details of the 
previous night’s murder. The camera is fixed on Alice, whose blank stare evinces 
lingering shock and mortification. Gradually, the sound of the neighbor’s voice becomes 
muffled, as though we, in sympathy with Alice, are too stunned to discern what is being 
said. The only word that continues to penetrate clearly is the repeated word knife. When 
Alice’s father asks her to cut the bread, she attempts, in her dazed state, to do so, only to 
be startled back to full consciousness by the neighbor, who seems to shout the word 
knife. Alice tosses the knife in the air, much to audience’s amusement and her father’s 
bemusement.  
 This breakfast scene, with its aural play on knife, receives some attention in 
virtually every critical account of Blackmail. What has not been noticed, however, is that 
the knife here belongs not only to the sound editor, but to the film editor as well. To 
illustrate exactly what I mean, I must first layout the correspondence between this knife 
scene and the earlier knife scene at the Artist’s studio. In the breakfast table scene, the 
camera initially rests on the neighbor. As she babbles about the un-Britishness of using a 
knife as a murder weapon, the camera pans to a medium shot of Alice seated at the table. 
On the word mind, there is a cut in which the camera jumps toward Alice to capture her 
face in close-up.204 We are now in Alice’s mind, which is why all sound aside from the 
piercing word knife fades to an unintelligible murmur. When Alice’s father momentarily 
                                                
204 The cut in question is not a “jump cut” in the technical sense, which would refer to a cut in which the 
camera moves only slightly, less than thirty degrees, to create an illusion of time passing. Instead, when I 
say that the camera jumps, I mean that, in the instant of the cut, the camera moves significantly toward or 
away from the object of its gaze, without necessarily shifting its angle. I will refer to several such jumps in 




manages to cut into Alice’s thoughts by asking her to “cut us a bit of bread,” the camera 
pans down to the table as Alice reaches for the knife, which gleams in the light as it turns 
in her hand. When the word knife jumps out at a near scream, the camera also jumps 
back, via a cut, to a long-shot from a peripheral, rather than frontal, view of the table. 
Thus, though the neighbor’s voice provides an undercurrent of continuity across the 
various camera movements, her voice also accentuates, in the words mind and knife, the 
jarring discontinuity of the image as we are first thrust into, then abruptly torn away 
from, Alice’s consciousness. 
 The knife scene at the Artist’s studio reverses the “jump” cuts described above. 
Whereas the breakfast table sequence begins with a shot of the neighbor talking, then 
pans right to fix on Alice, the murder at the Artist’s studio begins with a shot of two 
shadows, Alice’s and the Artist’s, struggling on the wall as Alice pleas, “Let me go!” 
from off-screen. The camera then pans right to center not on Alice, who along with the 
Artist has disappeared behind the bed curtain, but on Alice’s hand, which intermittently 
darts out from behind the curtain to clutch the wall. The camera then tracks-in on Alice’s 
hand, but at the last moment drops down to the knife on the night table. The knife clatters 
violently against the plate as Alice grasps at the handle, till suddenly she has a hold of it 
and the camera jumps back, via a very jarring cut, to a medium-long shot of the curtained 
bed and night table. The sound of Alice’s voice and the motion of the curtain gradually 
diminish to stillness, and the Artist’s hand falls limp outside the curtain. Alice slowly 
emerges holding the knife, which gleams in the light, her blank expression and rigid form 




returned to her face only when the camera jumps, via a second cut, to a much closer 
medium shot that frames her from the waist up (the cut also marks a return of background 
music).  
 With the doubling and reversal of each knife scene’s paired “jump” cuts, 
Hitchcock experiments with the proxemics of guilt. In the later breakfast table scene, the 
coupled cut toward / cut back delimits a span in which the viewer, drawn in too close, 
shares in the guilt known only to its bearer. In the earlier murder scene, the coupled cut 
back / cut toward marks a span in which the viewer is held deliberately at a distance. 
Since the jarring cut back is preceded directly by an extended tracking-in on the knife, the 
cut appears to be precipitated precisely by the viewer’s voyeuristic fascination with the 
murder weapon, which is also the weapon of the film editor. The knife, in this 
quintessentially Hitchcockian tracking shot, becomes the Hitchcockian stain.205 Having 
                                                
205 Slavoj Žižek elucidates the relations among the stain (which he also calls “the blot”), the gaze, and the 
tracking shot in “The Hitchcockian Blot,” in Alfred Hitchcock: Centenary Essays, ed. Richard Allen and S. 
Ishii-Gonzalès (London: BFI, 1999), 123-39. “The ‘phallic’ element of a picture is a meaningless stain that 
‘denatures’ it, rendering all its constituents ‘suspicious’, and thus opens up the abyss of the search for a 
meaning—nothing is what it seems to be, everything is to be interpreted, everything is supposed to possess 
some supplementary meaning. The ground of the established, familiar signification opens up; we find 
ourselves in a realm of total ambiguity but this very lack propels us to produce ever new ‘hidden 
meanings’: it is a driving force of endless compulsion. The oscillation between lack and surplus meaning 
constitutes the proper dimension of subjectivity. In other words, it is by means of the ‘phallic’ spot that the 
observed picture is subjectivised: this paradoxical point undermines our position as ‘neutral’, objective 
observer, pinning us to the observed object itself. This is the point at which the observer is already 
included, inscribed in the observed scene—in a way, it is the point from which the picture itself look back 
at us” (125). “The standard Hitchcockian formal procedure for isolating the stain, this remainder of the real 
that ‘sticks out’, is, of course, his famous tracking shot. Its logic can be grasped only if we take into 
account the whole range of variations to which this procedure is submitted. Let us begin with a scene from 
The Birds in which the hero’s mother, peering into a room that has been ravaged by the birds, sees a 
pajama-clad body with its eyes torn out. The camera first shows us the entire body; we then expect it to 
track forward slowly into the fascinating detail, the bloody sockets of the missing eyes. But Hitchcock 
instead gives us an inversion of the process we expect: instead of slowing down, he drastically speeds up; 
with two abrupt cuts, each bringing us closer to the subject, he quickly shows us the corpse’s head. The 
subversive effect of these quickly advancing shots is created by the way in which they frustrate us even as 




come too close, the viewer is suddenly, shockingly rent back and made aware of the 
depravity of his or her voyeuristic fascination. Through the cut, the gaze has been 
objectified. The knife in the murder scene, then, is unquestionably a tool of the film 
editor, and in the later breakfast table scene, it is a tool of both film editor and sound 
editor, as the sound of the neighbor’s voice, droning on about knives, works alternately to 
elide and emphasize the cutting of the image. 
The neighbor’s offhand remark on the un-Britishness of the knife takes on 
additional meaning in light of the many foreign influences apparent in Hitchcock’s use of 
the (film and sound) editor’s knife. Between the murder scene and the scene at the 
breakfast table, for instance, as Alice wanders the streets of London, she hallucinates in 
the bright, flashing lights of the city a change in a moving-picture sign: above the words 
“good cocktail,” the image of a jumping martini shaker (the jumping effect is created by 
two sets of lights that flash on and off alternately) suddenly transforms (i.e., dissolves) 
into a jumping (or, stabbing) knife. This hallucinated jumping knife, made possible by the 
magic of cinema, repeatedly cuts across the screen as it literalizes the “jump” cuts of the 
previous murder scene and the subsequent breakfast table scene. Effected entirely 
through the manipulation of light, the jumping knife hallucination evokes the German 
                                                                                                                                            
the ‘time for understanding’, the pause needed to ‘digest’, to integrate the brute perception of the object” 
(127). In his taxonomy of Hitchcockian tracking-shots, Žižek classifies the one just described as “[t]he 
precipitous, ‘hystericised’ tracking shot” (129). Žižek’s focus on The Birds (1963) suggests that this 
hystericized tracking-shot, “in which the camera draws into the blot too quickly, through jump-cuts” (129), 
was a late addition to Hitchcock’s arsenal. As my analysis of Blackmail and its proxemics of guilt shows, 





expressionist emphasis on bizarre and unsettling lighting effects.206 Moreover, the obvious 
discontinuity between the two positions of the hallucinated knife recalls not only the 
jarring break of Blackmail’s own “jump” cuts, but also the imperative to emphasize the 
break between shots, via editing, advocated by the great Soviet filmmakers. 
This emphasis on break or discontinuity recurs in scenes that play the visual and 
the aural against each other. When the Artist’s landlady telephones the police about the 
murder, the humor of the scene issues from the fact that neither the landlady nor the 
officer can understand what the other is saying, even though, in the actual on-screen 
image, the landlady is clearly speaking directly into the back of the officer’s head. The 
image is continuous, and the sound is clear, but somehow the path of communication is 
broken. The converse occurs in the famous sequence wherein the murdered Artist’s 
corpse is discovered. Having hallucinated the luminous jumping knife, Alice continues to 
walk the streets for hours. Just after dawn, she encounters a vagrant (perhaps drunk, but 
presumably alive) slumped against the side of a building. A cut to close-up on his 
outstretched right arm evokes the earlier image of the dead Artist’s arm. When the 
camera cuts back to the original medium-long shot, Alice, almost certainly flashing back 
to the rape and murder in the Artist’s studio, opens her mouth to scream, and as she is 
                                                
206 One might think, for instance, of the gleaming knife, which doubles as the film editor’s knife, in the Jack-
the-Ripper scene at the end of G.W. Pabst’s Pandora’s Box (1929) or of Pabst’s earlier Secrets of a Soul 
(1926), in which shiny, sharp blades continually occupy, transfix, or terrorize the protagonist, starting with 
the straight razor in the film’s opening image. In Hitchcock’s Blackmail, the hallucinated jumping knife is 
not simply an isolated trace of the German expressionist tradition. Rather, as a visual pun on the act of 
cutting the image in unexpected, expressive ways with light and shadow, the vision of the jumping knife 
points to the many other distinctly expressionist moments in the film, for example, in the Artist’s studio just 
prior to the rape and murder when a strange, spiraling shadow cuts across the Artist’s face, or much later 
when Alice, determined to turn herself in, stands up and the combination of light and shadow cuts 




screaming, the entire scene is instantaneously replaced by a shot of the Artist’s landlady 
standing over his dead body. The scream, as it turns out, is actually (or also?) the 
landlady’s. Though the two scenes match visually—in terms of camera placement and the 
relative positions of bodies both within and between the scenes—the match is not perfect, 
and the cut shocks in its abruptness. Here, then, the image is discontinuous, and the 
sound, though clear and clearly a continuous sound that bridges the cut, does not belong 
clearly either to Alice or to the landlady.207 Just so, throughout the film, sound and image 
are sometimes synchronous or otherwise complementary (in the by then prevailing mode 
of Hollywood), sometimes non-synchronous or otherwise contradictory (in the mode 
championed by Eisenstein and his Soviet colleagues). Hitchcock’s knife is, as the Whites’ 
neighbor suggests, distinctly un-British in many of its cuts.  
The Face 
 One of the traditions closely associated with Hitchcock is the cameo. By the time 
he started work on Blackmail, the director had already appeared in two of his own films, 
The Lodger (1927, as a newspaper editor at his desk) and Easy Virtue (1928, as a 
gentleman passing through a gate). His third appearance, however, would take the 
Hitchcock cameo tradition in a new direction since Blackmail’s cameo is the first in 
                                                
207 This cut from Alice to landlady in Blackmail anticipates the famous sequence in The 39 Steps (1935) in 
which the image of the silently screaming landlady, who has just discovered the corpse of the murdered spy 
in Hannay’s flat, cuts to an image of a train emerging from a tunnel. The cut is elided by the sound of the 
train’s whistle, which stands-in for the landlady’s scream. Thomas Elsaesser identifies this famous cut-on-
scream from The 39 Steps as “[o]ne of the ‘gimmicks’ that Hitchcock’s realist critics objected to” and notes 
that “Hitchcock’s imagination seizes on occasions, emotions, at the point where within the human element 
the mechanical becomes visible, undoing thereby the anthropomorphism that the cinema so deceptively 
simulates.” “The principle at work here,” Elsaesser states, “is that of negativity, where the human is 
bounded everywhere and contained by the mechanical, by death and by absence: all metaphors of the 
cinema at work in defying nature.” Thomas Elsaesser, “The Dandy in Hitchcock,” in Alfred Hitchcock: 




which the filmmaker’s face is visible to the audience.208 Seated behind Frank on a London 
Underground car, Hitchcock faces the camera directly as his attempts to read are thwarted 
by a young boy tugging sharply first on Hitchcock’s hat, then Frank’s. We cannot hear 
what Hitchcock says to the boy’s mother, but he is obviously admonishing her to control 
her son. Indignant, she says nothing to the boy, who returns to bully his chubby victim. 
Perched on his seat, the little boy towers over the portly director, who slowly shrinks 
back beneath the child’s unsettling gaze. 
 Surprisingly, many critics manage to read elements of directorial control or 
authority into this cameo. One recent account by David Pike, for example, says,  
The thwarted reader [Hitchcock] is the only passenger facing us directly, 
aligned with the side of the carriage and looking across it toward the 
camera set up as if from the point of view of the passengers on the other 
side, offscreen. Having received a wallop from this irritated passenger, the 
boy, who gets an earful from the mother in return, will next turn to the 
man we know to be the police detective and pull his hat down over his 
eyes, too. He then turns back to the first passenger, who fends him off 
with a dirty look, as the shot concludes with a dissolve back into the 
nighttime exterior of street traffic that had introduced it.209 
 
Error and infelicity abound here. Hitchcock does not “wallop” the boy. He jabs the 
mother once on the shoulder with his hand to get her attention, but the actual assailant 
remains untouched. And the boy does not “get an earful” from anyone, least of all the 
mother, who ignores her son and chastises Hitchcock instead. Last, to say Hitchcock 
“fends [the boy] off with a dirty look” is misleading, since it implies the boy backs down. 
                                                
208 Some critics have claimed that Hitchcock makes a second cameo appearance in The Lodger, where he 
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He does not. Instead, as I mention above, it is Hitchcock who backs away as the boy 
continues to loom above him, like a bird preparing to strike. Pike concludes his 
description of the cameo by remarking that “it is simultaneously existence as such, a brief 
moment of everyday life before we plunge into the suspenseful plot […], and also a 
quintessentially metacinematic moment, the director orchestrating on-screen the everyday 
life from which the couple are about to be evicted but which he and his audience continue 
to inhabit.”210 
One of the main arguments of Pike’s essay is that, in Hitchcock’s oeuvre, the 
London Underground signifies cinematic space as such; thus, the cameo in Blackmail is 
“quintessentially metacinematic.” On this point, I would agree, and I agree also that the 
audience probably does identify with the fat man on the train trying in vain to read his 
book. But if Hitchcock here embodies “the director orchestrating … everyday life,” then 
the director has purposely depicted himself less as maestro d’orchestra and more as the 
timpanist who slipped on a banana peel and plunged headfirst into his own drum (while 
the boy in the balcony gleefully munches a banana). Pike’s (mis)reading of the scene 
seems determined to preserve Hitchcock’s image as master filmmaker wielding absolute 
control, despite all evidence to the contrary in the scene itself.211 Such is the power of the 
auteurist myth, which Hitchcock himself consciously and meticulously cultivated 
throughout his career. The question arises, then: Why would Hitchcock choose this 
cameo, wherein he appears so helpless and humiliated, to make his face clearly visible to 
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the audience for the first time? And why let the humiliation stretch on for so long, the 
longest, at nearly twenty seconds, of any cameo in his fifty-five feature-length films? 
 To answer these questions, I return to another curious face, from a scene 
mentioned briefly above. Before the rape, murder, and blackmail, when the film still 
seems innocent enough and Frank is trying to cajole his capricious girlfriend into “going 
to the pictures,” he insists that he would very much like her to see Fingerprints. This title, 
I have argued, indicates that Blackmail itself should be read as bearer of its miscreant 
maker’s fingerprints, which, going forward, will forever mark cinematic tradition. When 
Frank says, “You haven’t seen Fingerprints. I’d like you to see that,” the camera 
immediately cuts to a seemingly unmotivated close-up on Alice’s face. In this close-up, 
Alice gazes slightly to the right, pursing her lips and arching her eyebrows. Her eyes dart 
down, then back up again. It’s unclear whether she’s looking at Frank or at something 
behind and to the side of him. Her flirtatious, bashful affectation does not make much 
sense if she is only looking at Frank, and she cannot be looking at her secret paramour, 
the Artist, since he has yet to arrive. One could argue that the close-up on Alice’s 
ambiguously coy expression is meant simply to suggest her duplicity, to foreshadow her 
immanent liaison with another man. I argue, however, that something more significant 
occurs. 
 When Frank says he wants Alice to see Fingerprints, the camera suddenly cuts to 
close-up on her face in order to signify that Hitchcock’s own fingerprints—the ones with 
which he will permanently mark cinema tradition—have largely to do with the form and 




connection to the rest of the film, Hitchcock emphasizes the theatricality of the criminal 
identification parade, as a young woman walks down the line, carefully scrutinizing each 
man’s face. The man she chooses is then taken away to be formally charged. A close-up 
on the charge sheet, whereon the sergeant records the list of crimes, dissolves to a close-
up on the criminal’s face, which then dissolves to a close-up on his official black-ink-on-
white-paper fingerprint. Like the criminal face that dissolves to criminal fingerprint, 
Hitchcock’s face, as the face of the new forward-facing cameo, becomes the criminal 
director’s fingerprint on cinematic tradition. Furthermore, in Blackmail Hitchcock’s face 
is a face of victimization, allied at various moments throughout the film with the face of 
Alice White. As David Sterritt notes, for example, when Alice and the Artist enter the 
latter’s studio, the “ominous-looking mask that hangs next to the door … suggests the 
particularly keen interest of Hitchcock (whose face and gaze we must be reminded of) in 
the events to come.”212 I argue that Sterritt is right to read the mask, which would 
otherwise appear unmotivated, as a stand-in for the gaze of the director. What Sterritt 
neglects to note, however, is that the mask, with its fitted hat, curls, and delicate feminine 
features, closely resembles Alice. Thus, even as the mask suggests “Hitchcock’s own 
presence as presiding influence over the narrative,”213 it also suggests the identity of 
Alice’s face and the face of Hitchcock, which, as the cameo has already demonstrated, 
signifies victimization at least as much as mastery. 
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At the same time, unlike either the criminal face, which dissolves to fingerprint, in 
the quasi-documentary-style opening sequence or Alice’s face, which is called forth by 
the word fingerprints, in the restaurant scene, Hitchcock’s face (both in the cameo and in 
the guise of the mask on the Artist’s wall) appears not in close-up, but at the considerable 
distance of a long-shot. If the two faces, of Hitchcock and of Alice, really are to be 
identified with each other, why should the camera draw so close to one, yet stay so far 
away from the other? To answer this question and to appreciate fully the connection 
between the two faces, one must consider Hitchcock’s framing of the face in conjunction 
with another key structural feature of Blackmail: the chase. 
The Chase 
 In the now classic 1980 essay “Hitchcockian Suspense,” Pascal Bonitzer argues 
that the first two decades of projected motion pictures constituted “a cinematographic 
Eden, in which anxiety, and the editing of the gaze, were as yet unknown. […]. One 
simply put the camera on its tripod, in front of whatever was to be filmed, and on one 
went with the comic turns and the wild gesticulations,” or, in the case of the Lumière 
Brothers, “the animated spectacle of the [everyday] world.”214 This “cinema based upon an 
uninterrupted flow of gestures,” which took innocent pleasure in the act of seeing, says 
Bonitzer, came to an end with D.W. Griffith, “whose films ushered in the age of close-
ups and editing.”215 By instituting the technique of “parallel editing, in which the images 
of pursuer and pursued alternate,” as the defining feature of the chase sequence, “Griffith 
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thus dismantled the primitive races and chases of the early Mack Sennett shorts, and 
replaced a merely mechanical diet of gags with an emotional register, built up through the 
interplay of close-up shots of the protagonists’ faces.”216 The key elements in Griffith’s 
invention of suspense are, therefore, parallel editing (or, cross-cutting) and the use of 
close-ups, particularly of the face, to stir emotion in the viewer. The “object” that 
Griffith’s invention of “anxiety or suspense releases, revises and sets going” is “the 
gaze.”217 
 Bonitzer goes on to say that Hitchcock builds on Griffith’s achievement in order 
to generate suspense through editing, “but Hitchcock, in contrast to the Griffithian 
acceleration of parallel actions, employs an editing of convergent actions in a 
homogeneous space, which presupposes slow motion and is sustained by the gaze, itself 
evoked by a third element, a perverse object or a stain.”218 As an example, Bonitzer cites 
the cigar scene from Blackmail, in which Tracy, the would-be blackmailer, purchases a 
cigar from Alice’s father, having just implied to Frank and Alice that he knows Alice 
murdered the Artist: “We have here a perfect diagram of the Hitchcockian system, 
featuring the function of the natural, of the crime and of the perverse object. What could 
be more natural […] than to buy a cigar at a tobacconist’s? Now, the suspense derives 
here from the fact that the man […] is going to take his time paying for his cigar.”219 
Transfixed by this site, Frank and Alice “are glued to each other as if they wished to be 
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melted into a single block.”220 When “the smoker realizes that he has no money on him,” 
he “cheerily asks for a note from the young policeman […]. So the blackmailing begins, 
and the fiction with it. The whole scene is thus polarized around the cigar, which 
becomes an object of terror, a perverse, almost obscene object.”221 The inherent sensuality 
and eroticism of the gaze for the parties involved—Tracy, Frank, Alice, and the 
audience—is particularly evident in this scene. 
 Though I do not endorse the rigidly binary pre- vs. postlapsarian model of 
cinema, wherein the fall is precipitated by the introduction of the gaze via Griffithian 
chase sequences, I do think Bonitzer is right to conceive Hitchcockian suspense, 
exemplified in Blackmail’s cigar scene, as an extension and adaptation of Griffithian 
cross-cutting, epitomized in the American director’s many iconic chase scenes. 
Curiously, Bonitzer’s explanation of parallel editing, as a technique whereby “the images 
of pursuer and pursued alternate,” does not fully capture the brilliance of Griffith’s 
innovation, which often entails not just two, but three, alternating lines of action. For 
example, the dastardly villain ties the helpless maiden to the railroad tracks (one), while 
the valiant hero and his trusty steed gallop toward her (two) in an attempt to rescue her 
before she is struck by the oncoming train (three). In a Griffith film, the camera would 
cut from one line of action, to the other, to yet another with ever greater speed, until, at 
the last moment, the hero would snatch the fair lady away from the dread engine of death, 
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thus ensuring their romantic union.222 In Hitchcock’s cigar scene, there are also more than 
two lines of action—Alice’s father fetching the cigar from an upper shelf and bringing it 
down to the counter, Tracy approaching the counter from the opposite side to take the 
cigar in hand and savor it in various ways, Frank and Alice pressing ever closer into each 
other as their anxiety rises, Frank approaching the counter to pay at Tracy’s prompting—
among which Hitchcock’s camera alternates, incorporating several close-ups on faces, to 
build tension up to the moment we see that, yes, in fact, this is the scene of blackmail 
foretold by the film’s title. 
 That suspense here is sustained via multiple lines of action is important insofar as 
this multiplicity anticipates the multiplicity of the final chase sequence (also omitted from 
Bonitzer’s essay) through the streets of London and the British Museum. I argue further 
that the cigar scene not only anticipates the final chase sequence, but also, in doing so, 
provides a crucial link between the film’s initial chase and its final one. Attentive 
observers will realize that several shots from the chase sequence that opens the film are 
repeated almost identically in the chase sequence that (almost) concludes the film.223 
Hitchcock had originally intended to extend this repetition of introduction in conclusion 
by repeating not only the chase, but also some of the introductory booking sequence, with 
one key difference: Alice would be the subject of arrest, rather than a nameless criminal. 
Thus, viewers’ initial experience of detachment in observing the operations of the 
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impersonal machine of a foundational London institution (i.e., Scotland Yard) would, at 
the conclusion of the film, be fundamentally transformed by their personal investment in 
the alleged criminal—no longer an anonymous ne’er-do-well but instead the sympathetic 
heroine—now caught up in the machinery. Though Hitchcock ultimately abandoned this 
ending (at the behest, he claimed, of studio executives),224 he nevertheless preserves the 
transition from the impersonal to the personal: in the opening chase sequence, the 
audience feels no personal connection to any of the characters; by the closing chase 
sequence, however, the audience has developed a strong personal stake in the fate of 
Alice and, albeit to a presumably lesser degree, Tracy. This transition from the 
emotionally distant to the emotionally enrapt is effected not only by the intervening 
narrative, but also by the editing of the chase sequences themselves. Whereas the first 
chase sequence shows one line of action edited for spatial and temporal continuity, the 
second chase sequence, as I have indicated, alternates among multiple parallel actions in 
an elaborate cross-cutting sequence to build tension. In this way, the shift from the 
opening to the closing chase sequence enacts the type of fall Bonitzer theorizes in his 
essay, that is, from the distant and impersonal to the up-close and personal. The crucial 
difference, in terms of cinematic technique, is the heightened manipulation of the gaze 
effected by parallel editing and close-ups.225  
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Close-Up and Faraway 
 Whether or not Hitchcock intended Blackmail, the first feature-length British 
talkie, to function in part as an allegory for the fall of film from “cinematographic Eden” 
to an anxiogenic and guilt-ridden realm menaced by the gaze, the myth of cinema as a 
somehow fallen medium, usually hinging on the transition from silent to sound film, was 
already circulating as early as 1929.226 And in any case, as I have already demonstrated, in 
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in five acres of coppice near Guildford,” Hitchcock announces that they must go to London, where they can 
finally “have peace” (219). Soon, they are in the heart of the city: 
Here was I, perched on the roof of London in my fourth-floor flat, a helpful gramophone 
waiting to subdue the noisy war of hooters versus klaxons waging battle in the outside regions. 
District underground trains went clattering by one hundred feet below but in full view, at the back. 
Coming from the far distance was that conglomeration of indistinguishable sounds which go to 
make up town life. 
 “Peace! Full-throated glorious peace! And now to The Skin Game,” thought I. (219-20) 
His proclamation is, of course, ironic: the cacophonous city is anything but peaceful. When a visitor 
suggests Hitchcock write an essay about Murder!, he turns to this fresh distraction. In composing the 
scenario, he says, he was unsure how to “emphasize the pressure to bear upon Sir John to make him agree 
with the rest of the jury” (223): 
I toyed with the gramophone, which, like my thinking apparatus at that moment, wouldn’t go. 
Suddenly the “juice” arrived and the gramophone burst into song. Almost simultaneously my 
thinking apparatus started into life. 
 “Got it,” I exclaimed. “We’ll have all the jury repeating single phrases. We’ll make ‘em 
ding dong, ding dong, ding dong into Sir John’s ears till he’s bewildered. We’ll numb him with 
monotony and stun him with crescendo. That’ll make him give in and everybody can see him 
crumbling.” (223) 
Sound, then, is the disorienting adversary of justice in Murder!, even as it is, in the era of talkies, an 
inextricable component of cinema and the cinéaste’s “thinking apparatus.” “What I wanted,” the director 
writes early in the essay, “was an adaptation which moved forward with increasing tempo yet never losing 
the rhythm” (222). Once he contrives the jury scene and arranges an impromptu rehearsal with his wife, 
maid, and secretary, everything falls into place: “Over and over again we repeated each our own line, 




making Blackmail, Hitchcock does seem to have been aware of his revolutionary role in 
shaping cinema tradition. This awareness is indicated not only by the progression in 
cinematic technique between the two chase sequences, but also in the content of second 
sequence, whose unexpected detour into the British Museum has no precedent in the 
Charles Bennett play from which the film was adapted. 
When Tracy first walks into the museum, statuary and guards inhabit the scene, 
but they do not appear deliberately arranged. This lack of apparent compositional design 
makes the next shot all the more striking, as Tracy enters a room in which floor-to-ceiling 
columns and massive busts of Egyptian pharaohs are framed by the camera to emphasize 
depth of field: the geometry of the space recedes toward a single vanishing point deep in 
the museum’s core. Directly in front of that vanishing point, far back in the room, stands 
a guard, erect as the columns and facing the same direction as the pharaohs (fig. 1). Like 
the pillaged contents of the museum, the statuesque guard is also an artifact of British 
imperial culture, as are the police who pursue Tracy.227 The sequence culminates with 
Tracy “on the roof of this bastion of imperialist culture, scaling its dome until he reaches 
the apex, at which point a pane of glass collapses from under him and he plummets to his 
own ruin.”228  
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That the climax of the film should take place on the roof of the British Museum is 
appropriate for many reasons. As Abramson, quoted immediately above, implies, the 
literal summit of the British Museum provides a fitting symbol for the figurative summit 
of “imperialist culture.” I would add that, by staging this scene at this lofty locale, 
Hitchcock implicitly allies British imperialist tradition with cinematic tradition. Just as 
the British Empire has collected artifacts from other cultures across the world and 
centuries, so Hitchcock has collected cinematic strategies from other national traditions 
(e.g., German expressionist lighting and camera movement, Soviet/Eisensteinian 
emphasis on rupture and non-synchronicity of sound and image, Hollywood/Griffithian 
chase sequences structured through parallel editing and close-ups, etc.) and made them a 
part of his own nascent, but already recognizable, signature style. Even within the final 
chase sequence itself, Hitchcock’s striving toward comprehensiveness is evident as he 
covers all relevant spatial axes in the vectors of the chase: width (left to right and right to 
left), depth (shallow to deep and deep to shallow), and height (high to low, as Tracy 
slides down a chain, and low to high, as all ascend a ladder to the roof). It makes sense, 
then, that the final confrontation of pursuer and pursued would coalesce in the extreme 
long shot of the museum’s roof. One of the most shocking shots in the film, it is difficult 
at first for the viewer to discern what exactly he or she is looking at: the composition of 
the scene has been reduced (or perhaps sublimated?) to pure geometry, that is, the “pure 
cinema” of which Hitchcock was so fond (fig. 2). In this sublime epiphany of the extreme 
long shot, the Hitchcockian stain takes the form of the ant-like creatures—Tracy and the 















When Tracy finally does plunge to his death, perhaps there is an implied pun on 
the fall of cinema. More important than the fall itself, though, is the sequence of shots 
directly before and after his fall: the extreme long shot of Tracy and the police scaling the 
dome cuts to a low-angle medium shot of Tracy’s dark silhouette against the bright sky. 
As Tracy attempts to explain to the gathered officers that Frank is, in fact, trying to pin 
the blame on him for a crime he did not commit—“I say, it’s not me you want. It’s him. 
Ask him why his own—” the glass beneath him breaks, and he falls through. The viewer, 
however, perceives the fall chiefly via sound, not sight. The cut from extreme long shot 
to medium shot as Tracy begins his entreaty to the police is matched at the moment the 
glass breaks by a cut back to an extreme long shot. Though Tracy’s tiny figure does 
visibly drop through the roof in the instant immediately after the cut, the viewer’s 
primary visual experience in the moment of the fall is not the movement of any object on-
screen, but rather the discontinuity (that is, the break) of the cut itself. In addition, the 
break of the cut is overlaid with the sound of breaking glass. This aural signal, which 
slightly precedes and significantly overwhelms the visual image of Tracy falling, is the 
chief means by which the audience recognizes Tracy has plunged through the roof. As in 
the two knife scenes, described in detail above, in this final confrontation, sound and 
image—aided by jarring cuts from faraway to up-close and vice-versa—play against each 
other to emphasize literal and figurative breaks. If there is an implied pun in Blackmail 
on the traumatic break between silent and sound film—which fundamentally diverts the 
narrative, both in cinema broadly speaking and in this particular scene in this particular 




film—in which questions of innocence and guilt have become so hopelessly vexed—
Hitchcock revisits the proxemics of guilt explored in the earlier knife scenes, and the 
jarring discontinuity of the too-faraway and the too-close-up is actualized in one last, 
literal break that forecloses immanent (and imminent) narrative possibility. Tracy’s 
accidental breaking of glass also bookends neatly his purposeful breaking of glass earlier 
in the film when he launched himself through the window of the White family’s parlor in 
order to evade police, thus setting the entire chase sequence in motion. 
The final confrontation on the dome of the British Museum is not, however, the 
only moment in the second chase sequence that affords some kind of symbolic resolution 
to the long-running dialectic of close-up and long-shot. I have already argued for a 
general analogy in the film between face and fingerprint, via the dissolve from one to the 
other in the booking of the nameless criminal; a specific analogy between Alice’s face 
and Hitchcock’s cinematic fingerprint, via the restaurant scene in which Frank insists that 
Alice see the movie Fingerprints; and an analogy between the faces of Alice and 
Hitchcock, via the scene in the Artist’s studio. At the same time, I questioned why, in all 
its guises—whether as a mask on the wall or as the helpless and intimidated visage of an 
accosted commuter—Hitchcock’s face would be kept at the considerable distance of a 
long-shot. If, as Alice has said, the director is “a real criminal,” why is his face never 
presented in close-up, as is the face of the nameless criminal before it dissolves to 
fingerprint, as is the face of Alice White when it appears in response to the word 
fingerprints? If the proxemics of guilt, as established by Blackmail, consist in abrupt 




of the criminal director’s face to complement the long-shots? These questions, I argue, 
are answered in the final chase sequence in the image of an idol.  
Before scaling the museum’s roof, Tracy penetrates deep into its interior through 
a series of shots in which he runs into the mise-en-abîme of various doorways. Reaching 
what one infers is the museum’s innermost sanctum, there appears the second most 
shocking shot (second only to the extreme long-shot of the domed roof) in the film: 
framed by what looks like a proscenium arch, a massive stone-faced idol, slightly right-
of-center, returns the camera’s gaze with its own neutral expression (fig. 4). I agree with 
critics who read this god’s face as a stand-in for that of the director, “impassively 
observing” the operations of fate in the universe he has devised and set in motion.229 
Unlike the director’s previous appearances in the film, however, whether in his own 
person during the Underground cameo scene or in the form of the peculiar mask on the 
Artist’s wall, this time, the face is no tiny detail; it is a hulking mass of stone that 
confronts the viewer directly. As though to accentuate the unexpected scale of the face, 
Tracy descends, slightly left-of-center, on a chain that extends the full height of the 
screen (fig. 5).  
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And yet, that (entirely accurate) description belies the strangeness of the 
museum’s Godhead. As with the cut to extreme long-shot on the museum’s roof, the cut 
to the face of the idol is shocking in large part because viewers cannot immediately 
discern what they are looking at. Is this uncanny, disembodied, mask-like face a life-size 
face shot in close-up, or is it a giant face shot from a distance? The question could also be 
posed in terms of competing cinematic traditions: in his 1944 essay “Dickens, Griffith, 
and the Film Today,” Sergei Eisenstein explains the crucial difference between the Soviet 
conception of the close-up and the Hollywood (that is, the Griffithian) conception of the 
close-up. “This distinction,” he says, 
in principle begins with an essence that exists in the term itself. 
 We [the Soviets] say: an object or face is photographed in “large 
scale,” i.e., large. 
 The American says: near, or “close-up.” 
We are speaking of the qualitative side of the phenomenon, linked 
with its meaning (just as we speak of a large talent, that is, of one which 
stands out, by its significance, from the general line, or of large print 
[bold-face]230 to emphasize that which is particularly essential or 
significant). 
Among Americans the term is attached to viewpoint. 
Among us—to the value of what is seen.231 
 
So, to return to Hitchcock’s film, should the viewer perceive this Godhead as a regular 
head close-up (a Hollywood way of seeing) or as a faraway “BIG HEAD” (a Soviet way 
of seeing)?232 At first, it would appear the former is the case, but then Tracy slithers down 
the chain, and the latter seems true instead.  
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In fact, both are true, not only in the way one seems to supplant the other in the 
viewer’s experience of the image, but also in the method Hitchcock used to produce the 
image. In order to shoot the museum chase sequence, including the shot of the Egyptian 
idol head, Hitchcock used the Schüfftan process, popularized two years earlier by UFA 
cinematographer Eugen Schüfftan’s work on Metropolis (1927). For this process, a small 
portion of a mirror’s reflective surface is scraped away. The mirror is then placed at a 
forty-five degree angle between the camera and the live actors, who are filmed through 
the altered (and therefore non-reflective, transparent) portion of the mirror. At the same 
time, a still image or miniature is positioned just outside the camera’s view, such that the 
still image or miniature is reflected in the mirror. This process creates a blended image, 
whereby the actors appear to move through a set with which they never interact. In the 
shot of Tracy descending a chain next to the massive idol’s head, the idol is actually a 
miniature reflected close-up in a mirror; through the magic of the Schüfftan process, 
however, it appears massive and faraway.233 
Thus, in creating the image of the idol, Hitchcock achieves an impossible unity of 
opposites. As a merging of both the Soviet and the American close-up—effected, 
moreover, through a German Expressionist filming technique—the image of the idol 
becomes a metonym for the various cinematic traditions (the legacy of Eisenstein, 
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Griffith, Lang, etc.) adopted and adapted by Hitchcock in the making of Blackmail. As a 
merging of the too-faraway and the too-close-up, the image of the idol instantiates in a 
single shot the proxemics of guilt presented and re-presented, like a theme and variations, 
throughout the first hour-and-fifteen-minutes of the film. The image of the idol therefore 
signifies not only the culmination of film traditions that have led up to this particular 
scene in this particular film, but also the point of departure from which Hitchcock will 
proceed as he continues in subsequent films to refine, without fundamentally changing, 
his signature style, according to which the objectification of the gaze goes hand-in-hand 
with the production of guilt and suspense. 
 The image of the idol is not only a stand-in for the director and an objectification 
of the gaze within the world of the film, but also, as Sterritt points out, another iteration 
of “the mask we saw hanging in [the Artist’s] studio.”234 I would press the 
correspondences further still: just as the face-like mask on the Artist’s wall should be 
identified with both Hitchcock and (as I have argued) Alice, so the idol in the museum 
should also be identified with Hitchcock and Alice—with Hitchcock for reasons already 
discussed, with Alice by virtue of the parallel editing that generates both suspense and 
guilt in the final chase sequence. As Tracy runs from the police, the camera cuts between 
pursuer, pursued, and, crucially, the stationary Alice, whose neutral expression assumes 
an ever greater air of guilt via the Kuleshov effect as the chase progresses. When the idol 
appears on-screen, with its similarly neutral expression, it does so immediately after a 
shot of, and in almost exactly the same position as, Alice’s face. Furthermore, at the end 
                                                




of the chase sequence, when Alice’s letter confirms our sense that her guilt has been 
mounting (and ours, too, for having identified with her), Alice stands, and the shadows of 
glazing bars crisscrossing an unseen window fall vertically along the side of her face and 
horizontally across her neck. This configuration of light and shadow not only suggests the 
possibility of execution, but also reinforces the correspondence between Alice and the 
decapitated idol’s head. In this moment, Alice has determined to abandon passivity and 
seize her fate, claiming for herself some degree of directorial agency.  
Paradoxically, to assert agency here means to relinquish it: by turning herself in, 
Alice would be submitting to an impersonal system of law that would strip her of all 
autonomy as she is churned, like any other criminal, through the institutionalized 
machinery of the police, a process depicted at length in the film’s quasi-documentary 
opening sequence.235 Similarly, even as Hitchcock, in his role as director, asserts near god-
like control over the production of the film, he also limits his own agency by restricting 
himself to genre expectations. To be sure, his films are responsible for helping to shape 
those expectations, but they derive from pre-existing traditions, and once the audience 
has come to conceive of the Hitchcock picture and even Hitchcock himself as identifiable 
commodities,236 the filmmaker is, for better or for worse, bound by those expectations.237 
                                                
235 In light of the sententious attitude of the times toward loose women, a self-defense plea would not 
necessarily convince a jury of Alice’s innocence. 
236 When the studio informed Hitchcock that Blackmail could be shot in its entirety as a sound film, he was 
confronted with the problem of his lead actress’s voice. Anny Ondra, who played Alice White, had grown 
up in Prague, and she spoke with a distinctly non-British accent. Eventually, Hitchcock enlisted the 
services of English actress Joan Barry, who spoke Ondra’s lines off-screen as Ondra silently mouthed them 
in front of the camera. Ondra’s sound test, which features a flirtatious exchange between the director and 
the actress, shows that, even at this very early stage, Hitchcock slipped easily into the role of performer. 
Alfred Hitchcock, “Blackmail – Test Take” (British International Pictures, 1929), 35mm BW Positive, 




That the power and presence of the director should be evoked by an artifact in a 
museum—and not just any museum, but the British Museum, one of modernity’s great 
repositories of imperial and, in the context of Blackmail, cinematic acquisition—in itself 
suggests a kind of institutionalized containment, an implicit guarantee that certain 
conventions will be adhered to in order to make the presentation familiar and palatable to 
the viewing public. If Hitchcock is, to some extent, the omnipotent director-god creating 
a cinematic world out of strands of various international film traditions, he is also the 
hapless man on the Underground subject to all that world’s vicissitudes, which menace 
him in the form of futurity’s emblem, the child.238 Indeed, the director’s subsequent career 
confirms the portent: as widespread popular acclaim earns Hitchcock ever greater 
                                                                                                                                            
wonder, then, that the cheeky young director mugging for the camera alongside Ondra would—through 
decades of film cameos, televised interviews, and his role as host of Alfred Hitchcock Presents—cultivate a 
public, on-screen persona as marketable as any other commodity in Hollywood. 
237 “The difficulty [for the filmmaker] is that our art is commercial,” writes Hitchcock in 1927. “We must not 
forget that our duty is always to provide entertainment for those who pay.” Alfred Hitchcock, “Films We 
Could Make,” in Hitchcock on Hitchcock: Selected Writings and Interviews, ed. Sidney Gottlieb, vol. 1, 
193. Originally published in London Evening News, November 16, 1927. 
238 In the first book-length critical account of Hitchcock’s British period, Maurice Yacowar interprets the 
book-wielding Hitchcock and the “pesky little boy” in the Blackmail Underground scene as representatives 
of silent cinema and sound cinema, respectively: “Hitchcock is trying to read a book but is disturbed by a 
noisy and pesky little boy. The reading is the important thing. Throughout the film Hitchcock 
systematically explores the limitations of aural communication, contrasting the new sound film with the 
venerable (and read) silent film. Hitchcock’s reading relates to the classical culture represented by the 
British Museum, with its huge, silent gods, through which the final chase is run. The traditional—reading, 
culture, the silent film, a morality as rigorous and impersonal as Scotland Yard—is tested by the more 
flexible and pragmatic modes and morality of the modern. Hitchcock in the underground lends his weight 
to the traditional—and finds the new rather needlessly noisy.” Yacowar, Hitchcock’s British Films, 2nd ed. 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2010), 218-19. (The first edition appeared in 1977.) Doubtless, this 
tension between two types of film, silent and sound, is present both in the Underground cameo scene and in 
the film as a whole. I am arguing for something more expansive, however, in the opposition of Hitchcock 
and his young assailant: not simply the opposition of silent and sound film, but rather of the cumulative 
film traditions that made Blackmail possible and the tradition that will, in subsequent decades, come to be 





autonomy over all aspects of the filmmaking process, it also confines him ever more 
stringently to the tradition he stakes out for himself as a genre director. 
In the end, Alice’s attempt to claim directorial agency through confession is 
thwarted, even as her complex identification with the director persists. Standing between 
Frank and another officer as the two men laugh at the fanciful notion of “lady detectives,” 
Alice abruptly stops laughing when she sees something off-screen, revealed in the 
reverse-shot as the grotesque face of the laughing jester painting. A portly voyeur with 
his pointer finger perpetually extended, the jester appears to be yet another stand-in for 
the portly director, more obviously so than even the mask in the Artist’s studio or the 
massive idol face in the British Museum. Thus, in the final shot of Blackmail, Hitchcock 
seems to channel the full force of patriarchy’s contemptuous laughter at Alice, whose 
agency has been repeatedly punished and circumvented throughout the film.239 And the 
audience reads in Alice’s changed countenance an expression of guilt as the camera 
alternates between close-ups on Alice and the accusatory jester. Yet, as the jester’s face 
recedes from the camera, presumably on its way to Scotland Yard’s evidence room, the 
relation between Alice and jester director shifts from opposition to identification: on the 
reverse side of the jester painting appears Alice’s crude sketch of herself. In the final 
shot, Alice and the director are represented as two sides of the same portrait. The 
lingering identification is important since it indicates the contradictory position of the 
director, at once in control and not in control, subject and object of ridicule.  
                                                
239 Tania Modleski was the first critic to address at length the ways in which Blackmail both reinforces and 
undermines patriarchal tendencies. See Modleski, “Rape vs. Mans/laughter: Blackmail,” in The Women 
Who Knew Too Much: Hitchcock and Feminist Theory (New York: Methuen, 1988), 17-30. For 




This ambiguity also manifests in a variation on the characteristic tracking shot 
that has governed the proxemics of guilt throughout Blackmail in the interplay of the 
close-up and the faraway. In this final sequence, as Alice becomes both subject and 
object of so much laughter, the viewer is able to identify with Alice and share in her 
intense guilt in large part because the camera moves the viewer, via a tracking shot, into 
an intimate close-up with Alice. After the alternations between close-ups on Alice 
(looking stage left) and the jester (looking straight at the camera), the audience is only 
imperfectly released from the jester’s fixed stare and the sense of guilt it engenders. I say 
imperfectly because the release comes not, as in previous instances, from the camera 
moving in the direction opposite to that which engendered the tension. Instead, the 
camera stays fixed, and a man, whose face is never seen, carries the two-sided painting 
into the recesses of the visual field. Now stranded in cinematic space and suddenly aware 
of his or her own isolation, the viewer cannot be sure where he or she stands in the film’s 
ambiguous power dynamics. It is as though the viewer, first drawn by the camera into 
uncomfortably close intimacy with Alice and the director, then deprived of the reverse 
tracking shot that would logically counter and close-off this uneasy closeness, has simply 
been abandoned.  
Saboteur  
About a third of the way through Saboteur, fleeing the police and menaced by a 
sudden downpour, protagonist Barry Kane seeks shelter at the solitary woodland cabin of 
Philip Martin, a blind composer who, from virtually the moment he appears on screen, 




finished their introductions, the elderly artist has already hinted strongly at his role as a 
mouthpiece for wartime propaganda: Barry identifies himself as a hitchhiker, and Philip 
affirms that hitchhiking is “the best way to learn about this country and the surest test of 
the American heart.” The patriotic performance becomes even more heavy-handed when 
Philip’s niece, Pat, implores her uncle to turn Barry over to the police. “It’s your duty as 
an American citizen,” she declares, to which Philip replies, “It is my duty as an American 
citizen to believe a man innocent until he’s been proved guilty.” Hitchcock follows this 
pronouncement on civic duty with an equally strident appeal to the romantic authority of 
the artist as a kind of blind seer. “I can see a great deal further than you can,” says Philip. 
“I can see intangible things, for example, innocence.” Twenty-first-century viewers are 
probably more averse to such cloying sentimentality than their 1940s counterparts. 
Nevertheless, contemporary audiences could hardly have failed to appreciate the 
saccharine inflection of such lines. 
 Philip’s absolute sincerity might seem anathema to Hitchcock’s own artistic 
method, so often characterized by dry irony and the macabre. Yet, the two artists are 
more similar than they initially appear. Most obviously, Philip shares Hitchcock’s 
antipathy toward the police. When Pat announces that the police are pursuing a very 
“dangerous” criminal, Philip cautions her not to accept their account so readily: “My 
dear, the police are always on the alarmist side. […]. How could they be heroes if he 
were harmless?” Thus, Philip simultaneously underscores the performative nature of 
power dynamics in the film and gives us reason to interpret his comments on the role of 




have in mind Philip’s response when Barry asks whether he lives alone. “Yes,” says 
Philip. “Except I don't think of it in that way. You see, sounds are my lights and my 
colors. My music, for example. I compose a little. And there is nobody to tell me that the 
results are anything but brilliant, so I live in a comfortable glow of self-appreciation.” 
Philip presents a romantic vision of the artist as isolated and perfectly self-sustaining. 
That presentation is belied, however, by Philip’s final words to Barry, which include an 
admonition: “Go ahead, Barry. Go ahead. And do the things I wish I could do.” The 
artist’s blindness might confer on him a second sight—one that allows him to “see 
intangible things”—but it also prevents him from interacting with the world, that is, with 
an audience, as he desperately wants to do. In expressing this dual desire and fear—the 
desire to connect with an audience, the fear that such connection may be impossible—
Philip gives voice to Hitchcock’s own anxiogenic relationship with his audience. The 
terror of the audience, I will argue, is one of Saboteur’s chief themes and a driving force 
of the narrative. 
Obbligato on an Apple 
 In addition to expressing Hitchcock’s anxiety over the impossibility of connecting 
with the audience, Philip also articulates Hitchcock’s primary method for generating a 
narrative fantasy that will appeal to the audience. He does so, fittingly, in a seemingly 
inconsequential line. As Philip plays “Summer Night on the River,” Barry spots a bowl of 
apples and, famished, loudly crunches into one. “A very interesting effect,” says the 
composer, smiling, “obbligato on an apple.” The effect is not obbligato, of course; it is ad 




of the composition, is merely a chance occurrence. And yet, that is precisely how so 
many Hitchcockian narratives are generated: through the chance occurrence that is, in 
fact, obligatory.  
 In Saboteur, the obligatory chance occurrence in which desire is activated, thus 
setting the narrative in motion, unfolds in the opening scene. Barry’s friend, Ken Mason, 
turns to lock eyes with the nameless blonde woman working at the aircraft factory, 
causing the collision with Fry, the saboteur who will subsequently frame Barry for both 
Ken’s murder and the destruction of the factory. “Obbligato on an apple” is therefore a 
doubly appropriate summation of Hitchcock’s narrative method since, in this case, the 
obligatory chance act, biting into an apple, is also the archetypal act of giving in to 
temptation.240 Near the end of the film, standing in the crown of Statue of Liberty, Pat 
refers explicitly to the moment in which Ken is tempted by “an unknown blonde” as the 
one in which “it all started.” By “it” Pat means the “long story” that has led to her 
confrontation with Fry in the statue’s crown. “I get it,” says Fry with a wry smile, “Little 
Miss Liberty carrying the torch.” Fry thereby identifies Pat not only with America and 
the ideals of liberty enlightening the world, but also with the unknown blonde who 
initially sparked the flame of desire (hence the pun on “carrying the torch”) and set the 
cinematic story on its way.  
 One could, therefore, reasonably interpret Barry’s journey across America—
which is defined first by horizontal movement through the vast expanses of the West, 
                                                
240 One wonders whether the critic strains credulity to see in Barry’s crunch an allusion to the Fall of Man. 
And yet, Pat’s later feigned role as a “snake charmer,” coupled with the police officer’s surprise that such a 
beautiful and seemingly innocent girl could in fact be a temptress—“You never can tell about women!”—




then, by vertical movement amid the colossal monuments of New York City—as a 
journey in which Ken Mason symbolically rises from the ashes241 to great heights on 
Liberty’s torch and romantic union with that other once unknown blonde, Pat. In his 
reading of Saboteur, Leslie Brill indicates such closure through symbolic return, though 
without referring to Ken Mason, when he includes Saboteur among those Hitchcock 
romances in which “[t]he faring forth of the protagonists […] generally leads to some sort 
of homecoming or returning to origins.”242 Brill focuses particularly on the film’s final 
image: 
Barry (Robert Cummings) scrambl[es] back up the Statue of Liberty to 
safety and to Pat’s (Priscilla Lane) embrace. The lovers have erased their 
misunderstandings and made firm connections earlier with a pair of 
desperately ardent kisses on the dance floor at the charity ball of a Fifth 
Column society lady. (“I’m afraid we’re not behaving very well,” says Pat 
after the first embrace. “What’s the difference? We weren’t invited 
anyway,” responds Barry, as he proceeds to the second.) The end not only 
recalls those kisses but affirms the lovers’ right to them—and to an 
invitation. Like Erica’s father [in The Young and Innocent], the man who 
boosts Barry to security and into Pat’s arms is a policeman, the 
representative of a society changed at the end of the movie from vengeful 
pursuer to grateful friend.243 
 
Thus, Brill concludes, “[t]hough Barry does not go back to the West Coast at the end of 
Saboteur, his journey ends with a […] sense of return.”244 This reading convincingly 
                                                
241 The film deliberately codes Barry’s ascent through the city as a symbolic rising from the ashes. When 
Barry, having been knocked unconscious, awakens to find himself in the Sutton Mansion’s food cellar, he 
lights a match and holds it close to a sprinkler head, which sets off a fire alarm and enables his escape. 
Barry’s path from that point forward is a continual ascent, from cellar to city street, to Radio City Music 
Hall, to the Statue of Liberty’s torch, to his final confrontation with Fry, and to his final union with Pat. A 
close-up on the sprinkler head reveals the manufacturer: “Phoenix Automatic Fire Alarm.” 
242 Leslie Brill, The Hitchcock Romance: Love and Irony in Hitchcock’s Films (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1988), 41. 
243 Ibid., 27. 




identifies the reintegration of self into society with the romantic union of the couple, 
enmeshed as they are in “desperately ardent kisses.” Brill’s reading is so convincing, in 
fact, that the reader would be forgiven for warmly recalling Barry and Pat’s kiss in the 
final shot—even though there is no kiss in the final shot. 
 In order to compensate for this strange, conspicuous lack, whereby the screen 
abruptly fades to black before the lovers can enact the expected kiss, Brill must reach 
back to a previous scene. In doing so, he replicates a maneuver the film repeatedly 
critiques: turning to the fantasy of an idealized past, then projecting that fantasy forward 
to obscure both the present moment and the potential for a future of imaginary fullness. 
The final scene itself, I argue, undercuts this maneuver by denying the kiss that would 
fulfill, in the coupling of Barry and Pat, the promise of a romantic union initially signaled 
at the outset by the flirtatious glances Ken Mason exchanges with the unknown blonde. 
Moreover, the scene “on the dance floor,” to which Brill refers in order to validate the 
imaginary fullness he reads into the final shot, explicitly critiques our tendency, as 
movie-goers and in life more generally, to idealize the past. By examining this dance 
floor scene in greater detail, I will show that the ambivalent appeal to the quintessential 
fantasy of Hollywood cinema (i.e., the production of the couple) at the end of Saboteur 
indicates a more fundamental uneasiness, on Hitchcock’s part, about the potential for 
appealing to the audience in a predictable way. 
The Fantasy of an Idealized Past 
 About two-thirds of the way through the film, an establishing shot of New York 




verticality inheres not only in the towering skyscrapers of the background, but also in the 
solitary lamppost of the foreground and the taut suspension bridge cables that cut through 
and constrict the entire visual field, as though the city, in its suffocating verticality, were 
directly repudiating the expansive horizontality of the American West depicted in the first 
part of the film. This visual tension between the horizontal and vertical corresponds to the 
thematic opposition between the American myth of a classless, democratic society and 
the stratified reality that lies beneath. The lie of egalitarian America, in which neither 
class nor history plays a role, is best exemplified by Charles Tobin’s Deep Springs 
Ranch: wide open spaces, informality of dress and behavior, the pretense of plain spoken 
sincerity, not to mention the cowboy ranch hands and horseback chase sequence (in 
which Barry is literally lassoed to the ground) that evoke both the great American genre 
of the Western and the great American fantasy of Manifest Destiny. All of this is a sham. 
 When Barry and Mr. Freeman arrive in New York, they alight first at Cut Rate 
Drugs, a soda shop and purveyor of cosmetics, tobacco, and pharmaceuticals that treats 
the audience to the sight of a mostly middle-class clientele. Exiting through the back and 
into an alley, the men will eventually enter Madame Sutton’s mansion, where an opulent 
high-society ball is underway. First, however, they must pass through the basement, 
where kitchen staff and other working-class laborers rush around, enabling the leisure 
activities of the upper-class (“upper” here signifying both figuratively and literally) who 
will never see most of the menial workers toiling to make the soirée run so smoothly. 
Once upstairs, Charles Tobin reveals Barry’s true identity to the other conspirators, and 




are guarded by servants in cahoots with Tobin, Sutton, and Freeman. “I know where 
we’ll be safe,” says Barry, ushering Pat onto the dance floor and into the kissing scene 
that Brill cites. 
 The scene’s anti-realism is expressed through both cinematography and dialogue. 
When Barry and Pat step out onto the dance floor, the camera, which had been filming 
from a fixed position, briefly tracks the couple’s movement as they recede back and to 
the left. The shot then cuts to a close-up on the couple, who resume reflections on their 
predicament: “Barry, I’m scared. It’s so unreal, all these people dancing and having a 
good time.” Indeed, with the cut to close-up, the scene does suddenly look unreal. 
Whereas before Barry and Pat were obviously being filmed in the same room as all the 
revelers, the couple now appears to be dancing in front of an optical projection. Let me be 
clear: I do not think Hitchcock has actually switched to optical projection. Barry and Pat 
are dancing in what looks like a semi-circle, rather than simply swaying side-to-side as 
one would expect if the background were a camera trick. Still, the difference in focus 
between foreground and background, along with the difference in distance between the 
camera and the couple versus the camera and all the other dancers, does yield a decidedly 
flattened, “unreal” image, as though Barry and Pat had been lifted out of the perilous 
world of the film and into the refuge of their own romantic union. The timing of Pat’s 
comment, “It’s all so unreal,” immediately after the cut to close-up, suggests that the 
audience is meant to perceive the sudden unreality in the altered visual field itself. 
 This scene of imaginary plentitude, which will culminate in the lovers’ only on-




says Pat, “why couldn’t I have met you a hundred years ago, on a beach somewhere?” 
Barry smiles and, gazing into her eyes, says, “Bathing suits looked awfully funny a 
hundred years ago.” He pauses. “I’ll bet you’d look beautiful, though.” They kiss. With 
his unexpected remark on those “awfully funny” bathing suits, Barry briefly, comically 
punctures the fantasy of a romanticized past with the prick of historical reality: to mid-
twentieth-century eyes, Victorian swimsuits would look funny, and certainly not very 
romantic, revealing, or sexy. Barry’s quip thus replicates in miniature what the film’s 
transition to the American East enacts on a much grander scale: in New York City, the 
truth of verticality—of class hierarchy—reveals itself, and History, which the egalitarian 
myth of the American West had sought to repress, returns with a vengeance in the form 
of a distinctly aristocratic ball. It is no coincidence that the swimsuits and the ball both 
evoke the same era. Even within the comforting, close-up, imaginary fullness of the 
romantic fantasy, lifted out of a flattened and blurred world, the historical repressed 
comes surging to the surface, in jokes and puns and slips of the tongue. 
The transition from the American frontier to the American metropolis is not 
accomplished in a single cut, however, but rather by way of a peculiar sequence in which 
Barry and Mr. Freeman are driven cross-country. Peering out at the Boulder Dam (known 
today as the Hoover Dam) and still posing as a fellow conspirator, Barry attempts to prod 
Freeman about plans to blow it up. But Freeman cuts him off midsentence to ask, without 
prompting, whether Barry knows Tobin well and whether Tobin’s granddaughter, Susie, 
was present when the two met at Deep Springs Ranch. Barry confirms that Susie was 




about old Tobin,” says Freeman, “his love for that little girl—evidence of a good heart.” 
Freeman then proceeds, still unprompted, to describe his own children: “Two boys. Nice 
little fellows. Age two and four. The four-year-old is naughty at times. He’s quite a 
problem. We get him a new toy, and within half-an-hour it’s [Freeman chuckles and claps 
his hands together] smashed to bits. And then [Freeman gazes distantly as his smile 
fades], sometimes, after it’s all over, he seems almost sorry.” Freeman’s gestures and 
facial expressions during these lines suggest he identifies with the unstable, destructive 
yet remorseful attitude he attributes to the “naughty” little boy. What’s more, in his 
remarks on the Boulder Dam just one minute earlier, Freeman has hinted at a 
pathological attraction-repulsion reminiscent of a four-year-old who impulsively destroys 
what he loves: “I’m glad we came this way [through Nevada]. It adds a few miles to our 
trip, but somehow I’ve become a little sentimental. I want to take a last look at it [the 
dam]. Beautiful, isn’t it? A great monument to man’s unceasing industry and his stubborn 
faith in the future.” Despite his subtly mocking tone on “stubborn faith in the future,” 
Freeman’s comments about the dam’s beauty and monumentality sound wholly genuine. 
And he himself expresses a stubborn, sentimental “faith in the future” as he fondly recalls 
Tobin’s love for Susie and dotes over his own two small boys. 
 Freeman’s pathology assumes a markedly queerer bent when he turns back to 
Barry to confess an “idiosyncrasy” of his. “Sometimes,” he says, “I wish my younger 
child had been a girl. In fact, my wife and I argue over a little idiosyncrasy I have. I don’t 
want his hair cut short until he’s much older. Do you think it’d be bad for him?” “Well, I 




car cuts to a close-up on Freeman, who articulates his next lines while slowly, eerily 
turning his eyes and head toward the camera, without ever quite looking into it: “When I 
was a child, I had long golden curls. People used to stop to admire me.” Freeman’s 
delivery of these lines—the turning of his head, the glassy-eyed, distant expression that 
passes over his face—mimics the delivery of his previous affirmation that, when his four-
year-old smashes a toy, “sometimes, after it’s all over, he seems almost sorry.”  
Through the cut-to-close-up, Hitchcock intensifies what he surely means to be an 
unsettling admission of gender dysphoria, linked by the actor’s deliberate, repeated 
movements245 to the pathological attraction-repulsion that would drive the queer psyche to 
destroy that which it also desires.246 The threat that queerness poses to the production of 
the (heterosexual) couple is driven home in the next scene as the driver and his passenger 
seat sidekick serenade Barry and the now sleeping Freeman to the tune of Freddy 
Martin’s absurdly sappy “Tonight We Love.” In the wake of Freeman’s disturbing 
performance, the sight of these two goons crooning an a cappella love ballad is, to put it 
plainly, weird. 
 Crucially, Freeman’s queerness, and concomitant attraction-repulsion, is framed 
in terms of his idealizing of the past, in which “people used to stop to admire” his “long 
                                                
245 Hitchcock was notorious for micromanaging actors’ movements during important scenes. When asked in 
a 1978 interview about his infamous assertion that “actors are cattle!” the director replied that, in fact, he 
had merely “said that actors had to be treated like cattle in that to direct actors you must guide their every 
movement, their looks, their total physical presence in front of the camera.” Allen R. Leider, “Interview: 
Alfred Hitchcock,” in Hitchcock on Hitchcock: Selected Writings and Interviews, ed. Sidney Gottlieb, vol. 
2, 355. Previously published in Elite, September 1978.  
246 Hitchcock frequently uses queerness as a signifier for other types of pathological deviance, which often 
mix desire and murderous intent. Bruno Anthony of Strangers on a Train (1951) immediately comes to 
mind, but there are many other examples, including the titular character of The Lodger (1927), Handel Fane 
(Murder!, 1930), Brandon and Phillip (Rope, 1948), Leonard (North by Northwest, 1959), and Norman 




golden curls.” Barry’s response—“Things are different nowadays. A haircut might save 
him [Freeman’s son] a lot of grief”—chiefly targets the queerness of Freeman’s 
confession, but it also implicitly reinforces the fantasy itself, i.e., that the past somehow 
harbored a now lost plenitude. Freeman’s attempt to replicate his own fantasy of lost 
plenitude through his son evinces a repetition-compulsion characteristic of the Death 
Drive, which, according to Lee Edelman, frequently manifests in narrative and culture 
through “the fantasy subtending the image of the Child.”247 Edelman explains that the 
Death Drive, which is another name for the queer, is “[e]ngaged in circulation around an 
object never adequate to fulfill it.”248 The circular pulsions of the drive are experienced 
within the Symbolic Order as the linear progression of heteronormative reproductive 
futurity, which takes the figure of the Child as the telos that would restore lost imaginary 
fullness.249 If we, as the audience, are disturbed by Freeman’s attempt to reproduce his 
                                                
247 Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2004), 2. 
248 Ibid., 22. 
249 The following excerpts from Edelman’s No Future elucidate more thoroughly the relation of the Death 
Drive to the queer and the figure of the Child: “The drive—more exactly, the death drive—holds a 
privileged place in this book [No Future]. As the constancy of a pressure both alien and internal to the logic 
of the Symbolic, as the inarticulable surplus that dismantles the subject from within, the death drive names 
what the queer, in the order of the social [i.e., the Symbolic], is called forth to figure: the negativity 
opposed to every form of social viability” (9). “This surplus, compelling the Symbolic to enact a perpetual 
repetition, remains spectral, ‘unreal,’ or impossible insofar as it insists outside the logic of meaning that, 
nonetheless, produces it. The drive holds the place of what meaning misses in much the same way that the 
signifier preserves at the heart of the signifying order the empty and arbitrary letter, the meaningless 
substrate of signification that meaning intends to conceal. Politics [here synonymous with ‘narrative’], then 
in opposing itself to the negativity of such a drive, gives us history as the continuous staging of our dream 
of eventual self-realization by endlessly reconstructing, in the mirror of desire, what we take to be reality 
itself. And it does so without letting us acknowledge that the future, to which it persistently appeals, marks 
the impossible place of an Imaginary past exempt from the deferrals intrinsic to the operation of the 
signifying chain and projected ahead as the site at which being and meaning are joined as One. In this it 
enacts the formal repetition distinctive of the drive while representing itself as bringing to fulfillment the 
narrative sequence of history and, with it, of desire, in the realization of the subject’s authentic presence in 




fantasy of lost wholeness through his own child, we are also forced to confront the fact 
that this dubious inclination to redeem oneself through one’s offspring informs even what 
most of us would consider healthy parent-child relationships. Thus, the figure of the child 
in Saboteur, initially embodied in Susie as a seemingly straightforward signifier of 
sincere, reassuring futurity, assumes through Freeman’s pathology the disturbing (in the 
sense of both “creepy” and “destabilizing”) role that children so often occupy in 
Hitchcock’s films.250 
On the most basic level, the oddity of Freeman is not so much a comment on 
queerness, per se, but rather on the stunted growth and unstable, confused identity that he 
embodies: attraction vs. repulsion, love vs. hate, man vs. woman, adult vs. child, 
American vs. foreign agent. The point is that the ironically-named Freeman is 
fundamentally conflicted in his identity and that he is trying to reclaim a sense of 
wholeness in who he imagines himself to have been. This is precisely Barry’s problem: 
he must reclaim his identity—as an honest, patriotic, law-abiding citizen—which has 
been stripped away from him. In terms of the classic Hollywood formula, this means he 
must get the girl. Queerness, in the form of Freeman, therefore poses an imminent threat 
to this necessary resolution, which means that the tendency to idealize the past and then 
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project that fantasy forward onto the future, a tendency inextricably bound up with 
Freeman’s queerness, is also an imminent threat.251 
The Dream of Cinema as Sabotage 
In addition to his role as a figure for queerness, which threatens the standard 
Hollywood formula of the production of the (heterosexual) couple, Mr. Freeman also 
introduces another important theme—cinema as sabotage—which speaks directly to 
Hitchcock’s transition from British filmmaker to American. Saboteur offers up its first 
overt sign that cinema is somehow analogous to sabotage when Barry and Freeman are 
sitting at the highway checkpoint by the Boulder Dam. Freeman has just finished 
commenting on how “beautiful” the dam is, and implying that it will soon be blown up, 
when a police officer leans in through the car window to assure the pair that “you’ll be 
moving along soon. Are you carrying any cameras or firearms at all?” Though the danger 
of cameras is probably lost to most viewers today, devoted Hitchcock fans will be 
familiar with the explosive potential of nitrocellulose film, once used in both still and 
motion picture cameras, from the director’s earlier production Sabotage (1936). In this 
British film, Karl Verloc’s London cinema serves as a front for a foreign terrorist cell, 
                                                
251 In the opening minutes of the film, during the initial sabotage scene and directly thereafter, Barry and 
Ken are characterized as “kids” at “play.” Grabbing the fire extinguisher from Barry, Ken exclaims, “What 
about me? Don’t I get to play too?” Then, moments later, when the sight of all-consuming fire cuts to a 
middle-aged factory worker recounting the disaster for the authorities, the worker repeatedly refers to Barry 
and Ken as “kids”: “So I see these two kids. And I yell at them the sprinklers are busted. The whole 
shootin’ match’ll go up. And they run right in, the both of them. And the last thing I saw when I looked 
back was one kid give the extinguisher to the other kid, and then it was just like all hell comes up. And 
that’s all I see.” Then, when asked whether anyone else was there, he says, “No. Just the two kids. The poor 
kid with the extinguisher and the one who give it to him.” By framing Barry and Ken as “kids” at the 
traumatic moment that will soon set Barry on the run to clear his name and reclaim his identity, Hitchcock 
subtly underscores that the journey toward these goals is a journey of maturation, which will culminate in 




and the young, naïve Stevie, along with the omnibus he’s riding, is blown up when the 
bomb inside his film canister detonates before the boy can reach the intended target.252 In 
Saboteur the cinema as sabotage analogy becomes indisputable when, in the latter part of 
the film, we see Freeman posing as an official from the American Newsreel Corporation. 
Standing in front of an American Newsreel van, he explains in detail to his subordinates 
how they will use film equipment to disguise and detonate bombs as part of a terrorist 
attack on Brooklyn Harbor during the imminent launch of the U.S.S. Alaska warship.  
 To understand why the American Saboteur continually, and with increasingly 
heavy hand, insists on equating cinema to sabotage, I would propose turning again to the 
British Sabotage, specifically, to a scene in which Detective Spencer has been summoned 
to Scotland Yard for a conference with the Chief Inspector. When the Chief Inspector 
announces that the Home Office “are scared something worse than tonight’s job [a 
disruption of London’s electric power grid] may happen,” the Detective inquires after the 
purpose of “all this wrecking.” The Chief Inspector replies matter-of-factly: “Making 
trouble at home to take our minds off what’s going on abroad. Same as in a crowd. One 
man treads on your toe. While you’re arguing with him, his pal picks your pocket.” If we 
entertain the notion that the sabotage in Saboteur is also an act of misdirection, then it is 
logical to ask from what exactly the audience is being distracted. The answer, I would 
argue, is History, i.e., the fundamental class disparities and legacy of class conflict in the 
United States, which will only be exacerbated by the full flowering of global capitalism 
underway at the time of the film’s production. Such is the function of the love story in 
                                                
252 The omnibus driver only very reluctantly allows Stevie to board in the first place since the ostensible 




Saboteur: the union of Barry and Pat provides the audience a sense of closure (albeit a 
sense of closure undercut by the absence of a final kiss) when, in fact, nothing has 
resolved the tension between the historical reality of class conflict and the American 
myth of a wholly egalitarian society. 
 Though the first overt signs of cinema as sabotage emerge with Mr. Freeman, the 
theme manifests in more subtle ways long before the conspirator appears in Soda City. 
Even before the first credits roll, the opening sequence introduces the motif of the vertical 
versus the horizontal: a booming brass section strikes the initial chord of a menacing 
orchestral score, and from utter blackness the fade-in reveals a corrugated metal wall, 
marked by distinct vertical grooves, that fills the entire screen; seconds later, the shadow 
of a figure in hat and trench coat emerges from the lower right of the frame, moving 
slowly from right to left. This formal tension between the horizontal and the vertical, as I 
have already argued, corresponds to the thematic tension between the myth of an 
egalitarian America free from history and the reality of longstanding class conflict and 
inequality. As the shadow continues its slow procession, the title of the film, Saboteur, 
appears across the screen in bold, cursive font distinct from all other text that comprises 
the credits. As though that weren’t a strong enough signal that the shadow should be 
identified with the titular saboteur, just minutes into the film, another corrugated metal 
wall marked by distinct vertical grooves fills the screen, and black smoke, the first sign of 
sabotage within the narrative itself, enters from the lower right, just as the ominous 
shadow had in the opening sequence. I argue that the opening sequence, in which a 




means of foreshadowing covert machinations. It is also an allusion to the myth of Plato’s 
Cave, and as such, it frames the entire film as a commentary on the veracity of the image, 
which is entirely appropriate for a story in which so many characters are other than what 
they initially appear to be.253 
 But the movement of the shadow across the screen is not, as it initially appears to 
be, a simple horizontal motion from right to left. After twenty seconds or so (the illusion 
is prolonged by the changing credits, which partially distract the viewer’s attention), it 
becomes apparent that the figure is also moving toward the viewer—or at least, it appears 
to be. Like the cinematic image, a shadow is two-dimensional and cannot literally emerge 
from the surface onto which it is projected. This particular shadow is growing larger, and 
this growth creates the illusion of motion toward the viewer, foreshadowing two pivotal 
moments later in the film. One of these pivotal moments occurs late in Saboteur when 
Fry appears to emerge from the Radio City Music Hall film-within-a-film into the panic-
stricken audience. This scene stages most overtly what I have previously hinted at as the 
threat of “the terror of the audience.” In order to appreciate this threat fully, however, one 
must first appreciate the other pivotal moment: Pat’s entrance into her uncle’s cabin and 
Barry’s fantastic journey. 
 Pat is the dream of cinema, the fantasy realized. As mentioned above, her 
eventual union with Barry symbolically fulfills the promise of a romantic union implied 
                                                
253 The duplicitous Mr. Tobin, for example, first appears at swim and fully exposed, his most conspicuous 
accessory a toddling emblem of futurity. By all outward signs, he is an upstanding citizen with nothing to 
hide and, as Freeman says, “with a good heart.” Tellingly, throughout the poolside sequence in which Barry 
meets Tobin, the quivering interplay of light and shadow, reflected from the surface the water onto the 
outer wall of Tobin’s ranch house, lends an otherworldly aesthetic once again reminiscent of Plato’s Cave, 




by the obligatory chance occurrence—Ken Mason locking eyes with the unknown 
blonde—that first sets this specific cinematic narrative in motion. More fundamentally, 
though, Pat’s transition from two-dimensional billboard model, who maintains a clear 
distance from Barry as audience, to three-dimensional person able to engage fully with 
the audience is the dream of cinema fulfilled: that the two-dimensional cinematic image 
could so wholly absorb the viewer as to become indistinguishable from real, lived 
experience. By framing the dream of cinema as one that emerges from the realm of 
advertising,254 Hitchcock also implies that, however much his cinema may be art, it is also 
inextricably bound up in the commodifying exigencies of consumer capitalism—an 
inescapable fact of the Hollywood studio system to which he contractually obligated 
himself when he left Britain to work at Selznick International Pictures. Hitchcock’s 
presentation of the billboards also emphasizes the curious force of advertisement vis-à-
vis the viewer. The billboards, which bear Pat’s image, engage the viewer through a 
double movement: by appearing to speak directly to the individual viewer, who identifies 
with Barry, and by appearing to speak to the public generally, who will ostensibly buy 
the product advertised.255 This double-movement, which is an integral part of the 
                                                
254 For an extended analysis of Hitchcock’s penchant for utilizing the imagery of American advertising, 
using North by Northwest as a paradigmatic example, see Richard H. Millington, “Hitchcock and American 
Character: The Comedy of Self-Construction in North by Northwest,” in Hitchcock’s America, ed. 
Jonathan Freedman and Richard Millington (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 140-43. 
255 In a general sense, this double-movement is true of all advertisement, which is half the point, but the 
billboards in Saboteur make the doubleness overt, producing an effect both comical and creepy. For 
instance, early in the film, on the run from police, as Barry hitchhikes his way to Tobin’s Deep Springs 
Ranch, he spots the first billboard by the side of the highway. The nameless model, who will later appear in 
the film as Pat, points to the right, against the flow of traffic. Printed across the top of the billboard in bold 
capital letters are the words “YOU ARE BEING FOLLOWED.” Then, in smaller, less commanding font 
much lower on the billboard, we see, “by the cars that don’t use,” and then, finally, “comet oil.” Due to the 




American experience insofar as that experience is defined by the machinations of 
consumer capitalism, is likely to produce a paranoid response in the viewer, as it does for 
Barry. And in a narrative filled with so many varieties of duplicity, such a response, as I 
have already pointed out, would hardly be unjustified. 
The Debasement of Art  
 If the American public of Saboteur are primed for paranoia by advertisement, they 
are also, in stark contrast to Hitchcock’s British public, unburdened by historical 
awareness. Thus far, I have explicated this latter point in the context of the fantasy of an 
egalitarian society without a past and the ways in which class inequality continually 
punctures that fantasy. Just as important, however, especially for the British artist 
attempting to establish himself in America, is the corollary fact that, in the United States, 
collective memory in the context of art also seems to have been effaced. For example, the 
sequence in which Barry first spots one of Pat’s billboards opens with Barry, who has 
hitched a ride in the cab of a semi-truck, whistling the theme from Beethoven’s 
Symphony No. 5. “Catchy,” says the trucker. “What?” says Barry. “That tune you’re 
whistling. Ta-ta-ta-taaa, ta-ta-ta-taaa.” “Oh, I didn’t even know I was whistling,” says 
Barry. “That’s a sign you must be pretty happy. Easy to see there’s nothing on your 
mind.” The irony and humor in this exchange are multilayered. First, the eight notes that 
open Beethoven’s Symphony No. 5 are one of the most famous and recognizable themes 
(perhaps the most famous and recognizable theme) in all of Western music, yet the 
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trucker seems not to recognize it. Second, the trucker’s failure to recognize the music also 
causes him to misread Barry’s emotional state as happy and carefree. Such an affective 
description is diametrically opposed to the actual emotional import of Beethoven’s 
theme, which is widely interpreted as a representation of “fate knocking at the door.”  
Even more relevant for Saboteur’s particular historical moment, however, is the 
fact that virtually any British adult (and countless others across Europe) watching the 
film in 1942 would immediately have recognized the theme from Beethoven’s Fifth 
Symphony as the salutation of the BBC’s WII radio broadcasts to Europe. Since June 
1941, the BBC had been prefacing these broadcasts with the four notes struck on timpani 
as part of the “V for Victory” campaign.256 In his ignorance of art and its connection to 
history, Hitchcock’s American truck driver reduces world-historical events, invoked 
metonymically by the whistled theme, to mere domestic squabbles: the trucker complains 
about his wife, then asks Barry whether he’s married. When Barry confirms his 
bachelorhood, the trucker retorts, “Go ahead and whistle.” Even without the wartime 
context, describing Beethoven’s theme as “catchy” is a bit like describing the Mona Lisa 
as “pretty” or the Palace of Versailles as “shiny.” The descriptors are not inaccurate, but 
they do reflect a diminished capacity for historical, cultural, and aesthetic appreciation. 
                                                
256 Listeners in Nazi-occupied countries were encouraged to scrawl the letter V (for Victory, Victoire, or 
Vrijheid, depending on the local language) in public places wherever they could. Beethoven’s theme 
became a rallying cry unto itself for two reasons: the theme is synonymous with its symphony (i.e., No. V) 
as a whole, and the theme’s rhythm matches exactly the Morse code sequence (short-short-short-long) for 
the letter V. James MacDonald, “British Open ‘V’ Nerve War; Churchill Spurs Resistance,” New York 
Times, Sunday, July 20, 1941, late city edition, https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/learning 





Having briefly whistled his way into the role of performer, Barry is misunderstood by his 
diegetic audience of one, the trucker.  
The net effect of the pair’s performer-audience interaction is not unfavorable, 
though. The trucker reacts unpredictably to Barry’s whistling, thus misreading Barry’s 
state-of-mind, but he also reacts most helpfully in his later role as audience. Having 
previously parted ways with the trucker, Barry has been captured by police, who are 
transporting their suspect to the county jail when their progress is suddenly halted on a 
bridge by a broken down car and the semi-truck whose familiar driver has stopped to 
assist. Barry seizes this opportunity to leap out of the police car and off the bridge into 
the river far below. The police race down into the ravine, and the trucker, like every other 
person in the (non-diegetic) audience, is clearly thrilled by the spectacle. When the 
officers completely lose sight of their suspect, the trucker calls down to them, sending the 
police off in the wrong direction. He then scurries to the opposite side of the bridge and, 
smiling, flashes an a-okay sign at Barry, who responds by raising his arms triumphantly 
into the air. An unpredictable audience, it seems, is precisely that: unpredictable. 
 The Beethoven’s Fifth scene, which prompts the relatively lighthearted exchange 
between Barry and the trucker, corresponds to a much more disturbing driving scene, 
which I have already touched on, later in the film. When the two goons chauffeuring 
Barry and Mr. Freeman from California to New York begin their strange serenade, 
American audiences of 1942 would quickly have identified the song as Freddy Martin’s 




previous year.257 Few twenty-first century viewers will know the song lyrics, but classical 
music lovers will recognize the tune as the opening melody from the first movement of 
Tchaikovsky’s Piano Concerto No. 1. I have already argued that Freeman’s queerness, as 
expressed in the scene directly before the serenade, is not primarily a comment on 
queerness as such, but rather a signifier of a pathologically divided psyche desperate to 
restore a fantasized lost plenitude. Both Freeman and Barry are attempting to reclaim 
some sense of grounded, whole identity. Freeman’s queerness threatens Barry insofar as 
it threatens Barry’s eventual romantic union with Pat, which, according to the classic 
Hollywood formula and centuries of novelistic convention, would grant Barry a firm, 
socially-sanctioned role within and through the institution of marriage. However, this 
idealized vision of romantic love and its potential to confer authentic identity is 
undermined by the grotesque degradation of art enacted in the serenade scene, as one of 
the greatest concerti of the Romantic era—an aesthetically revolutionary composition in 
its own time and an enduring testament to the sublimity of artistic expression—is reduced 
to the status of a syrupy-sweet love song. 
The final lines of the song question whether love will last: “Tonight we love in 
the glow/ That glows so softly I know/ This wasn’t meant to borrow, but tomorrow/ Will 
it be gone,/ Or will it always live on?” On the word glows, a counter-shot reveals that 
Barry has just seen the third of the three billboards. This one features an image of Pat, 
bouquet in hand, staring up at the sky, and enveloped in a soft glow. The text reads, “A 
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Final Tribute/ A Beautiful/ FUNERAL $49.50 and up.” The scene fades to black, the 
singing ends on the words “I know,” and the music shifts to a menacing orchestral score, 
leaving the audience to infer the truncated question of love’s permanence. Ostensibly, 
Pat’s image complements this question and generates suspense by inducing the audience 
to wonder whether Barry will indeed be able to reunite with his beloved, convince her of 
his innocence, and thus live happily-ever-after. Ultimately, though, I think these 
questions miss the point. By cutting to an image of the final billboard during the strange 
cross-country serenade, Hitchcock situates the debasement of art embodied by the song 
firmly within the commodifying imperatives of consumer capitalism and advertisement. 
The most prominent feature of the advertisement, aside from the woman and the word 
FUNERAL, which is printed bold capital letters, is neither the word tribute nor the word 
beautiful, but the price. In the ahistorical American landscape of consumer capitalism, 
commodification is king, and neither art nor love can overcome the immense force of 
cultural debasement.258 
The Terror of the Audience 
The fantasy of romantic love, represented (albeit in debased form) by the 
saccharine love song and angelic billboard image, is forcibly displaced by the subsequent 
establishing shot of New York City, whose overwhelming verticality signals an upsurge 
of repressed History. The fantasy continually returns, however, most notably in the dance 
floor sequence at the Sutton Mansion, which I have already analyzed in detail, and then 
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again in the Radio City Music Hall sequence, where suddenly we are back in Plato’s 
Cave. Having successfully detonated the bomb at Brooklyn Harbor, Fry returns to the 
Rockefeller Center office of American Newsreel, only to discover that police are waiting 
for him. Fry darts to the elevator, barely escaping his pursuers, then sneaks into the 
RCMH cinema via a side door, where the audience are watching an unidentified 
melodrama. When Fry spots several officers entering the theater from the back, he leaps 
onto the stage, where his body appears as a two-dimensional, shadowy silhouette 
superimposed on the massive glowing images of the film screen. The shadow moves first 
left to right, then, much like the shadow from the opening credit sequence, right to left. 
Shots are fired, but the distinction between fantasy and reality has broken down, and it is 
unclear whether the shots originate from Fry, the police, or the film-within-the-film. The 
audience, both diegetic and non-diegetic, are now seized by the enigma of the truth or lie 
of the image, and panic starts to set in. The RCMH audience only truly erupt into a 
frenzy, however, when Fry shifts even farther left, leaving the backdrop of the film 
screen behind and thus transforming from two-dimensional shadow to three-dimensional 
person who then leaps directly at the camera and the audience, as though emerging from 
both the film (Saboteur) and the film-within-the-film. 
The obvious point to make here would probably be something about the violence 
inherent in art, or at least, à la Walter Benjamin, in art that relies on the ostensibly 
inauthentic processes of mechanical reproduction. I would like to make a different 
argument, however, building on the work Leslie Abramson has pioneered in Hitchcock 




spectators in Hitchcock’s films in order to challenge the dominant conception of 
Hitchcock as auteur. Abramson argues that spectators within the films, far from being the 
credulous sheep that Hitchcock often referred to in interviews, frequently pose a grave 
threat to directorial agency. I propose that, in the Radio City Music Hall scene, which 
Abramson does not discuss, the film spectators embody what I have called “the terror of 
the audience.” This terror of the audience does represent a threat to directorial agency; 
however, it does so in a uniquely American way that Abramson does not touch on in her 
book. The film that the RCMH audience are watching appears to be a melodrama in 
which an adulterous couple are discussing how the woman’s husband, Henry, will react 
when he finds out about the affair. The woman is convinced her husband will fly into a 
murderous rage, and indeed, moments later, Henry enters the scene and fires the lethal 
shots that overlap with those fired by Fry and the police. Though the film-within-a-film 
offers up this predictable melodramatic fodder, the audience’s reaction is anything but 
predictable: they find the entire sequence, right up to the moment they realize they are 
actually being shot at, uproariously funny. 
The disturbing incongruity of imminent violence met with full-throated laughter 
is, I argue, a logical intensification of the earlier Beethoven’s Fifth scene, wherein 
Barry’s audience of one, the trucker, responds inappropriately to the symphony’s theme. 
The theme carries with it not only the sublime weight of the symphony itself and of “fate 
knocking at the door,” but also the ongoing, catastrophic reality of World War II then 
raging across three continents. Thus contextualized, the trucker’s flippant “Catchy!” is 




murderous scene unfold on screen. In an American landscape bereft of artistic and 
cultural tradition, the public are only able to appreciate artifacts and events of world-
historical import in diminished form, that is, as they appear filtered through the lens of 
personalized, domestic relations and degraded art: the trucker hears the theme from 
Beethoven’s Symphony No. 5, and almost immediately, it prompts him to complain 
about his wife; the two thugs driving cross-country intone the opening of Tchaikovsky’s 
Piano Concerto No. 1, but they add lyrics that reduce it to a sentimental love song, 
punctuated by a billboard image that commodifies love and death; the audience in RCMH 
are confronted with a showdown between police and an international terrorist bent on 
overthrowing the United States and its wartime allies, but the confrontation only becomes 
real to them as an extension of an absurdly trite melodrama. In all cases, Hitchcock is 
faced with a vexing question: How does one make art for a public that exist in a 
commodified, ahistorical world that continually reduces art to advertisement and 
sentimentality? 
 Hitchcock, the Master of Suspense, zealously cultivated his persona as master 
manipulator. If the audience is subject to being manipulated, however, the manipulator is 
limited in his methods by the fantasies and expectations of the audience. This is 
Hitchcock’s dilemma. As he would admit outright late in his career, 
I am a prisoner of my own success. I’m not an unwilling prisoner, but 
there are only certain types of films I can make. A thriller, a murder story, 
a film which affects the emotions of those who watch it everywhere in the 
world. … But if I made films only to please myself, they would certainly 
be different from the ones you see on the screen. They would be more 
dramatic, perhaps without humor, more realistic. The reason I continue to 




The public expects a certain type of story from me and I don’t want to 
disappoint them.259 
 
Even in a mid-career film like Saboteur, there are multiple depictions of an audience that 
sees not necessarily what is happening or what they are explicitly being shown, but 
rather, what they wish to see. We witness this dynamic in weak form in the film’s final 
minutes as Fry dangles, literally, by a thread from the Statue of Liberty’s torch. The 
close-up on his fast unraveling coat seam cuts to a long shot that reveals not only Lady 
Liberty’s blank stare, but also a half-dozen tourists gazing out contentedly from the 
statue’s visor, as oblivious as Liberty herself to the life-or-death scene playing out on the 
torch. The dynamic appears in strong form earlier at the Sutton Mansion when Barry 
approaches a distinguished-looking older guest and informs him, directly and truthfully, 
that “this whole house is a hotbed of spies and saboteurs.” Rather than entertain the idea 
that Barry might be telling the truth, the distinguished gentleman looks askance at his 
entirely sober interlocutor and replies, “What’s the matter with you, sir? You’re drunk. 
You’re not even dressed.” Earlier still in the film, Pat and Barry have stopped on the 
highway in the middle of the desert. Pat, who still distrusts Barry, hails passing motorists 
to enlist their help in contacting the police. Meanwhile, Barry attempts to use the radiator 
fan in Pat’s car to cut through the chain of his handcuffs. Just when it seems Pat will 
manage to flag down a car, the handcuff chain snaps, and Barry dashes behind the wheel 
of Pat’s vehicle. In his haste to prevent Pat from alerting the other motorists, an elderly 
couple, of his fugitive status, he nearly runs Pat over. He then leaps out of the car and 
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seizes Pat, who is obviously struggling and yelling for help, forcing her into the car while 
the elderly couple look on. As Barry speeds off with Pat shouting protests, the camera 
cuts to a two-shot of the elderly couple, still staring wide-eyed. “My,” says the woman, a 
faint smile passing over her face, “they must be terribly in love.” 
The joke, of course, is that Barry and Pat are clearly not in love at that moment, 
but they clearly will be since, first, the archetypal Hollywood film requires the production 
of the couple and, second, the archetypal Hitchcock film requires that a man and woman 
forced to spend an extended amount of time together, especially if they are both on the 
run and especially if they do not particularly like each other, must eventually fall in love. 
Originally, Hitchcock had planned to appear as the silent, elderly husband in the 
sequence just described.260 This cameo placement, of Hitchcock in the driver’s seat, could 
be interpreted as the director’s assertion of his own authority: “This couple is not in love 
at the moment, but just wait! By my authority, they soon will be, and you know it.” I 
would read the cameo differently, however—not as a testament to the director’s power to 
                                                
260 Rob Nixon, “Behind the Camera on Saboteur,” Behind the Camera, Turner Classic Movies, accessed 
February 21, 2018, http://www.tcm.com/this-month/article/220480%7C0/Behind-the-Camera-
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cannot help thinking the director was especially delighted by the idea of staging such a scene of desire, 
which would ordinarily have required some amount of spoken dialogue, through wholly visual means. 
Though the great majority of the audience would have had no idea what words Hitchcock was 




manipulate and control, but rather, as a confession of his powerlessness in the face of the 
audience’s conditioned fantasy. The audience, now embodied in the wide-eyed elderly 
woman, is determined to witness the full flowering of romantic love, even when the 
actual scene on display is one of violence, panic, and abduction. 
Little Miss Liberty Carrying the Torch 
 The Statue of Liberty, fashioned after Roman goddess Libertas, is a fitting 
endpoint for Barry’s journey, both from West to East and from the depths of the Sutton 
Mansion food cellar to the heights of the great American metropolis. Though Liberty 
Island is not geographically the easternmost point of the United States or New York City, 
when Saboteur premiered in 1942, the Statue of Liberty had for decades greeted refugees 
and other immigrants arriving from across the Atlantic to adjacent Ellis Island, the U.S.’s 
busiest immigrant reception point. The statue is not physically the tallest structure in New 
York City, but, as Liberty Enlightening the World, it represents the pinnacle of the 
American ideals that Saboteur ostensibly defends amid the turmoil of WWII. In addition, 
as mentioned above, when Fry calls Pat “Little Miss Liberty carrying the torch,” he puns 
cleverly on the statue’s official name, Liberty Enlightening the World, thereby 
identifying Pat both with the lofty ideals that define America and with the unknown 
blonde who sets the propulsive force of narrative desire in motion in the film’s opening 
minutes. Hitchcock’s penchant for overlaying the political and personal narratives often 




in an assumed battle-of-the-sexes.261 In this case, however, by so strongly identifying Pat, 
who is the dream of cinema realized, with the Statue of Liberty, Hitchcock also extends 
his commentary on the art of film in America to its logical conclusion. Formally, 
Saboteur is defined not only by horizontal movement along a y-axis (including the left to 
right of Barry’s journey as envisioned on a map) and by vertical movement along an x-
axis, but also by movement along a z-axis, whereby the flat cinematic image emerges in 
three dazzling dimensions, dissolving, for at least an illusory moment, the division 
between cinematic fantasy and lived experience. During the opening credits, the ominous 
figure like a shadow in Plato’s Cave appears to emerge from the screen. Once a two-
dimensional billboard image, Pat emerges into Barry’s story as a real person with width, 
height, and depth. Fry sends the Radio City Music Hall audience into absolute panic 
when he appears to emerge from the projected images of the film-with-the-film. And 
here, finally, at the end of Hitchcock’s film, just as Pat has emerged into three glorious 
dimensions, so the statue with which she is identified also emerges in three glorious 
dimensions, open to exploration both outside and in. 
 But in a significant sense, those three dimensions are not so glorious: The Statue 
of Liberty, an icon of the American ideal of liberty cast in the image of a Roman goddess, 
turns out to be a hollow idol. The climactic clash of Axis and Ally, embodied in the 
characters of Fry and Barry, plays out on her right hand and torch, on the very symbol of 
                                                
261 For example, after narrowly escaping police detection and settling down for the night in a circus caravan, 
Pat tells Barry that she now believes his claim to innocence. When Barry wonders aloud at this sudden 
reversal, Pat replies, “It’s a free country. A girl can change her mind, can’t she?” Thus, the overriding 
concern of the political narrative—that America and her allies should prevail and libertas should be 




that which makes the invisible visible, yet she continues to stare blankly ahead, as 
oblivious to the dramatic World-War-in-miniature as the tourists peering out from her 
crown. If, as I have argued, the various idols that appear in Blackmail’s thrilling British 
Museum chase sequence signify the cumulative weight of British imperial tradition, and 
the cumulative techniques of cinematic tradition that Hitchcock had culled from the finest 
international filmmakers, the idol at the end of Saboteur signifies, in its hollowness and 
blank stare, the effacement of history and artistic tradition with which the artist is 
confronted in the commodified American landscape of ascendant global capitalism and 
pervasive advertisement. In Saboteur’s historical moment of production, with the world 
engaged in both a global war and a global socio-economic paradigm shift, established 
means of narrative closure in general and cinematic closure in particular (i.e., the 
production of the couple) could no longer offer the sense of absolute certainty they once 
did. Barry and Pat are denied their final kiss, and viewers who take time to ponder this 
peculiar lack are faced with doubtful shadows looming at the edge of liberty’s light. 
Shadow of a Doubt 
Though Saboteur (1942) is not the first film Hitchcock made in the United States, 
it is his first American film in that it is the first set entirely in America and the first to 
employ an all-American cast. Shadow of a Doubt (1943), however, is the first to examine 
closely the specifically American incarnation of the fundamental unit of society under 
capitalism: the bourgeois nuclear family. By introducing cosmopolitan Uncle Charlie 
Oakley into the Newton’s small-town Santa Rosa home, Hitchcock exposes the 




Many key motifs present in Saboteur return in Shadow of a Doubt. For example, 
the Sutton Mansion dance scene, which signifies the return of the historical repressed in 
the form of an aristocratic Victorian ball, manifests in Shadow of a Doubt as recurring 
Victorian waltz sequence. In Shadow of a Doubt, however, the dance sequence is entirely 
extra-diegetic, and if it does bear direct relation to the main narrative, it is only as a 
mental construct passed between the two Charlies, who are dual images of a single 
psyche. This near total severing of a key recurring sequence from the main narrative 
reflects the atomization of both society and the individual under nascent global 
capitalism. 
In Shadow of a Doubt, Hitchcock shifts his focus to the pathologically sick 
individual—in this case, Uncle Charlie—which will become a recurring theme in the 
director’s later work. Some critics, such as Slavoj Žižek, have correctly attributed this 
shift to the ever-increasing alienation of the individual under global capitalism.262 
However, no critic has yet realized that Uncle Charlie is sick in precisely the way that 
makes him the instantiation of the dark side of the fantasy of capitalism, according to 
which value is determined by productivity. The capitalist mode of production, which in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries produced both the middle class and the cultural 
emphasis on the nuclear family as the foundation of civil society, dictates woman’s 
position of productivity, and hence her identity, as either wife or mother. As Emma 
Newton tearfully reminds her family and assembled guests, “I got married, and then, you 
know how it is. You sort of forget you’re you. You’re your husband’s wife” (and, by 
                                                




extension, his children’s mother). When a woman no longer fulfills either of these roles, 
she is, figuratively speaking, dead. In murdering rich widows, Uncle Charlie simply 
literalizes the dark logic of capitalism. 
Uncle Charlie’s arrival in Santa Rosa is marked by one of the most famous 
symbols in all of Hitchcock’s films: as the train pulls into the station, prodigious plumes 
of black smoke billow from the locomotive’s engine. Thus, just as the dark shadow and 
the creeping smoke of Saboteur’s credit and opening sequences suggest invasion by a 
menacing foreign agent, so the dark, foreign contaminant that fills Santa Rosa’s clear air 
portends the intrusion of an ominous force that does not belong in the idyllic town. Yet, 
as the literalization of the fantasy of capitalism, the psychotic Uncle Charlie does belong 
there (the town square is dominated by a massive Bank of America, after all). By pushing 
the fantasy to its breaking point, Uncle Charlie’s sickness draws attention to capitalism’s 
obscene imperative whereby widows, who no longer produce value as mothers or wives, 
are simply dead weight in the system. 
The symbolism of the train, and its connection to Uncle Charlie’s sickness, is not 
exhausted by its smoke. During his cross-country journey, Charlie conceals himself in a 
private compartment, with curtain drawn, so that neither we nor the other passengers can 
peek inside. After the porter calls through the curtain to ensure “Mr. Otis” (Charlie’s 
chosen alias) is ready to disembark at Santa Rosa, a fellow passenger, who is playing 
bridge with her husband and another man, alerts the porter that her husband is a doctor 
and asks whether there’s anything he could do to help the ailing Mr. Otis. “No, ma’am,” 




myself since we first got on the train.” As the porter is speaking, the doctor gazes 
intensely at the other player, whose face we cannot see, sitting across the table. “Well,” 
says the doctor, “you don’t look very well either.” The camera cuts to close-up on the 
man’s hand: straight spades, sequentially arranged from 2 to ace. 
The joke, of course, is that the man with his back to the camera, the one holding 
all the cards (both proverbially and, more or less, literally), is Hitchcock. As many critics 
have noted, by identifying Hitchcock’s immense directorial power with sickness, the film 
implies that the “very sick” Uncle Charlie also somehow partakes of or instantiates that 
cinematic power.263 I agree with this analysis, but I also think critics have yet to realize the 
extent to which Uncle Charlie is to be identified with Hitchcock’s cinema. I argue that 
Uncle Charlie’s alias, “Mr. Otis,” is an anagram for mortis,264 the Latin genitive singular 
of “death” or “annihilation.” As a serial killer, Uncle Charlie is certainly a harbinger of 
death for his victims. On an even more fundamental level, however, he is the element that 
is paradoxically both integral to and excluded from the Symbolic Order of the narrative 
                                                
263 See, for example, William Rothman, Hitchcock: The Murderous Gaze, 2nd ed. (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 
2012), 195. First edition published in 1982 by Harvard University Press. 
264 Throughout his career, Hitchcock continually demonstrated a fondness for play with the signifier: e.g., the 
recurring bird puns as the camera soars over the Thames, into the midst of a riverside environmentalist 
rally, and over to Covent Garden (Frenzy, 1972); Roger Thornhill’s monogrammed “ROT” matchbox, with 
its middle initial that stands for “nothing” (North by Northwest, 1959); the elusive Ambrose Chappell, 
taxidermist, who is mistaken for the elusive Ambrose Chapel, Bayswater (The Man Who Knew Too Much, 
1956); the cigarette lighter inscribed with “A to G,” suggesting both “Anne to Guy” and “Antony to Guy” 
(Strangers on a Train, 1951); the intricate dreamwork of the Dali dream sequence that encodes the secret of 
John Ballantyne’s trauma (Spellbound, 1945); Beaky and Johnnie’s murderous game of anagrams 
(Suspicion, 1941); the curious establishing shot of an open dictionary and subsequent zooming-in on the 
entry for sabotage (Sabotage, 1936). Hitchcock’s first job in the (silent) film industry, title-card designer, 
instilled in him a keen appreciation for the materiality of words. For young Hitchcock’s account of the 
“many elements that go to the making of picture titles,” see Alfred Hitchcock, “Titles—Artistic and 
Otherwise,” in Hitchcock on Hitchcock: Selected Writings and Interviews, ed. Sidney Gottlieb, vol. 2, 101-




(and integral precisely because it is excluded), which is defined by ascendant global 
capitalism. As such, Charlie Oakley instantiates within the world of the film the film’s 
own Death Drive.  
Throughout much silent film and into early sound film, and in Hitchcock’s work 
in particular, the train repeatedly functions as a symbol of cinematic narrative and the 
mechanized cinematic apparatus.265 In Shadow of a Doubt the train is associated with the 
power and process of cinema not only by the presence of the director and the overt 
holding-all-the-cards visual pun, but also by the window placed prominently in the frame 
between Hitchcock and the woman intent on helping “that poor soul” Mr. Otis. The 
moving image framed by the window is conspicuously suggestive of a projected motion 
picture—and of course, that’s exactly what it is: rear projection creating the illusion of 
motion on a sound stage. In addition, directly prior to this interior train sequence, when 
Uncle Charlie’s niece Charlotte (i.e., Little Charlie) discovers that her uncle is already on 
his way to Santa Rosa, she leaves the telegraph office beaming. She is convinced that he 
has telepathically received her invitation before she has had the chance to send it: “He 
heard me. He heard me,” she says. As she advances along the sidewalk toward the 
camera, her image dissolves to that of the oncoming train, thereby indicating that Little 
Charlie’s narrative advancement—that is, her process of maturation in this bildung film 
narrative—corresponds to the advancement of the train and its defining “very sick” 
passengers, Uncle Charlie and Hitchcock.  
                                                
265 For a detailed account of the relation of railroad technology to cinema technology and cinematic 
perception, as well as the important role trains played in early film, see Lynne Kirby, Parallel Tracks: The 




Just as the train that brings Uncle Charlie into Santa Rosa is an engine of death, so 
too is the train that carries him away. At the end of the film, when Uncle Charlie prevents 
his niece from stepping off the train before it leaves the station, he takes her hand in his 
and implores her “to forget all about me; forget I ever came to Santa Rosa.” Little Charlie 
glances down, then back at her uncle, her expression of bewilderment fast replaced by 
terror. “Your hands!” she gasps, indicating a change, as though the motion of the train 
has triggered an autonomous impulse that now grips Uncle Charlie and manifests in his 
altered grip on her wrist.266 Their struggle by the open doorway, during which the camera 
lingers on their entwined legs, is both highly sexualized and reminiscent of the extra-
diegetic waltzing sequence interspersed throughout the film. When Uncle Charlie 
whispers the innuendo-laden, “Not yet, Charlie. Let it get a little faster. Just a little faster. 
Faster,” the commands alternate with shots of the train tracks. Thus, Uncle Charlie’s 
psychotic drive, which is ambiguously murderous and suicidal, is also aligned with the 
fundamental rhythms of classic film editing, whereby the increasingly rapid alternation of 
images generates suspense. The train setting is particularly apropos since it evokes the 
earliest parallel editing experiments of D.W. Griffith, who established and perfected the 
suspense-inducing technique in his many proto-western shorts during the first decade of 
the twentieth century. At the actual moment of Uncle Charlie’s death, as he plunges onto 
                                                
266 Throughout the film, Uncle Charlie’s hands seem to act independently of his conscious mind. The 
morning after he arrives in Santa Rosa, for example, we see him eating breakfast in bed. As he picks up a 
piece of toast, Emma announces that a young man has called about coming to the house to interview 
everyone. Uncle Charlie’s cheerful expression suddenly hardens and grows distant. The low-angle shot 
centers his hands near the bottom of the screen as he slowly and distractedly rips his toast in half. More 
obvious still is the later scene in the ‘Til-Two Bar when, moments away from condemning the world as a 
“foul sty,” Uncle Charlie disturbs his niece by absent-mindedly twisting his napkin. In another scene, we 
see him gazing out an upstairs window at Little Charlie. The camera pans down to his hands, which drop a 




the tracks in front of the oncoming train, the image of the waltzing couples is 
superimposed, along with the accompanying music, one last time, signifying that Uncle 
Charlie’s destruction of self is a natural extension of the murderous tendencies he had 
directed outward at so many others. In addition, as the entwining of legs and suggestive 
whispering indicate, Uncle Charlie’s murder-suicide is also a kind of consummation. The 
dark fantasy of capitalism has not died with him.  
Despite the film’s romantic resolution in the coupling of Little Charlie and 
Detective Graham, the ending is disturbing and cynical. Uncle Charlie’s reputation 
remains in tact,267 thanks in no small part to Little Charlie, and though the latter preserves 
the illusion of the good uncle not for the sake of respectability, but rather out of love for 
her mother, the fundamental dishonesty of the bourgeois nuclear family as an institution 
will continue, in the implied marriage of Detective Graham and Little Charlie and in 
general. As Little Charlie reflects on her uncle’s bleak opinion of the world and the 
nature of humanity, Detective Graham attempts to comfort her: “Well, it’s not quite as 
bad as that, but sometimes it needs a lot of watching. It seems to go crazy every now and 
then. Like your Uncle Charlie.” Graham’s attempt at consolation is unsettling. Yes, Uncle 
Charlie did need “a lot of watching” (to put it mildly); even so, an earlier exchange 
between the two men comes to mind. Leaving the Newton household ostensibly for the 
last time, Detective Graham is admonished by Uncle Charlie: “And don’t take any more 
photographs without permission. Rights of man. You know, freedom?” Graham replies, 
                                                
267 The final line of the film is spoken by the unseen priest presiding over Uncle Charlie’s funeral service. Of 
Uncle Charlie and other loved ones lost, the priest affirms, “the beauty of their souls, the sweetness of their 




“We’ll have a talk about freedom some day, Mr. Oakley.” Uncle Charlie’s appeal to 
individual liberty—bolstered by the reference to Thomas Paine’s revolutionary treatise on 
the inalienable rights of the individual and the imperative to overturn any government 
that violates those rights—invokes the founding ethos of the United States of America 
and stands in uneasy opposition to Graham’s insistence on a surveillance state. Uncle 
Charlie embodies a contradiction at the core of the American experience, and his death 
does nothing to resolve that contradiction. 
There is no human statue in Shadow of a Doubt that constitutes an idol. Instead, 
idol status is split between the enormous Bank of America that looms over Santa Rosa’s 
town square and Uncle Charlie, who also produces enormous amounts of money, 
executes the totalizing logic of America as Bank, and is idolized not just by Little Charlie 
and Emma, but by nearly everyone in the town. Emma emphasizes Uncle Charlie’s star 
status when she informs him of the men supposedly from the “National Public Survey”: 
“You’re not the only celebrity in this town. The whole family’s gonna be in the 
limelight.” Uncle Charlie is Hitchcock’s ideal actor, one who shuns celebrity (he will not 
allow his picture to be taken) and presents a neutral façade onto which others can project 
their fantasies. Uncle Charlie also signifies a turning point in Hitchcock’s filmmaking 
after which Hitchcock will, in ever more fractured, atomized, post-modern settings, 
increasingly focus on the phenomenon of the celebrity idol identified also as sculpted or 
crafted idol.268 Thus, in a scene from Spellbound (which Selznick, not Hitchcock, insisted 
                                                
268 Brigitte Peucker reads the sculptures and paintings that appear throughout Hitchcock’s oeuvre as 
manifestations of the disavowal and displacement of the male’s dual attraction-repulsion toward the 




on cutting),269 Ingrid Bergman becomes the statue of a classical goddess; in Vertigo, Kim 
Novak as Judy is meticulously remade in the image of Kim Novak as Madeline; in North 
by Northwest, Carry Grant’s sculpted visage is repeatedly identified through 
shot/counter-shot sequences with the faces of Mount Rushmore. 
If the analysis begun in this chapter were extended into the next phase of 
Hitchcock’s career, it would have to contend with the Hollywood star system, and 
particularly the close-up on the film star’s face, as a symptom of commodification, 
instance of reification, and additional means for the director to reassert authorial control.270 
Concluding, however, with Shadow of a Doubt, Hitchcock’s in-depth exploration of the 
American bourgeois nuclear family and the emerging global-capitalist system that 
sustains it, I would like to linger on the figure of the train, that long-established signifier 
of cinema and the unstoppable, mechanized forward thrust of modernity. As a filmmaker, 
Hitchcock had at his disposal the moving image, an ideal toward which his literary 
predecessors could strive, but never wholly achieve. Joseph Conrad openly disdained 
film, yet his process of retroactive modification—an image-making technique that 
                                                                                                                                            
plot, mask a continuous preoccupation with the stasis of sculpture and painting, suggestive of and displaced 
by the death around which every Hitchcock plot inevitably turns. In many instances, it is the body of the 
woman that is fragmented or dismembered, conflated with the ‘dead’ space of the pictorial or with the 
sculptural fragment, and most intimately bound up with the uncanny and paradoxical capacity of cinema 
both to fragment the body and to animate it.” Brigitte Peucker, “The Cut of Representation: Painting and 
Sculpture in Hitchcock,” in Alfred Hitchcock: Centenary Essays, ed. Richard Allen and S. Ishii-Gonzalès, 
141. Peucker’s short analyses of specific scenes from the films are often insightful, if occasionally 
problematic. 
269 Leonard J. Leff, Hitchcock and Selznick: The Rich and Strange Collaboration of Alfred Hitchcock and 
David O. Selznick in Hollywood (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987), 165. Leff quotes Ingrid 
Bergman briefly on the deleted statue scene in Spellbound. For a more detailed description of this scene, 
see Donald Spoto, The Art of Alfred Hitchcock: Fifty Years of His Motion Pictures, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Anchor Books, 1992), 143. 
270 Fredric Jameson touches briefly on these issues in “Allegorizing Hitchcock,” in Signatures of the Visible 




continually loops back on itself, thus destabilizing the image and subverting the effects of 
reification—clearly attempts to render a figure in continuous motion. At the core of Oscar 
Wilde’s Salomé stirs a gesture of disavowal, whereby the key motif of idolatry is both 
asserted and denied. This dialectical shuttering back and forth expands outward, through 
imagery and allusion, generating a complex network of oppositions continuously 
transvalued. While it is true that Wilde could stage his drama (in France, at least), the 
theater does not afford an artist the extraordinary level of control the filmmaker 
commands over what and how an audience sees. For filmmaker Hitchcock, the structure 
of Shadow of a Doubt suggests an auteur in near absolute control of his craft.271 And yet, 
in this film whose complicated villain seeks to revive the fantasy of an idealized past in a 
present dominated by the Bank of/as America, the insistent forward thrust of the train, 
whose rhythms are identified with the fundamental rhythms of cinema and the relentless 
pulsions of the Drive, is inescapable. Though that Drive is of a piece with Uncle Charlie, 
it also exceeds the bounds of his ego and elicits a death wish that enjoins even a master of 
his craft to choose the inevitable and submit to the world-historical forces that determine 
the conceivable contours of his and every other art.  
                                                
271 The most meticulous expositor of Hitchcock’s seemingly absolute mastery in crafting Shadow of a Doubt 
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